There can be no parole restitution fine on sentences of life without the possibility of parole. We will strike the fine and direct the trial court to issue a new abstract of judgment.
Because defendant was sentenced to prison for life without the possibility of parole, her parole revocation fine should be stricken.
PEN 1202.45(a)
People v. Coleman (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 709, 725
We find there was insufficient evidence to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant’s prior strikes were based on separate criminal acts, and we remand for resentencing on that basis. There was insufficient evidence to impose his federal conviction for bank robbery as a prior strike because it could not be shown that the conviction was based on a different criminal act than either of his two state robbery convictions.
If two strike offenses are based on a single act, the court must dismiss one of the strikes.
People v. Vargas (2014) 59 Cal.4th 635, 638
Prior convictions for multiple criminal acts committed in a single course of conduct may be treated as separate strikes, so long as the convictions are not so closely connected that treating them as separate strikes would be contrary to the spirit of the Three Strikes law.
People v. Benson (1998) 18 Cal.4th 24, 35
People v. Vargas (2014) 59 Cal.4th 635, 648
[GARY NOTE: The California Supreme Court issued its opinion–published, of course, but hey!–in People v. Shaw (2025) 18 Cal.5th 1089 on December 15, 2025. It concluded that only one strike can be based on the single act of vehicular manslaughter that resulted in the death of two occupants of the car his vehicle struck. One justice wrote a concurring opinion in which he questioned the continuing validity of People v. Benson (1998) 18 Cal.4th 24 (holding that two prior offenses committed seconds apart against a single victim may be treated as separate strikes) and People v. Fuhrman (1997) 16 Cal.4th 930 (holding that two offenses committed in quick succession against two separate victims qualify as separate strikes). Two other justices agreed with the concurring opinion. It may be that the majority believed that Shaw did not present the precise question raised in Benson and Furhman and therefore decided not to venture beyond the facts before it at this time. That’s pure speculation by me, of course. But there may be an audience in our high court willing to closely examine exactly what can constitute separate strikes where the crimes are closely related in time and nature.]Penal Code section 654 does not apply to successive federal and state prosecutions.
People v. Belcher (1974) 11 Cal.3d 91, 98
People v. Fielder (2004) 114 Cal.App.4th 1221, 1234 [Retrial of prior conviction findings is not barred by the state or federal prohibitions on double jeopardy even when a prior conviction finding is reversed on appeal for lack of substantial evidence]
Rhodius resolved a split of authority among the Courts of Appeal regarding resentencing eligibility when a defendant’s sentence for a prior prison enhancement (see former sec. 667.5(b)) was stayed and never executed. Rhodius held that defendants whose enhanced prison prior term or terms were stayed at sentencing are eligible for resentencing under section 1172.75. Pursuant to Rhodius, the court therefore reversed the trial court’s order denying defendant a resentencing hearing, and remanded for the court to hold that hearing.
Defendants whose enhanced prison prior term or terms were stayed at sentencing are eligible for resentencing under section 1172.75.
PEN 1172.75
People v. Rhodius (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1050
At the resentencing hearing conducted after the remittitur issued, the trial court declined to strike or reduce the Penal Code section 12022.53(d) firearm enhancement and reimposed the sentence of 50 years to life. The parties agree that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to conduct the earlier hearing (while the appeal was up in higher court, the trial court permitted the prosecution to file new circumstance in aggravation) and the matter must be remanded for a new resentencing hearing. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a new sentencing hearing conducted in accordance with Senate Bill 567.
It is well established that the filing of a valid notice of appeal vests jurisdiction of the cause in the appellate court until determination of the appeal and issuance of the remittitur.
People v. Perez (1979) 23 Cal.3d 545, 554
People v. Burhop (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 808, 813
This jurisdictional rule serves to protect the appellate court’s jurisdiction by preserving the status quo until the appeal is decided, and prevents the trial court from rendering an appeal futile by altering the appealed judgment by conducting other proceedings that may affect it.
People v. Awad (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 215, 224
During the premature hearing, the trial court permitted the prosecution to amend the information to add a factor in aggravation pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 4.421(b)(1), and accepted defendant’s waiver of his right to trial and admission to the new allegation. Because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to conduct this hearing, all proceedings conducted during that hearing—including the amendment of the information and defendant’s subsequent admission—are null and void.
People v. Williams (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 436, 446-447
After the passage of Senate Bill No. 483 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.), the court held a resentencing hearing at which it recalled defendant’s sentence, struck the prison prior enhancement, sentenced defendant to a term of 24 years, and set the matter for further resentencing. At the subsequent hearing, the court denied defendant’s motion to strike his 10-year gang enhancement, finding that granting it would endanger public safety. On appeal, defendant asserts the court erred in failing to conduct a full resentencing — specifically, that it did not consider Assembly Bill No. 333’s impact on his sentence. He also claims the court erred by considering his current dangerousness, rather than his future dangerousness upon release, and by not recalculating his custody credits at resentencing. The People concede that the matter should be remanded for a full resentencing and that defendant’s credits should be recalculated.
The matter must be remanded for a full resentencing. By its plain terms, section 1172.75 requires a full resentencing, not merely that the trial court strike the newly invalid enhancements.
PEN 1172.75
People v. Monroe (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 393, 402
People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893 [the resentencing court has jurisdiction to modify every aspect of the sentence, and not just the portion subjected to the recall]
Amendments made by Assembly Bill 333 regarding elements constituting gang misconduct applied retroactively.
People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1206-1207
In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740
People v. Burgos (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1, 28
If the court determines the gang enhancement must be vacated, the People must be given the opportunity to retry the gang enhancement in compliance with the amendments brought about by Assembly Bill 333. The Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar retrial of a defendant whose conviction is set aside because of an error in the proceedings leading to conviction. If the People choose to retry it, the trial court is directed to conduct a full resentencing after that issue has been decided.
People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1207
People v. Sek (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 657, 669
United States v. Tateo (1964) 377 U.S. 463, 465
If the court modifies a defendant’s sentence, then the court must recalculate the number of days that the defendant has already spent in custody and award those recalculated credits in the new abstract of judgment.
PEN 2900.1
People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 29, 37, 41