Tag Archives: Sentencing

Abstracts and Minutes, Sentencing

Case: 000438

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

We agree with the defendant that the trial court erred in calculating his sentence, and we therefore remand for a full resentencing. At that resentencing, the trial court may revisit the aggravating factors, so we decline to decide today the defendant’s challenge to one aggravating factor. We likewise decline to decide whether the victim’s mother and sister were properly named as protected persons on the criminal protective order, as the trial court must also determine the scope of the protective order in fully resentencing the defendant.

There were also errors in the minute order and the abstract of judgment because they reflected imposition of multiple fines that were not imposed in the court’s oral pronouncement.

First Holding:

It was error for the court to sentence the defendant under section 667.71 and also sentence him to a determine term. Section 667.71, also known as the “Two Strikes” law, provides that a habitual sexual offender shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for 25 years to life. A habitual sexual offender is defined as a person who has been previously convicted of one or more of certain specified offenses and who is convicted in the present proceeding of one of those offenses. Among the specified offenses is lewd or lascivious act in violation of section 288(a).

The Two Strikes law is an alternative sentencing scheme for specified sexual offenses. Unlike a sentence enhancement, which imposes an additional term of imprisonment added to the base term, the Two Strikes law sets forth an alternate penalty for the underlying felony itself when the defendant has satisfied specified conditions. In other words, the trial court may either sentence the defendant under the penalty specified in the underlying statute or based on the Two Strikes law, but not both.

Authority:

People v. Lopez (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 355, 360

People v. Murphy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 136, 155

People v. Acosta (2002) 29 Cal.4th 105, 118 [discussing One Strike law]

Second Holding:

Because we find the trial court’s sentence as to count 2 is unauthorized, we remand for a full resentencing as to all counts to allow the trial court to exercise its sentencing discretion in light of the changed circumstances.

Authority:

People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893

Third Holding:

As there were errors in the minute order and abstract of judgment listing multiple fines that were not imposed in the oral pronouncement of judgment, we trust the court’s minutes and abstract of judgment will track the court’s oral pronouncement on remand.

Authority:

People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 389 [Rendition of the judgment is normally an oral pronouncement, and the abstract of judgment cannot add to, or modify, the judgment, but only purports to digest and summarize it]

Abstracts and Minutes, Fines and fees, Sentencing

Case: 000437

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The abstract of judgment incorrectly indicates a restitution fine of $3,400 to be paid, rather than the $2,400 imposed by the trial court. It must be corrected.

Holding:

[GARY NOTE: The court cited no authority for its order directing the trial court to correct the abstract of judgment–likely because the legal principle is well-established and seems obvious–but there is plenty of authority, which I cite below.]

Authority:

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185 [holding reviewing courts have the inherent power on appeal to correct clerical errors found in court records, such as may be found in abstracts of judgment, whether on the court’s own motion or upon application of the parties]

People v. Jones (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1, 89

People v. Baker (2021) 10 Cal.5th 1044, 1109 [court has inherent power to correct clerical errors in abstract of judgment]

Abstracts and Minutes, Fines and fees, Sentencing

Case: 000436

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The abstract of judgment is incorrect in that it indicates that the trial court imposed a restitution fund fine of $330 pursuant to section 1202.4 but at sentencing the trial court stated that the amount of that fine was $300. It must be corrected.

Holding:

Where there is a discrepancy between the oral pronouncement of judgment and the minute order or the abstract of judgment, the oral pronouncement controls.

Authority:

People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 385

Duty of the court, Sentencing

Case: 000435

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

We remand for the trial court to modify the judgment to reflect an additional five days of presentence custody credit.

Holding:

The defendant is entitled to all days of custody, and there was an error in the trial court’s calculation.

Authority:

PEN 2900.5

Discretion, Sentencing, Standard of review

Case: 000434

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

At the hearing on resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.75, the trial court abused its discretion in denying the defendant a continuance to obtain documents from the California Department of Corrections (CDCR). We conclude that the error prejudiced defendant because the trial court lacked potential information relevant to exercising its discretion. Additionally, the record does not show that when it denied the requested continuance, the court understood the full scope of its discretion. We reverse the judgment and remand for a new resentencing hearing.

First Holding:

Section 1172.75(a) provides that any sentence enhancement that was imposed prior to January 1, 2020, under section 667.5(b), except for any enhancement imposed for a prior conviction for a sexually violent offense as defined in Welfare and Institutions Code section 6600(b)is legally invalid.

Section 1172.75(d)(3) provides that the court may consider postconviction factors, including, but not limited to, the disciplinary record and record of rehabilitation of the defendant while incarcerated, evidence that reflects whether age, time served, and diminished physical condition, if any, have reduced the defendant’s risk for future violence, and evidence that reflects that circumstances have changed since the original sentencing so that continued incarceration is no longer in the interest of justice. Where defendant’s original sentence included a now-invalid sentencing enhancement the resentencing court must provide a full resentencing hearing.

Authority:

PEN 1172.75

People v. Monroe (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 393, 402

Second Holding:

We review a trial court’s denial of a continuance for abuse of discretion. In reviewing the decision to deny a continuance, one factor to consider is whether a continuance would be useful. Here, a continuance was merited because it would have allowed defense counsel to obtain potential evidence relevant to resentencing from the CDCR. The People did not oppose the requested continuance. The burden of a continuance was minimal because there would have been no need to reschedule witnesses or consider juror inconvenience.

We do not agree that the denial of a continuance was harmless. The record does not indicate the court understood the extent of its discretion when it denied the continuance. The court incorrectly stated that its only discretion was whether to strike the additional 25-to-life gun allegation, when in fact the court had discretion to reduce the 25-year-term to impose a lesser included enhancement.

Authority:

People v. Mungia (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1101, 1118

People v. Grajeda (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 829, 839–840

People v. McDavid (2024) 15 Cal.5th 1015, 1020–1021, 1030 [trial court has discretion to strike enhancement and impose lesser included sec. 12022.53 enhancement or other lesser included enhancement]

Third Holding:

Section 1050(b) generally requires a written motion to request a continuance, but section 1050(c) states that, notwithstanding subdivision (b), a party may make a motion for a continuance without complying with the requirements of that subdivision, albeit absent a showing good cause, sanctions may be imposed.

Authority:

PEN 1050

Amelioration, Elements of crime, Sentencing, Standard of review, Sufficiency of and substantial evidence, Vicarious liability

Case: 000432

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

It was error to deny the petition for recall of sentence for attempted murder under section 1172.6 because there was insufficient evidence of intent to kill. We reverse the order denying the petition and remand the matter with directions for the trial court to grant the resentencing petition, vacate the attempted murder conviction, and resentence on the remaining charges.

First Holding:

The Legislature enacted SB 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) to eliminate the natural and probable consequences doctrine and to limit application of the felony murder rule. Except in cases of felony murder, a principal must act with malice aforethought to be convicted of murder, and malice shall not be imputed to a person based solely on his or her participation in a crime. A defendant convicted of murder or attempted murder under a now-invalid theory may petition the sentencing court to have his or her conviction vacated and to be resentenced on any remaining counts under section 1172.6.

Authority:

PEN 188(a)(3)

People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 448–449

People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 708

Second Holding:

At the evidentiary hearing, the prosecution bears the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of murder or attempted murder under a currently valid theory. If the prosecution fails to sustain its burden of proof, the prior conviction, and any allegations and enhancements attached to the conviction, shall be vacated and the petitioner shall be resentenced on the remaining charges.

Authority:

PEN 1172.6(d)(3)

Third Holding:

We review the trial court’s factual findings following a section 1172.6(d) hearing for substantial evidence. We review the entire record in the light most favorable to the court’s order to determine whether any rational trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

Authority:

People v. Clements (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 276, 298

People v. Manibusan (2013) 58 Cal.4th 40, 87

Fourth Holding:

To prove the crime of attempted murder, the prosecution must establish ‘the specific intent to kill and the commission of a direct but ineffectual act toward accomplishing the intended killing. To be guilty of attempted murder, the defendant must intend to kill the alleged victim, not someone else. A defendant cannot be convicted of attempting to kill someone if the defendant is not aware that person is present. Because direct evidence of a defendant’s intent is rare, intent to kill may be inferred from the defendant’s acts and the circumstances of the crime.

Authority:

People v. Canizales (2019) 7 Cal.5th 591, 602

People v. Mumin (2023) 15 Cal.5th 176, 191

People v. Ibarra (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 1070, 1079

People v. Smith (2005) 37 Cal.4th 733, 741

Fifth Holding:

A defendant may be convicted of attempted murder as a direct aider and abettor. To be convicted under such a theory, the defendant must give aid or encouragement with knowledge of the direct perpetrator’s intent to kill and with the purpose of facilitating the direct perpetrator’s accomplishment of the intended killing—which means that the person guilty of attempted murder as an aider and abettor must intend to kill.

Authority:

People v. Nguyen (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1015, 1054

Sixth Holding:

Without any evidence that someone inside the co-defendant’s car targeted or otherwise shot at another person when they fired the underlying shots, we can only speculate as to whether the defendant acted with the intent to kill. Speculation is not substantial evidence.

Authority:

People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 735

Seventh Holding:

The trial court also improperly relied on its own experience as a former gang prosecutor when it denied the petition, noting that it had prosecuted several cases against members of a gang in the 1990’s in explaining why it found that the defendant acted with the intent to kill. The court’s personal experience is not evidence.

Authority:

Abatti v. Imperial Irrigation Dist. (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 236, 286

Eighth Holding:

When admitting a sentencing enhancement, the defendant admits only the facts necessary to establish the enhancement’s elements.

Authority:

People v. Estrada (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 328, 338

Duty of the court, Sentencing

Case: 000431

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The superior court abused its sentencing discretion by imposing a midterm sentence in the absence of any indication that the superior court was aware of the requirements of section 1170(b)(6) regarding a lower-term presumption where the defendant makes a showing of childhood trauma sufficient to trigger the presumption. We reverse the judgment and remand the matter for a new sentencing hearing

First Holding:

In relevant part, section 1170(b)(6), provides that, unless the court finds that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances that imposition of the lower term would be contrary to the interests of justice, the court shall order imposition of the lower term if the following was a contributing factor in the commission of the offense: (A) The person has experienced psychological, physical, or childhood trauma, including, but not limited to, abuse, neglect, exploitation, or sexual violence. Here, as the Attorney General concedes, the defendant made a sufficient showing in this respect, thus triggering the lower term presumption. The contested issue, then, is whether the superior court actually found that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances that imposition of the lower term would be contrary to the interests of justice.

Authority:

PEN 1170(b)(6)

Second Holding:

On the present record, we cannot conclude the court made that finding. First, the court did not expressly conduct the inquiry that would allow such a finding to be made: The court neither referred to section 1170(b)(6), nor invoked its language. Second, the record does not affirmatively show compliance with the statutory sentencing mandate, as is required when the court has not expressly complied. The court’s averment that “looking at the mitigating factors is where you start nowadays” is too vague to be an affirmative indication that the court was aware that the lower term was presumptive.

Similarly, the court’s decision to select the midterm after referring to aggravating factors is different from a finding that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors, as is required to defeat the presumption in favor the lower-term sentence. Indeed, on the sentencing form signed by the sentencing judge, no marking has been made on the field that reads, “[25] Aggravation factors outweigh those in mitigation,” even though several other fields on the form are marked. In short, this record gives us no reason to believe the court complied with section 1170(b)(6).

Authority:

People v. Fredrickson (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 984, 991 [the record must affirmatively show compliance with a statutory sentencing mandate whenever the mandate has been triggered by an initial showing of the applicability of the statute]

Juveniles, Sentencing

Case: 000428

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The juvenile court’s review of the probation report and relation motions before determining jurisdiction was prejudicial error and merits reversal.

First Holding:

The history of section 701 indicates that the Legislature intended to create a bifurcated juvenile court procedure in which the court would first determine whether the facts of the case would support the jurisdiction of the court in declaring wardship and thereafter would consider the social study report at a hearing on the appropriate disposition of that ward. The primary purpose of the jurisdictional hearing “is to determine whether sufficient evidence exists to declare the minor a ward of the juvenile court. If the court finds that the minor is a person described in section 602, the court must determine whether the minor’s offense would be a misdemeanor or a felony if committed by an adult. The court then proceeds to hold a disposition hearing.

Authority:

WIC 701

In re Gladys R. (1970) 1 Cal.3d 855, 859

In re P.A. (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 23, 31–32

Second Holding:

At the jurisdictional hearing, the admission and exclusion of evidence shall be pursuant to the rules of evidence established by the Evidence Code and by judicial decision. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt supported by evidence, legally admissible in the trial of criminal cases, must be adduced to support a finding that the minor is a person described by [Welfare & Institutions Code] [s]ection 602. Rule 5.780(c) further provides that the juvenile court must not read or consider any portion of a probation report relating to the contested petition before or during a contested jurisdiction hearing.

Authority:

WIC 701

Rules of Court, rule 5.780(c)

Third Holding:

The juvenile court’s erroneous consideration of a probation report before determining jurisdiction is reviewed for harmless error under Watson. Under that standard, we determine whether it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of the error.

Authority:

People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836

Fourth Holding:

An objection is sufficient if it fairly apprises the trial court of the issue it is being called upon to decide. In a criminal case, the objection will be deemed preserved if, despite inadequate phrasing, the record shows that the court understood the issue presented. In any event, to the extent the court did not understand the issue based on its colloquy with counsel, we exercise our discretion to reach the merits.

Authority:

People v. Scott (1978) 21 Cal.3d 284, 290

People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161, fn. 6 [An appellate court is generally not prohibited from reaching a question that has not been preserved for review by a party]

Fifth Holding:

Invited error bars a claim on appeal when a defendant, for tactical reasons, makes a request acceded to by the trial court and claims on appeal that the court erred in granting the request.

Authority:

People v. Russell (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1228, 1250

Sixth Holding:

If the jurisdictional facts presented at the hearing are far from conclusive, the juvenile court’s review of the probation report prior to determining jurisdiction constitutes prejudicial error. Thus, if the determination of jurisdiction is made by closely balanced evidence, reversal is proper.

Authority:

In re Gladys R. (1970) 1 Cal.3d 855, 862

In re James B. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 862, 875

Abstracts and Minutes, Equal protection, Fines and fees, Sentencing

Case: 000427

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The matter is remanded for limited resentencing proceedings concerning the imposition of mandatory ancillary costs under Penal Code section 1465.8 and Government Code section 70373, both of which were omitted from the trial court’s original oral sentencing pronouncements.

First Holding:

The sentencing hearing transcript shows the trial court only imposed restitution and parole revocation fines, both in the amount of $500. The court purported to waive all fees and other fines without providing an explanation. Yet, the minute order and the indeterminate abstract of judgment indicate an imposed $200 court security fee pursuant to Penal Code section 1465.8, as well as a $150 criminal conviction assessment pursuant to Government Code section 70373.

The court security fee and the criminal conviction assessment are properly characterized as ancillary costs. That is, they are funding mechanisms created by the Legislature to raise funds for court operations and facilities; they are not punitive in nature. Imposition of these ancillary costs is mandatory for every criminal conviction except parking offenses. However, due to a robust fee waiver system in civil cases for the same types of ancillary costs, the unavailability of a fee waiver in criminal cases violates equal protection guarantees. Upon request by a criminal defendant, a trial court must consider a defendant’s inability to pay before imposing a court operations assessment under section 1465.8(a)(1) or a court facilities assessment under Government Code section 70373(a)(1). This includes allowing the parties to present and contest any relevant evidence or argument on the question.

Authority:

People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1, 11, 14-15, 26-27, 30

Second Holding:

[Gary Note: The court sidestepped the issue because it remanded for a Kopp hearing, but oral pronouncements prevail over written orders. The court has the authority to order corrections where the abstract of judgment or minute order does not reflect exactly what the court ordered. Had the court decided to order the correction, there are many cases it could have chosen from as authority. I have set forth a few below. Again, the discrepancy was moot in this case.]

Authority:

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185

People v. Delgado (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1059, 1070

People v. Leon (2020) 8 Cal.5th 831, 855

In re Black (1967) 66 Cal.2d 881, 890

People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 385

People v. Farell (2002) 28 Cal.4th 381, 384, fn. 2

Abstracts and Minutes, Sentencing

Case: 000426

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

It was error for the jury to convict defendant of counts 1 and 2, which appeared to be based on the same facts. The conviction on count 2 should be stricken. Further, counts 1 and 3 were part of an indivisible course of conduct with the same intent and objective, and section 654 therefor applies. And the abstract of judgment must be amended to reflect the correct count number for one of the counts.

First Holding:

The record shows that defendant was charged with kidnapping for ransom (PC 209(a)) in count 1 and kidnapping (sec. 207(a)) in count 2. The jury acquitted him of counts 1 and 2 as charged and found him guilty of false imprisonment (sec. 237(a)) as a lesser included offense on both counts. During closing argument and again at sentencing, the prosecutor acknowledged that counts 1 and 2 were charged in the alternative and were based on the same facts. Section 954 authorizes multiple convictions for different or distinct offenses, but does not permit multiple convictions for a different statement of the same offense when it is based on the same act or course of conduct. The conviction on count 2 should be stricken.

Authority:

PEN 954

People v. Vidana (2016) 1 Cal.5th 632, 650

Second Holding:

Section 654(a) provides, in pertinent part, that an act or omission that is punishable in different ways by different provisions of law may be punished under either of such provisions, but in no case shall the act or omission be punished under more than one provision. It precludes multiple punishments for a single act or indivisible course of conduct.The purpose of section 654 is to prevent multiple punishment for a single act or omission or indivisible course of conduct, even though that act or omission or indivisible course of conduct violates more than one statute and thus constitutes more than one crime.

Authority:

PEN 654

People v. Hester (2000) 22 Cal.4th 290, 294-295

People v. Liu (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1119, 1135

Third Holding:

It is defendant’s intent and objective, not the temporal proximity of his offenses, which determine whether the transaction is indivisible. If all of the offenses were merely incidental to, or were the means of accomplishing or facilitating one objective, the defendant may be found to have harbored a single intent and therefore may be punished only once. But if the defendant acts with multiple criminal objectives that are independent of, and not merely incidental to, each other, he may be punished for separate violations, even though the violations shared common acts or were part of an otherwise indivisible course of conduct. Thus, the principal inquiry in each case is whether the defendant’s criminal intent and objective were single or multiple. Each case must be determined on its own facts. The trial court has broad latitude in determining whether section 654(a) applies in a given case.

Authority:

People v. Harrison (1989) 48 Cal.3d 321, 335

People v. Richardson (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 1203, 1214

People v. Liu (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1119, 1135-1136

People v. Garcia (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1550, 15

Fourth Holding:

A court’s determination, express or implied, that two crimes were separate, involving separate objectives, under section 654 is a question of fact we review for substantial evidence. We review the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment and will affirm the court’s sentencing decision if it is supported by substantial evidence.

Authority:

People v. Richardson (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 1203, 1214

Fifth Holding:

Gratuitous violence against a helpless and unresisting victim has traditionally been viewed as not incidental to robbery for purposes of section 654. Section 654 cannot, and should not, be stretched to cover gratuitous violence or other criminal acts far beyond those reasonably necessary to accomplish the original offense.

Authority:

People v. Nguyen (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 181, 190-191

Sixth Holding:

So long as some substantial evidence to support the implied finding exists, there can be no reversal. Where the court made no express findings on the issue, a finding that the crimes were divisible is implicit in the judgment and must be upheld if supported by substantial evidence. Under this standard, the appellate court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s finding and presume the existence of every fact the trial court could reasonably deduce from the record.

Authority:

People v. Ibarra (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 1070, 1083

People v. Vasquez (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 732, 737

Seventh Holding:

We note a clerical error. Generally, a clerical error is one inadvertently made. Clerical errors can be made by a clerk, by counsel, or by the court itself. A court has the inherent power to correct clerical errors in its records at any time so as to make these records reflect the true facts. The abstract of judgment for the indeterminate term lists the assault with a deadly weapon as count 5; however, the assault was count 4 and should be listed as such.

Authority:

People v. Schultz (1965) 238 Cal.App.2d 804, 808

In re Candelario (1970) 3 Cal.3d 702, 705

Abstracts and Minutes, Fines and fees, Sentencing

Case: 000425

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

Having been sentenced to a term of life without the possibility of parole (LWOP) and an indeterminate sentence of 25 years to life, it was error to impose the parole revocation restitution fine. The abstract of judgment also must be corrected to reflect the custody credits awarded at the sentencing hearing.

First Holding:

Section 1202.45(a), provides that the court shall assess a parole revocation restitution fine in every case where a person is convicted of a crime and his or her sentence includes a period of parole. This parole revocation fine statute, however, does not apply in cases where the defendant is sentenced to LWOP and indeterminate terms. The parole revocation fine shall be stricken.

Authority:

People v. Alvarez (2025) 18 Cal.5th 387, 485–486 [parole revocation fine under sec. 1202.45 inapplicable where sentence was death]

People v. Battle (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 50, 63 [improper to impose parole revocation fine where the defendant received an indeterminate term of 25 years to life and LWOP]

People v. Samaniego (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1148, 1184 [where the defendant is sentenced to LWOP, there can be no parole, and therefore the parole revocation fine was improperly assessed]

People v. Brasure (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1037, 1075 [parole revocation fine proper where the defendant, in addition to being sentenced to death, also sentenced to determinate term]

Second Holding:

The abstract of judgment is incorrect in reflecting the custody credits. The court’s oral pronouncement is correct, and it controls over the abstract of judgment or sentencing minute order. The trial court is directed to issue an amended abstract of judgment that accurately reflects the correct number of days of actual custody credit awarded by the court in its oral pronouncement of judgment.

Authority:

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185 [courts may correct clerical errors at any time, and appellate courts with jurisdiction have the power to order correction of abstracts of judgment that do not accurately reflect the oral judgment of the sentencing court]

Sentencing

Case: 000424

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The defendant is entitled to three additional days of credit for time served.

Holding:

Based on calculations, the defendant was in custody for three days longer than the amount granted by the trial court. As for conduct credit, PC 2933.1 limits the amount of presentence conduct credit to 15% of the actual period of presentence confinement. If the 15% results in a number that includes a partial day, the conduct credit is not rounded up (because that would exceed 15%), and partial days cannot be awarded.

Authority:

PEN 2900.5

PEN 2933.1

People v. Valenti (2016) 243 Cal.App.4th 1140, 1184

People v. Ramos (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 810, 815–816