Error and/or relief
Following remand from the defendant’s prior appeal, the trial court declined to strike a firearm enhancement. The court did not realize the impact of recent changes in the law on gang criminal activity, asserting that its jurisdiction was limited to the scope defined in the remittitur (which remanded for reconsideration of the request to dismiss the firearm enhancement). We reverse the judgment and remand the matter for the trial court to rule on defendant’s motion to dismiss the gang enhancements, and to reconsider its determination declining to dismiss the firearm enhancements under section 1385 under the standard more recently articulated by the Supreme Court.
First Holding:
The scope of the superior court’s jurisdiction as defined by a remittitur does not prevent the retroactive application of ameliorative laws. We review associated questions of statutory construction de novo. Whether a statute applies retroactively is a question of statutory construction we review de novo. We review for abuse of discretion the trial court’s exercise of discretion under section 1385(c).
Authority:
People v. Lopez (2025) 17 Cal.5th 388, 396
People v. Burke (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 237, 242
People v. Brown (2012) 54 Cal.4th 314, 319
People v. Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024, 1033
Second Holding:
Section 1385(c)(1) provides that, notwithstanding any other law, the court shall dismiss an enhancement if it is in the furtherance of justice to do so, except if dismissal of that enhancement is prohibited by any initiative statute. In exercising its discretion under this subdivision, the court shall consider and afford great weight to evidence offered by the defendant to prove that any of the nine mitigating circumstances in subparagraphs (A) to (I) are present. Proof of the presence of one or more of these circumstances weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the enhancement, unless the court finds that dismissal of the enhancement would endanger public safety.
Authority:
PEN 1385(c)
Third Holding:
Absent a finding that dismissal would endanger public safety, a court retains the discretion to impose or dismiss enhancements provided that it assigns significant value to the enumerated mitigating circumstances, when they are present. In other words, if the court does not find that dismissal would endanger public safety, the presence of an enumerated mitigating circumstance will generally result in the dismissal of an enhancement unless the sentencing court finds substantial, credible evidence of countervailing factors that may nonetheless neutralize even the great weight of the mitigating circumstance, such that dismissal of the enhancement is not in furtherance of justice.
Authority:
People v. Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024
Fourth Holding:
The Legislature amended PC 186.22(g) to redefine the phrase “benefit, promote, further, or assist” a criminal street gang for the purposes of section 186.22. The phrase now means “to provide a common benefit to members of a gang where the common benefit is more than reputational.” Those elemental changes apply retroactively to all nonfinal cases such as this one.
Authority:
PEN 186.22(e)(1)
PEN 186.22(g)
People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1207
In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 745
Fifth Holding:
Where a statute is silent regarding retroactivity, we employ the ordinary presumptions and rules of statutory construction to discern the Legislature’s intent. Ordinarily, statutes are presumed to apply only prospectively, unless the Legislature expressly declares otherwise. Estrada, however, held that an amendment to a statute that lessened punishment for a crime gave rise to an inference of contrary legislative intent; that is, that the Legislature must have intended that the amendment mitigating punishment would apply retroactively to every case to which it constitutionally could apply. The Estrada rule rests on an inference that the Legislature intends an amendment reducing punishment under a criminal statute to apply as broadly as possible, distinguishing only as necessary between sentences that are final and sentences that are not.
Authority:
Californians for Disability Rights v. Mervyn’s, LLC (2006) 39 Cal.4th 223, 230
People v. Burgos (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1, 7
In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740
People v. Superior Court (Lara) (2018) 4 Cal.5th 299, 308
Sixth Holding:
If the trial court exercises its discretion to dismiss the gang enhancements, the prosecution will be entitled to the same remedy as the defense (i.e., withdrawal from the plea agreement) and the trial court may withdraw its approval of the plea agreement as well. In that event, the trial court must restore the parties to the status quo ante, including permitting the prosecution to request to reopen the preliminary hearing and present evidence on the new elements of the gang allegations or to proceed without those charges.
Authority:
People v. Stamps (2020) 9 Cal.5th 685, 707-708
People v. Superior Court (Garcia) (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 256
Mendoza v. Superior Court (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 42
Seventh Holding:
Penal Code section 1016.7 provides that, in the interest of justice and to reach a just resolution during plea negotiations, the prosecutor shall consider whether the defendant has experienced psychological, physical, or childhood trauma, whether the defendant is or was a youth at the time of the commission of the offense, and whether any of those considerations contributed to the commission of an alleged offense. The statute defines youth as any person under 26 years of age on the date of the offense. But it is not retroactive. It does not reduce punishment for a criminal offense, create discretion to reduce punishment, narrow the scope of criminal liability, or create a concrete avenue for certain individuals charged with a criminal offense to be treated more leniently or avoid punishment altogether.
Authority:
People v. Burgos (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1, 13
