Tag Archives: PEN 1385

Amelioration, Discretion, Sentencing, Standard of review

Case 001010

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

In resentencing the defendant, the court abused its discretion in not giving proper consideration to whether to strike prior strike convictions. Remanded for proper consideration.

First Holding:

Under section 1172.1, a trial court may recall and resentence “at any time” upon the recommendation of the Secretary of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, the Board of Parole Hearings, the district attorney of the county in which the defendant was sentenced, or the Attorney General if the Department of Justice originally prosecuted the case.

Effective January 1, 2024, a trial court may recall a sentence and resentence a defendant on its own motion “at any time if the applicable sentencing laws at the time of original sentencing are subsequently changed by new statutory authority or case law.

Once a trial court decides to recall and resentence, it may either reduce the sentence by modification or vacate the conviction and impose judgment on any necessarily included lesser offense or lesser related offense, whether or not that offense was charged in the original pleading.

In resentencing the defendant in the same manner as if they had not previously been sentenced, the resentencing court shall consider if the defendant has experienced psychological, physical, or childhood trauma, including, but not limited to, abuse, neglect, exploitation, or sexual violence, and whether those circumstances were a contributing factor in the commission of the offense.

Authority:

PEN 1172.1

Second Holding:

Section 1385(c)(1) provides that, notwithstanding any other law, the court shall dismiss an enhancement if it is in the furtherance of justice to do so, except if dismissal of that enhancement is prohibited by any initiative statute.

Section 1385(c)(2) further provides that, in exercising its discretion under this subdivision, the court shall consider and afford great weight to evidence offered by the defendant to prove that any of the mitigating circumstances in subparagraphs (A) to (I) are present. Proof of the presence of one or more of these circumstances weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the enhancement, unless the court finds that dismissal of the enhancement would endanger public safety.

‘Endanger public safety’ means there is a likelihood that the dismissal of the enhancement would result in physical injury or other serious danger to others. Accordingly, if the court finds that dismissal of an enhancement would endanger public safety, then the court need not consider the listed mitigating circumstances.

Authority:

PEN 1385

People v. Mendoza (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 287, 296

Third Holding:

A court’s decision not to strike a prior serious felony enhancement is reviewed for abuse of discretion.

Authority:

People v. Shaw (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 582, 585

People v. Jefferson (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 235, 242–243 [a trial court’s exercise of discretion must not be disturbed on appeal except on a showing that the court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice]

Fourth Holding:

Absent a finding that dismissal would endanger public safety, a court retains the discretion to impose or dismiss enhancements provided that it assigns significant value to the enumerated mitigating circumstances when they are present.

In other words, if the court does not find that dismissal would endanger public safety, the presence of an enumerated mitigating circumstance will generally result in the dismissal of an enhancement unless the sentencing court finds substantial, credible evidence of countervailing factors that ‘may nonetheless neutralize even the great weight of the mitigating circumstance, such that dismissal of the enhancement is not in furtherance of justice.

Authority:

People v. Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024,1029

Fifth Holding:

A trial court has discretion under the Three Strikes law to dismiss or vacate prior conviction allegations or findings in the furtherance of justice. In exercising its discretion, the court may give no weight whatsoever to factors extrinsic to the Three Strikes scheme.

Instead, preponderant weight must be accorded to factors intrinsic to the scheme, such the nature and circumstances of the defendant’s present felonies and the prior serious and/or violent felony convictions, and the particulars of his background, character, and prospects. In considering these intrinsic factors the court must determine whether the defendant may be deemed outside the scheme’s spirit, in whole or in part, and hence should be treated as though he had not previously been convicted of one or more serious and/or violent felonies.

While the purpose of the Three Strikes law was to ensure longer prison sentences, the “overarching consideration” and “underlying purpose” in striking prior conviction allegations is the avoidance of unjust sentences.

Authority:

PEN 1385(a)

People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, 530-531

People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161

People v. Garcia (1999) 20 Cal.4th 490, 498–500

Sixth Holding:

Abuse of discretion in failing to strike a prior conviction occurs in limited circumstances: where the trial court is not aware of its discretion; where the trial court considers impermissible factors; or where applying the Three Strikes law would produce an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd result under the specific facts of a particular case.

A reviewing court’s disagreement with the trial court’s weighing of proper factors (as distinct from the trial court’s reliance on improper factors in the weighing process) does not constitute an abuse of discretion.

We conclude from this record that the trial court failed to balance the appropriate factors set forth in Williams, that is, the defendant’s personal background, character, and prospects, and the specifics of his criminal history, the characteristics of the present offense for which he was being resentenced, or if a shorter sentence would accommodate risks to public safety.

Significantly, courts have reversed the denial of dismissal of prior strikes in instances where the prior strikes were far more serious than the defendant’s.

(Gary note: I have left out the appellate court’s recitation of facts peculiar to this defendant and the facts in this case, but court determined that the lower court had not given proper consideration of those factors. It remanded for a proper consideration.)

Authority:

People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 378-379

People v. Dryden (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 1007, 1029

People v. Avila (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 1134, 1140–1141 [defendant’s three previous strikes were two robberies and assault with a knife]

Amelioration, Appellate Principles, Discretion, Sentencing, Standard of review

Case 000906

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

At a resentencing hearing under section 1172.75, the trial court struck the one-year prior but otherwise declined to reduce the defendant’s sentence. The trial court did not apply the correct standard of law and therefore abused its discretion. We reverse the order.

First Holding:

SB 136 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess. amended section 667.5b) to allow courts to impose one-year prior prison term enhancements only for specified sexually violent offenses. Thereafter, SB 483 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) made the amendment retroactive to final cases and added what is now section 1172.75.

Section 1172.75 sets forth the process for recalling sentences and resentencing. If a judgment includes a qualifying enhancement, the trial court shall recall the sentence and resentence the defendant. Resentencing shall result in a lesser sentence than the one originally imposed inclusive of the enhancements unless the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that imposing a lesser sentence would endanger public safety.

At resentencing, the court may consider postconviction factors, including, but not limited to, the disciplinary record and record of rehabilitation of the defendant while incarcerated, evidence that reflects whether age, time served, and diminished physical condition, if any, have reduced the defendant’s risk for future violence, and evidence that reflects that circumstances have changed since the original sentencing so that continued incarceration is no longer in the interest of justice.

Authority:

PEN 667.5(b)

PEN 1172.75

Second Holding:

Unless the court originally imposed the upper term, the court may not impose a sentence exceeding the middle term unless there are circumstances in aggravation that justify the imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding the middle term, and those facts have been stipulated to by the defendant, or have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a court trial.

At a hearing under section 1172.75, the resentencing court shall apply any other changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion so as to eliminate disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing.

Authority:

PEN 1172.75(d)(2)

Third Holding:

As relevant here, SB 81 (2021–2022) effected a change in law by adding subdivision (c) to section 1385. That subdivision provides that, notwithstanding any other law, the court shall dismiss an enhancement if it is in the furtherance of justice to do so, except if dismissal of that enhancement is prohibited by any initiative statute. In exercising its discretion under this subdivision, the court shall consider and afford great weight to evidence offered by the defendant to prove that any of the mitigating circumstances in subparagraphs (A) to (I) are present.

Proof of the presence of one or more of these circumstances weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the enhancement, unless the court finds that dismissal of the enhancement would endanger public safety. ‘Endanger public safety’ means there is a likelihood that the dismissal of the enhancement would result in physical injury or other serious danger to others.

Authority:

PEN 1385(c)

Fourth Holding:

Section 1385(c) sets forth several mitigating circumstances for consideration. Two of them are relevant in this case. Under section 1385(c), absent a finding that dismissal would endanger public safety, a court retains the discretion to impose or dismiss enhancements provided that it assigns significant value to the enumerated mitigating circumstances when they are present.

Stated simply, if the court does not conclude that dismissal would endanger public safety, then mitigating circumstances strongly favor dismissing the enhancement. But ultimately, the court must determine whether dismissal is in furtherance of justice.

This means that, absent a danger to public safety, the presence of an enumerated mitigating circumstance will generally result in the dismissal of an enhancement unless the sentencing court finds substantial, credible evidence of countervailing factors that may nonetheless neutralize even the great weight of the mitigating circumstance, such that dismissal of the enhancement is not in furtherance of justice.

Authority:

PEN 1385(c)

People v. Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024, 1029, 1038

Fifth Holding:

We review a trial court’s sentencing decision under section 1172.75 for abuse of discretion and ask whether the trial court’s findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, whether its rulings of law are correct, and whether its application of the law to the facts was neither arbitrary nor capricious.

We similarly review a trial court’s decision not to dismiss a sentencing enhancement for an abuse of discretion. A court abuses its discretion when it makes an arbitrary or capricious decision by applying the wrong legal standard or bases its decision on express or implied factual findings that are not supported by substantial evidence.

Authority:

People v. Garcia (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 848, 857

Nazir v. Superior Court (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 478, 490

People v. Moine (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 440, 449

Sixth Holding:

We reject the Attorney General’s argument that the defendant forfeited this contention because he failed to raise it below. The defendant did not have to ask the trial court to apply the correct standard of law to preserve a claim on appeal that the trial court applied an incorrect one. Rather, a defendant is entitled to sentencing decisions based on the sentencing court’s informed discretion, including one informed by the correct law. In any event, we may review any question of law involved in any ruling or order that affects the defendant’s substantial rights, even if the defendant did not object below.

(Gary note: The court proceeded to analyze the trial court’s treatment or lack thereof of facts specific to this defendant that demonstrated the abuse of discretion.)

Authority:

PEN 1259

People v. Salazar (2023) 15 Cal.5th 416, 424

Appellate Principles, Duty of the court, Sentencing

Case 000893

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

It was error for the judge to stay the section 12022.1 enhancement under section 1385(b)(1). An enhancement may be stricken or imposed, unless there is some other legal reason it must be stayed rather than imposed.

First Holding:

Ordinarily, an enhancement must be either imposed or stricken in furtherance of justice under section 1385. Section 1385(b)(1) adds that, if the court has the authority pursuant to subdivision (a) to strike or dismiss an enhancement, the court may instead strike the additional punishment for that enhancement in the furtherance of justice in compliance with subdivision (a).

The trial court has no authority to stay an enhancement, rather than strike it—not, at least, when the only basis for doing either is its own discretionary sense of justice.

There are exceptions to this rule that permit courts to stay the punishment imposed for an enhancement, for example section 654 and rule 4.447 of the California Rules of Court. These exceptions are not discretionary; they are limited to the situation in which an enhancement that otherwise would have to be either imposed or stricken is barred by an overriding statutory prohibition. In that situation—and that situation only—the trial court can and should stay the enhancement.

Authority:

PEN 1385(b)(1)

People v. Lopez (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 355, 364

Second Holding:

According to the transcript of the sentencing hearing, the trial court here relied on section 1385(b)(1) when it purported to stay the section 12022.1 enhancement. It does not appear that any overriding statute prohibits imposition of the enhancement in this case.

As a result, the court lacked the authority to stay the enhancement. In general, we presume a trial court knew and followed the law. Based on the statutory provision cited by the court, we conclude the court intended to strike the punishment for the enhancement rather than imposing an unauthorized stayed sentence.

The minute order from the sentencing hearing supports this conclusion by indicating that the court struck the enhancement, though it suggests the court did so at a prior hearing, which is not supported by the transcript. We will modify the judgment accordingly.

Authority:

People v. Ramirez (2021) 10 Cal.5th 983, 1042

Amelioration, Appellate Principles, Effective assistance of counsel, Fines and fees, Sentencing, Standard of review, Statutory interpretation

Case 000886

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

1n 1991, for a crime committed in 1989, the defendant was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole (LWOP). When his case came up for resentencing under section 1172.75 in 2025, the court believed its only discretion was to impose less than the upper term on the determinate portion of his sentence. Defense counsel agreed. This was error. The court also erred in its calculation of credit for time served. And the restitution fine must be struck.

First Holding:

Prior to January 1, 2020, section 667.5(b) required trial courts to impose a sentence enhancement of one additional year for each of a defendant’s prior prison or jail terms. Section 1172.75(a) now provides that any sentence enhancement that was imposed prior to January 1, 2020, under section 667.5(b) is legally invalid.

Section 1172.75(b) and (c) mandate that the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation identify eligible individuals whose sentences include now-invalidated section 667.5 enhancements, and that the trial court shall recall the sentence and resentence the defendant.

While conducting the resentencing, section 1172.75(d)(2), provides the express instruction that the court shall apply the sentencing rules of the Judicial Council and apply any other changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion so as to eliminate disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing.

Authority:

PEN 1172.75

People v. Rhodius (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1050, 1054

Second Holding:

Section 190.2(a) provides that where there has been a finding of certain enumerated special circumstances in connection with a defendant who has been found guilty of first degree murder, the penalty is death or LWOP. Section 1385 previously provided the trial court with the discretion to strike or dismiss the special circumstances.

Although the statute only authorizes such relief upon motion of the court or application of the prosecution, the defendant nevertheless has the right to invite the court to exercise its power by an application to strike a count.

Failure by a defendant to make such a request under section 1385 results in forfeiture of the issue. In the interests of justice, and in consideration of defendant’s alternative argument of ineffective assistance of counsel, we exercise our discretion to reach a question that has not been preserved for review by a party.

Authority:

PEN 190.2(a)

PEN 1385

People v. Nguyen (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 1133, 1141, 1144

People v. Coleman (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 709, 724

People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161, fn. 6

Third Holding:

Contrary to Section 1385, however, section 1385.1 provides that a judge shall not strike or dismiss any special circumstance which is admitted by a plea of guilty or nolo contendere or is found by a jury or court as provided in Sections 190.1 to 190.5, inclusive. The section was enacted as of June 6, 1990, via voter initiative Proposition 115. The dispute here centers around whether section 1385.1 serves as a bar to the trial court’s discretion to strike section 190.2 special circumstances when the court is resentencing a defendant pursuant to section 1172.75 for a pre-June 6, 1990, crime.

Authority:

PEN 1385.1

People v. Nguyen (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 1133, 1141

Fourth Holding:

Ordinarily, we review the trial court’s sentencing decisions for abuse of discretion. However, defendant argues pursuant to McDavid that the trial court necessarily abused its discretion when it failed to strike his special circumstances because it was unaware that it had any discretion to do so.

We therefore examine whether the trial court had any discretion in this regard, which is a question of statutory interpretation to be reviewed de novo.

Authority:

People v. Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th 825, superseded by statute on another ground as stated in People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 757

People v. McDavid (2024) 15 Cal.5th 1015, 1023

Fifth Holding:

The Nguyen court noted that section 1385.1 operates only prospectively, therefore, a trial court may dismiss a special circumstance allegation attached to any murders committed before June 6, 1990, the date that section 1385.1 became effective. Nguyen specifically relied upon Tapia.

In Tapia, Proposition 115 took effect while the defendant was in the process of being prosecuted for first degree murder. The defendant challenged the trial court’s decision to conduct voir dire pursuant to the new Proposition 115 procedures.

In examining whether Proposition 115’s provisions could be applied to crimes committed prior to its effective date after consideration of ex post facto concerns, the Supreme Court separated the provisions into four separate categories depending on their impact upon defendants.

Relevant to this inquiry, the high court expressly categorized section 1385.1 as falling within the category of provisions that change the legal consequences of criminal behavior to the detriment of defendants and therefore cannot be applied to crimes committed before the measure’s effective date.

Authority:

People v. Nguyen (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 1133, 1141

Tapia v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 282, 286-287, 297

Sixth Holding:

The mandate in section 1172.75(d)(2), that the trial court apply any other changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion” evidences a legislative intent that defendants are to be treated with more leniency, not less, when being resentenced pursuant to this statute. Because the trial court clearly expressed more than once its belief that it did not have any discretion with respect to the LWOP sentence on Count 1, we deem the court to have abused its discretion and reverse.

Authority:

PEN 1172.75(d)(2)

People v. McDavid (2024) 15 Cal.5th 1015, 1023 [A court acting while unaware of the full scope of its discretion is deemed to have abused it.]

Seventh Holding:

The court court failed to award the defendant 2 days of credit for time served, and we modify the judgment accordingly.

(Gary note: The court did not cite any authority, but it seems obvious that the court has the power to modify the credit for time served to the correct number. I have cited authority the court could have relied on. The issue does not seem so much a matter of the trial court refusing to award credit; rather, it was a mathematical error. I speculate that perhaps the court did not award credit for the first day in custody. Counting days is different than determining the number of days between dates. From January 1 through January 31 is 31 days, counting. But if you subtract January 1 from January 31, you will realize only 30 days.  For credit for time served, the correct number is the counting number–31 in my example.)

Authority:

PEN 2900.5

Eighth Holding:

As part of defendant’s original 1991 sentencing, the court ordered him to pay $10,000 to the state Restitution Fund pursuant to Penal Code section 1202.4 (formerly Govt. Code sec. 13967(a).) In light of section 1465.9, which compels that restitution fines older than 10 years be vacated, we vacate that fine. In Salstrom, the court determined that the reference to 10 years is from the date the restitution fine was originally ordered.

Resentencing does not reset the 10-year limitation. Applying section 1465.9 to reduce defendant’s sentence as part of a section 1172.75 resentencing hearing gives effect to both statutes.

Authority:

PEN 1465.9

People v. Giordano (2007) 42 Cal.4th 644, 652-653 [detailing the history of the restitution statutes]

People v. Salstrom (2025) 117 Cal.App.5th 596, 599-601, review granted on unrelated issues, March 11, 2026, S295038

Mejia v. Reed (2000) 31 Cal.4th 657, 663 [when two codes are to be construed, they must be read together and so construed as to give effect, when possible, to all the provisions thereof]

Discretion, Sentencing

Case 000636

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The matter was remanded to the lower court following the defendant’s first appeal in this case so that it could exercise its discretion to strike the vicarious gun use enhancements. On resentencing following the defendant’s first appeal in this case, the trial court imposed enhancements for the personal use of a firearm (sec. 12022.53(b), in lieu of the vicarious liability enhancements found true by the jury under subdivisions (d) and (e)(1) of section 12022.53.

The personal use of a firearm enhancements must be vacated because there was no jury finding that the defendant had personally used a firearm during the offense. The vicarious enhancement must be reimposed, and the matter should be remanded back to the trial court so that it may exercise its discretion to strike those enhancements.

First Holding:

A trial court has discretion to strike a section 12022.53(d) firearm enhancement and impose a lesser uncharged enhancement under subdivisions (b) or (c). A trial court is not categorically prohibited from imposing an uncharged, lesser-included enhancement when the prosecution has alleged the greater enhancement and the facts supporting the lesser enhancement have been alleged and found true.

Authority:

People v. Tirado (2022) 12 Cal.5th 688

Second Holding:

In Arellano, our Supreme Court held that a trial court resentencing a petitioner under section 1172.6 lacked authority to impose a firearm enhancement that had never been admitted or found true by a trier of fact. The enhancement had been dismissed as part of a negotiated disposition, and the trial court relied on police reports and other hearsay summaries to conclude that the defendant was armed.

The court rejected this approach and explained that resentencing under section 1172.6 is limited to the target offense or underlying felony. A similar defect occurred here. The jury never found that the defendant personally used a firearm. Instead, the jury returned true findings only under section 12022.53, subdivisions (d) and (e)(1), which required proof that a principal discharged a firearm during a gang-related offense, causing great bodily injury or death.

As in Arellano, the trial court later relied on its own factual findings from a collateral proceeding (a separate hearing on the defendant’s petition for resentencing under section 1172.6) to conclude that the defendant personally used a firearm during the offense. The trial court’s finding in a collateral proceeding was not sufficient to support imposition of the enhancement.

The matter is remanded for resentencing, during which the court shall exercise its discretion under section 1385 and Tirado to determine whether to strike or dismiss the lawfully adjudicated enhancements.

Authority:

People v. Arellano (2024) 16 Cal.5th 457, 464-465

Duty of counsel, Effective assistance of counsel, Sentencing

Case 000616

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The judgment is affirmed as to all verdicts and findings made at trial, but the sentence is vacated and the cause is remanded for a new sentencing hearing. The defendant’s attorney’s assistance was ineffective by counsel’s failure to argue a statutory mitigatory factor at the sentencing hearing.

First Holding:

When an enhancement is pleaded and proven, the sentencing court is ordinarily presented with a binary choice: impose the additional punishment or strike/dismiss the enhancement.

Section 1385(c) provides, in pertinent part, that notwithstanding any other law, the court shall dismiss an enhancement if it is in the furtherance of justice to do so, except if dismissal of that enhancement is prohibited by any initiative statute.

In exercising that discretion, section 1385 lays out nine factors in mitigation for the court to consider and afford great weight to. Proof of one or more of the listed circumstances weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the enhancement, in the absence of a finding that dismissal would endanger public safety.

One of the listed circumstances (1385(c)(2)(B)) is “Multiple enhancements are alleged in a single case. In this instance, all enhancements beyond a single enhancement shall be dismissed.” Rules of Court, rule 4.423(b)(1) mirrors that mitigation factor.

Authority:

PEN 1385(c)

People v. Lopez (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 355, 364

Second Holding:

If the sentencing court does not conclude that dismissal would endanger public safety, then mitigating circumstances strongly favor dismissing the enhancement. This means that, absent a danger to public safety, the presence of an enumerated mitigating circumstance will generally result in the dismissal of an enhancement unless the sentencing court finds substantial, credible evidence of countervailing factors that may nonetheless neutralize even the great weight of the mitigating circumstance, such that dismissal of the enhancement is not in furtherance of justice.

Authority:

People v. Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024, 1036

Third Holding:

A defense attorney who fails to adequately understand the available sentencing alternatives, promote their proper application, or pursue the most advantageous disposition for his client may be found incompetent.

Authority:

People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 350

Fourth Holding:

To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that (1) counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms, and (2) counsel’s deficient performance was prejudicial.

Reviewing courts must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance because it is all too easy to conclude that a particular act or omission of counsel was unreasonable in the harsh light of hindsight.

Because the presumption of counsel’s competence can typically be rebutted only with evidence outside the record, ineffective assistance claims are normally raised in habeas corpus proceedings where such evidence can be presented. Defendants who present IAC claims on direct appeal bear a heavy burden. If the record on appeal sheds no light on why counsel acted or failed to act in the manner challenged, the claim must be rejected unless counsel was asked for an explanation and failed to provide one, or there simply could be no satisfactory explanation.

Put differently, where counsel’s trial tactics or strategic reasons for challenged decisions do not appear on the record, we will not find ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal unless there could be no conceivable reason for counsel’s acts or omissions.

Authority:

People v. Scott (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1188, 1211

Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687–688, 691–692

In re Scott (2003) 29 Cal.4th 783, 811–812

People v. Arce (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 924, 930

People v. Garcia (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 887, 900

People v. Carter (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1114, 1189

People v. Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 926

Fifth Holding:

Defendant’s trial counsel did not file any sentencing memoranda. Assuming counsel was aware of the relevant sentencing laws concerning multiple enhancements, counsel nevertheless failed to promote their proper application and pursue the most advantageous disposition for his client. Counsel also failed to object to the erroneous contention in the probation report, and in the prosecutor’s argument at sentencing, that there were no mitigating circumstances. There is no conceivable strategic or tactical explanation for counsel’s omissions.

Authority:

People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 351

Sixth Holding:

When a stay of punishment is required under section 654, a trial court has discretion to choose which count will serve as the principal term without regard to the longest potential term of imprisonment. Here, the court stated its intention to use count 1 as the principal term before defense counsel presented his arguments at the sentencing hearing. The attorney was thus aware defendant’s prison term would be based on the offense that included two enhancement findings.

We are unable to conceive of a rational, tactical reason for counsel’s failure to request the dismissal of at least one enhancement pursuant to section 1385(c)(2)(B).

Authority:

People v. Caparaz (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 669, 688, citing sec. 654(a), as amended by AB 518 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.)

Seventh Holding:

Counsel alluded to the defendant’s childhood trauma, but only in a passing reference to the diagnosis mentioned in the probation report. He made no effort to link that potential mitigating circumstance to the offense. As made plain by the statutory text, the mere fact a defendant has suffered past trauma is insufficient—such trauma must be a contributing factor in the commission of the offense for the low term presumption to apply.

Authority:

People v. Knowles (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 757, 765

Eighth Holding:

In the context of appellate representation, where appellate counsel fails to raise a significant and obvious issue, the failure will generally be considered deficient performance under Strickland if the missed issue is clearly stronger than those presented. Similar reasoning can be applied to the performance of defendant’s trial counsel at sentencing. Advocating for dismissal of an enhancement under section 1385(c)(2)(B) would have been an objectively stronger argument, by a wide margin, than the generalized request for leniency based on defendant’s educational achievements.

Authority:

In re Hampton (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 463, 477

Ninth Holding:

Objections can be made during and even after the formal pronouncement of judgment. Once it became clear the court was imposing the middle term, defense counsel had nothing to lose by pointing out the applicability of section 1385(c)(2)(B). At the very least, doing so would have preserved the issue for appellate review.

Failure to present any objections or argument regarding section 1385 fell below the minimum standards of performance required of a defense attorney.

Authority:

People v. Gonzalez (2003) 31 Cal.4th 745, 755

People v. Steele (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 212, 226 [finding forfeiture where defendant did not object either before or after pronouncement of sentence, despite the opportunity to do so]

Tenth Holding:

Prejudice flowing from ineffective assistance is established by showing there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. The burden requires more than speculation as to the effect of the errors or omissions of counsel. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.

Authority:

Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 694

People v. Williams (1988) 44 Cal.3d 883, 937

Amelioration, Discretion, Sentencing, Standard of review

Case 000610

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The court erroneously believed that the defendant was categorically ineligible for resentencing under section 1172.75 because he was serving an indeterminate sentence under the “Three Strikes” law. Because the record does not clearly indicate that the court would have made the same decision had it been aware of the full scope of its resentencing power and discretion, we reverse and remand the matter with directions for the court to conduct a full resentencing under section 1172.75.

First Holding:

Once the trial court confirms that the underlying judgment includes an invalid prior prison term enhancement, the court must recall the sentence and resentence the defendant. A defendant who is eligible for relief under section 1172.75 is entitled to a full resentencing.

Authority:

PEN 667.5

PEN 1172.75

People v. Rhodius (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1050, 1067, fn. 3

Second Holding:

Section 1172.75(d) establishes several parameters for resentencing.

First, the resentencing shall result in a lesser sentence than the one originally imposed as a result of the elimination of the repealed enhancement, unless the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that imposing a lesser sentence would endanger public safety.

Second, the court must apply the sentencing rules of the Judicial Council and apply any other changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion so as to eliminate disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing.

Third, the court may consider postconviction factors that speak to whether continued incarceration remains in the interest of justice, such as the defendant’s physical condition and records of discipline and rehabilitation while incarcerated.

Finally, unless the court originally imposed the upper term, the court may not impose a sentence exceeding the middle term unless there are circumstances in aggravation that justify the imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding the middle term, and those facts have been stipulated to by the defendant, or have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a court trial.

Authority:

PEN 1172.75

Third Holding:

A trial court has the authority to exercise its discretion under section 1385(a) and Romero to strike any or all of a defendant’s strike priors after recalling his sentence and for the purposes of resentencing him under section 1172.75. As the court in Rogers explained, because a trial court’s power under section 1385(a) to dismiss or strike a strike prior is independent of either the Three Strikes law or the subsequent Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012, any exercise of that power at a resentencing proceeding under section 1172.75 does not offend either.

Authority:

People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497

People v. Rogers (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 340, 362, 364

Fourth Holding:

Where, as here, a trial court sentences a defendant without being aware of the full scope of its sentencing discretion, remand is required to allow the court to fully exercise that discretion unless the record clearly indicates that the court would have reached the same decision had it been aware of the scope of its discretion.

Authority:

People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1391

Effective assistance of counsel, Sentencing, Standard of review

Case 000573

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

A remand for resentencing is required because the defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel by reason of defense counsel’s failure to raise his mental health issues as a mitigating factor at the time of sentencing, despite there having been considerable evidence introduced during pretrial proceedings that the defendant had mental health issues, including a finding under section 1372 that he was incompetent to stand trial, whereupon he was committed to a state hospital until his competency was deemed restored three months later.

First Holding:

Defense counsel should have pointed out that there was evidence suggesting that, at least at the time of the offense, he was struggling with mental health issues. Under rule 4.423, mental illness is a mitigating factor at sentencing. Section 1385(c)(5) defines mental illness as a mental disorder as identified in the most recent edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders.

That subdivision further provides that a court may conclude that a defendant’s mental illness was connected to the offense if, after reviewing any relevant and credible evidence, including, but not limited to, police reports, preliminary hearing transcripts, witness statements, statements by the defendant’s mental health treatment provider, medical records, records or reports by qualified medical experts, or evidence that the defendant displayed symptoms consistent with the relevant mental disorder at or near the time of the offense, the court concludes that the defendant’s mental illness substantially contributed to the defendant’s involvement in the commission of the offense.

The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (5th ed. text rev. 2022) defines an overarching new category of substance use disorders—with the specific substance used defining the specific disorders. It states that the essential feature of a substance use disorder is a cluster of cognitive, behavioral, and physiological symptoms indicating that the individual continues using the substance despite significant substance-related problems.

Authority:

Rules of Court, rule 4.423

PEN 1385(c)(5)

Second Holding:

Despite considerable evidence, defense counsel remained silent at the sentencing hearing when the trial court remarked that no mitigating circumstances had been presented.

To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must show counsel’s performance was deficient and resulting prejudice, i.e., a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s deficient performance, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different.

We can conceive of no reasonable tactical purpose for defense counsel’s failure to argue rule 4.423(b)(2) and (b)(4) applied in this case. We further conclude defense counsel’s omission was prejudicial. For the trial court to impose the upper term the court was required to find that there are circumstances in aggravation of the crime that justify the imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding the middle term.

Had defense counsel raised the applicability of rule 4.423(b)(2) and (b)(4), there is a reasonable probability the court would have balanced the mitigating factors against those in aggravation and would not have imposed the upper term.

Authority:

People v. Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th 986, 1009

People v. Centeno (2014) 60 Cal.4th 659, 675–676 [where there was no conceivable reasonable tactical purpose for defense counsel’s omission, defense counsel’s failure to object to prosecutorial misconduct was ineffective]

Third Holding:

Defense counsel inexplicably made no arguments regarding any mitigating factors” when arguing the Romero motion to strike his prior convictions. On remand, the defendant is free to make the arguments he believes counsel should have made.

Authority:

People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497

People v. Dryden (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 1007, 1029 [both aggravating and mitigating circumstances are relevant considerations in determining whether to strike a prior strike conviction]

People v. Jones (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 37, 46 [on remand for resentencing, full resentencing is appropriate]

People v. Ramirez (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 55, 64 [When a case is remanded for resentencing by an appellate court, the trial court is entitled to consider the entire sentencing scheme]

Discretion, Sentencing

Case 000505

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

We vacate the defendant’s sentence, and we remand for the trial court to hold a new sentencing hearing, at which it shall consider whether to exercise its discretion under section 1385 to dismiss the one-year enhancement it imposed under section 12022(b)(1).

First Holding:

During the sentencing of the defendant for second degree murder in which it was found true that he used a knife, the court stated it had no discretion to dismiss the enhancement allegation. Section 1385 governs a trial court’s discretion to dismiss an enhancement. Specifically section 1385(c)(1) states that the court shall dismiss an enhancement if it is in the furtherance of justice to do so, except if dismissal of that enhancement is prohibited by any initiative statute. In exercising its discretion, the court shall consider and afford great weight to evidence offered by the defendant to prove that any of the mitigating circumstances in subparagraphs (A) to (I) are present. Proof of the presence of one or more of these circumstances weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the enhancement, unless the court finds that dismissal of the enhancement would endanger public safety.

Under section 1385(a), if the court does not find that dismissal would endanger public safety, the presence of an enumerated mitigating circumstance will generally result in the dismissal of an enhancement unless the sentencing court finds substantial, credible evidence of countervailing factors that may nonetheless neutralize even the great weight of the mitigating circumstance, such that dismissal of the enhancement is not in furtherance of justice.) One enumerated mitigating circumstance is that the current offense is connected to mental illness. The defendant identifies that circumstance as potentially applicable here in light of information developed during the mental competency proceedings in this matter.

Authority:

PEN 1385

People v. Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024, 1029

Second Holding:

The record establishes the trial court was not aware of its discretion under section 1385 to dismiss the weapon enhancement. Defendants are entitled to sentencing decisions made in the exercise of the informed discretion of the sentencing court. A court that is not aware of the scope of its discretionary powers can no more exercise that informed discretion than one whose sentence is or may have been based on misinformation regarding a material aspect of a defendant’s record. Where the trial court was not aware of its discretion to dismiss a sentencing allegation under section 1385, it abuses its discretion. We accordingly conclude the trial court abused its discretion because it was not aware of its discretion to dismiss the weapon enhancement.

Authority:

People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1391

Nazir v. Superior Court (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 478, 490

Third Holding:

When a court has not exercised its informed discretion, remand is the default unless the record clearly indicates that the trial court would have reached the same conclusion even if it had been aware that it had such discretion. Here, we find no indication in the record as to how the trial court would have exercised its discretion had it known it had the discretion to dismiss the enhancement. We will therefore remand for the trial court to exercise its discretion under section 1385 regarding the weapon enhancement imposed under section 12022(b)(1).

Authority:

People v. Salazar (2023) 15 Cal.5th 416, 431

Amelioration, Sentencing

Case: 000409

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

At the hearing on the petition for recall of sentence under section 1172.75, the trial court declined to reduce the defendant’s sentence beyond the dismissal of the now-invalid enhancement for prior prison terms. The judgment is reversed and the matter remanded for reconsideration in light of the views expressed in this opinion. We do not conclude the trial court necessarily abused its discretion or that it could not reach the same result upon resentencing. Given the number of questions raised by the record, however, remand is appropriate. To the extent the trial court did not conduct the proper analysis, it will have the opportunity to reconsider its rulings. To the extent the court did apply the correct standards, it will have the opportunity to clarify its reasoning.

(GARY NOTE: This was a lengthy opinion reciting many facts regarding the conducting of the resentencing hearing. The defendant argued that it was error to not impose a mitigated sentence, or a worst, the middle term, and it was error not to strike one or more of the enhancements. The defendant had presented to the trial court an extensive social study on his behalf which, arguably, demonstrated that his circumstances merited great weight in favor of mitigation.

(The opinion recites the pertinent factors, the facts asserted in favor, and the trial court’s responses. The opinion is replete with citations in response to assertions by both the defense and the People on why the trial erred or did not err. To do the opinion justice, I found it very hard to condense its holdings into a summary of the sort I present in this blog. But it still contains some gems worth setting forth, whether the appellate court relied on them in the defendant’s favor or not.

(As indicated in the intro paragraph, the appellate court did not so much as find that the trial court erred but instead it could not tell from the record whether the court gave proper consideration to the factors and understood clearly its options. So it was remanded for a do-over, encouraging at least tacitly that the trial court needs to be clearer in its reasoning if it does not intend to grant any of the relief requested by the defendant. The “holdings” and authorities listed hereafter should be seen simply as pronouncements I thought worthy of mention, and not so much as providing support for the appellate court’s decision to remand for resentencing or clarification.)

First Holding:

The question relevant to the section 1385(c) analysis is whether the defendant would pose a danger to the public if released from prison at the end of a sentence resulting from dismissal of the enhancements. Current dangerousness cannot be determined simply by examining the circumstances of the crime in isolation, without consideration of the passage of time or the attendant changes in the inmate’s psychological or mental attitude. Moreover, under section 1385(c), unless dismissal of the enhancement would result in immediate release, the question is not just current dangerousness but dangerousness at a point in the future.

Authority:

PEN 1385(c)

People v. Buford (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 886, 914

In re Shaputis (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1241, 1255

People v. Gonzalez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 215, 228

Second Holding:

Absent evidence to the contrary, we presume that the trial court knew the law and followed it. Here, however, the record reflects several reasons to question whether the court afforded the mitigating circumstances the weight required by section 1385(c)(2) in considering whether to dismiss any of the enhancements.

Authority:

People v. Ramirez (2021) 10 Cal.5th 983, 1042

People v. Bravo (2025) 107 Cal.App.5th 1144, 1157

Third Holding:

Section 1172.75 requires full resentencing for all defendants who qualify for recall of sentence under the statute. The court may revisit all prior sentencing decisions and has jurisdiction to modify every aspect of the sentence, and not just the portion subjected to the recall.

Authority:

PEN 1172.75

People v. Rogers (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 340, 358, 361

People v. Monroe (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 393, 402

People v. Valenzuela (2019) 7 Cal.5th 415, 424-425

Fourth Holding:

When a judgment of imprisonment is to be imposed and the statute specifies three possible terms, the court shall, in its sound discretion, order imposition of a sentence not to exceed the middle term, except as otherwise provided in paragraph (2). A trial court may impose an upper term sentence only where there are aggravating circumstances in the crime and the defendant has either stipulated to the facts underlying those circumstances or they have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt. The sentencing court can also rely on certified records of conviction without having to submit the prior convictions to the jury. The amendments also created a presumption in favor of the lower term where specified circumstances were contributing factors in the commission of the offense, unless the trial court finds that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances that imposition of the lower term would be contrary to the interests of justice.

Authority:

PEN 1170

People v. Flores (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 495, 500

Fifth Holding:

Section 1385(c)(1) provides that the court shall dismiss an enhancement if it is in the furtherance of justice to do so, except if dismissal of that enhancement is prohibited by any initiative statute. Subdivision (c)(2) provides that a sentencing court in exercising its discretion to dismiss a sentencing enhancement shall consider and afford great weight to evidence offered by the defendant to prove certain enumerated mitigating circumstances, and proof of the presence of one or more of these circumstances weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the enhancement, unless the court finds that dismissal of the enhancement would endanger public safety.

Authority:

PEN 1385(c)(1)

People v. Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024, 1028

Sixth Holding:

Section 1170(b)(6) now provides for a presumption in favor of the lower term where specified circumstances were contributing factor[s] in the commission of the offense. The sentencing court may only depart from this lower term presumption if it finds that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances such that the lower term would be contrary to the interests of justice. The new law thus dramatically restrains the court’s discretion to impose the middle or upper term, now requiring the court to impose the lower term if a qualifying trauma was a contributing factor in the commission of the offense unless the court finds that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances so that imposition of the lower term would be contrary to the interests of justice. Accordingly, under the new law, the presumption is that the court shall order imposition of the lower term whenever the defendant has a qualifying trauma.

Authority:

PEN 1170(b)(6)

People v. Salazar (2023) 15 Cal.5th 416, 419

Seventh Holding:

Section 1170(b)(6) makes clear that the low term is presumed only if the sentencing court first finds the defendant falls into one of the three special categories set forth in section 1170(b)(6) and, second, finds that circumstance was a contributing factor in the commission of the offense.

Authority:

People v. Hillburn (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 189, 205

Amelioration, Discretion, Duty of the court, Sentencing, Standard of review

Case: 000358

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The matter is remanded for the trial court to properly consider its discretion on whether to strike the prior serious felony conviction in light of the presence of one or more mitigating circumstances enumerated in section 1385(e), in the absence of a finding of danger to public safety.

First Holding:

Senate Bill No. 81, effective January 1, 2022, added subdivision (c) to section 1385. Section 1385(c) provides, “(1) Notwithstanding any other law, the court shall dismiss an enhancement if it is in the furtherance of justice to do so, except if dismissal of that enhancement is prohibited by any initiative statute. (2) In exercising its discretion under [subdivision (c)], the court shall consider and afford great weight to evidence offered by the defendant to prove that any of the mitigating circumstances in [the subparagraphs to subdivision (c)(2)] are present.

Proof of the presence of one or more of these circumstances weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the enhancement, unless the court finds that dismissal of the enhancement would endanger public safety. Endanger public safety means there is a likelihood that the dismissal of the enhancement would result in physical injury or other serious danger to others.

The mitigating circumstances identified in the subparagraphs include, among others, that multiple enhancements are alleged in a single case. In this instance, all enhancements beyond a single enhancement shall be dismissed. And they include that the application of an enhancement could result in a sentence of over 20 years. In this instance, the enhancement shall be dismissed.

Authority:

PEN 1385

Second Holding:

Absent a danger to public safety, the presence of an enumerated mitigating circumstance will generally result in the dismissal of an enhancement unless the sentencing court finds substantial, credible evidence of countervailing factors that may nonetheless neutralize even the great weight of the mitigating circumstance, such that dismissal of the enhancement is not in furtherance of justice. This furtherance of justice inquiry requires a trial court’s ongoing exercise of discretion. Thus, notwithstanding the presence of a mitigating circumstance, trial courts retain their discretion to impose an enhancement based on circumstances long deemed essential to the furtherance of justice inquiry

Authority:

People v. Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024, 1033–1036

Third Holding:

In determining whether dismissing an enhancement would endanger public safety, the plain words of the statute do not support a trial court’s singular focus on whether the defendant currently poses a danger. Although the current dangerousness of the defendant is an appropriate factor to consider, as it will have some bearing on whether dismissing the enhancement would endanger the public, a crucial part of the inquiry is how the dismissal will impact the length of the defendant’s sentence. Thus, a currently dangerous defendant who will be released from prison within a short timeframe might be found by the trial court to pose a greater danger to the public than a defendant who is currently dangerous but who has no prospect of release from prison until he is elderly.

Authority:

People v. Gonzalez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 215, 225, 228

Fourth Holding:

We review a trial court’s decision not to strike a sentence enhancement under section 1385 for abuse of discretion. The abuse of discretion standard is highly deferential. When a discretionary power is statutorily vested in the trial court, its exercise of that discretion must not be disturbed on appeal except on a showing that the court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice.

We presume that the trial court acted to achieve legitimate sentencing objectives. The burden is on the party challenging the sentencing decision to show that the court abused its discretion. We may not presume error from a silent record. Unless the record affirmatively demonstrates otherwise, the trial court is deemed to have considered all the relevant sentencing factors set forth in the rules. In addition as a general rule a trial court is presumed to have been aware of and followed the applicable law. Thus, where a statement of reasons is not required and the record is silent, a reviewing court will presume the trial court had a proper basis for a particular finding or order. A trial court abuses its discretion by rendering a sentencing decision based on impermissible factors or on an incorrect legal standard. Defendants are entitled to sentencing decisions made in the exercise of the informed discretion.

Authority:

People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 371

People v. Mendoza (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 287, 298

People v. Knowles (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 757, 765

People v. Stowell (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1107, 1114

People v. Knoller (2007) 41 Cal.4th 139, 156

People v. Nakano (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 623, 635 [an abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court applies the wrong legal standard]

People v. Flores (2020) 9 Cal.5th 371, 431

Fifth Holding:

When the trial court does not conclude that dismissal would result in a danger to public safety, the court must assign great weight to any mitigating factors, if present, and exercise its discretion in determining whether dismissal would be in the furtherance of justice. The term “great weight” did not create a presumption in favor of dismissal, but should be interpreted to mean that absent a danger to public safety, the presence of an enumerated mitigating circumstance will generally result in the dismissal of an enhancement unless the sentencing court finds substantial, credible evidence of countervailing factors that may nonetheless neutralize even the great weight of the mitigating circumstance, such that dismissal of the enhancement is not in furtherance of justice.

Without credible evidence to support findings on aggravating circumstances, judges could disregard mitigating factors without a proper basis for doing so. This would be incompatible with the great weight the Legislature has attached to the enumerated mitigating circumstances. Section 1385(c)(2)’s mandate to give great weight to enumerated mitigating circumstances requires a sentencing court to engage in a holistic balancing with special emphasis on the enumerated mitigating factors.

Authority:

People v. Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024, 1033–1036

People v. Ortiz (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1087, 1094

Sixth Holding:

On appeal, we presume that a judgment or order of the trial court is correct, all intendments and presumptions are indulged to support it on matters as to which the record is silent, and error must be affirmatively shown.

Authority:

People v. Giordano (2007) 42 Cal. 4th 644, 666

Seventh Holding:

The court did not explicitly conclude that dismissal of the enhancements would result in a danger to public safety. Indeed, the trial court did not discuss public safety in its findings, nor did it make any statements related to the possibility of the defendant committing further crimes if his sentence were to be reduced, and he were to be released early, following dismissal of the enhancements. when the trial court does not conclude that dismissal would result in a danger to public safety, the court must assign “great weight” to any mitigating factors, if present, and exercise its discretion in determining whether dismissal would be in the furtherance of justice.

Walker and Gonzalez had not been decided at the time of the trial court’s ruling, and that in making its findings, the trial court did not use the word “mitigating factors,” or specifically discuss the mitigating factors listed under section 1385(c). While we acknowledge that a silent record does not, on its own, reflect an abuse of discretion , we find it is not evident from the instant record and findings that the trial court would have still exercised its discretion not to dismiss the enhancement if it had the guidance provided in those cases. The trial court did not make any indication that the defendant would pose a danger to public safety if he were to be released early as a result of a reduced sentence.

Further, while the trial court’s final order cited the serious nature of the defendant’s offenses, as well as his criminal history. it is unclear if such findings reflected the trial court engaging in a holistic balancing with special emphasis on the enumerated mitigating factors as required under Walker. Under these circumstances, we conclude that remand for resentencing is required. In reaching our decision, we do not express any position on how the court should exercise its discretion under section 1385 regarding dismissal of the section 667(a) enhancement.

Authority:

People v. Stowell (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1107, 1114

People v. Salazar (2023) 15 Cal.5th 416, 424 [noting that if the trial court is unaware of the scope of its informed discretion at the time of sentencing and fails to exercise it in making a sentencing decision, the appellate court must remand for resentencing unless the record clearly indicates that the trial court would have reached the same conclusion even if it had been aware that it had such discretion]

People v. Gonzalez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 215, 228

People v. Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024, 1036

Amelioration, Retroactivity, Sentencing, Sufficiency of and substantial evidence

Case: 000357

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

On remand from the Supreme Court, the prior opinion is amended to vacate the strike finding and prior serious felony enhancement in light of AB 333, enacted after he was sentenced. As held in the original opinion, three of the four counts of felon in possession of a firearm must be vacated, because the same gun was possessed for all four underlying robberies.

First Holding:

The evidence is insufficient to support three of the four charged counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm because he possessed the same gun continuously and can therefore be convicted of only one count. As the Attorney General concedes, the evidence shows a single continuing offense without the interruption in possession necessary for separate crimes. (Indeed, to help prove identity of the perpetrator, the prosecutor relied on the fact that the same gun was used in all the offenses.) We will therefore reverse the judgment and order all but one firearm possession conviction vacated.

Authority:

People v. Mason (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 355, 365

Second Holding:

After defendant was sentenced, section 1170(b) was amended to create a presumption in favor of the low term under certain circumstances, including where the defendant was under age 26 at the time of the offense and youth was a contributing factor in the offense. Because that new provision is ameliorative, it applies retroactively to this nonfinal judgment.

Authority:

PEN 1170(b)(6)

People v. Flores (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1032, 1039

Third Holding:

The Attorney General does not dispute defendant was under 26 at the time of the offenses but argues resentencing is not required because there is no evidence youth was a contributing factor and the aggravating factors found by the court outweigh the mitigating factors such that the court would not have imposed the low term in any event. But when a court has imposed a sentence while unaware of the extent of its discretion—in this case because the legislation was not yet in effect—resentencing is required unless the record clearly indicates the court would have imposed the same sentence under the new standard. We are not persuaded that a lack of evidence showing youth contributed to the offense obviates the need for remand, as before the enactment of the new law, counsel may have had less incentive to present mitigation on the point, and defendant should now be allowed the opportunity to do so.

Authority:

People v. Gerson (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 1067, 1096

Fourth Holding:

Defendant’s sentence was increased based on the finding that he was convicted in 2012 of a serious felony. The prior conviction is for assault under former Penal Code section 245(a)(1), which qualified as a prior serious felony because it was found to have been committed to benefit a criminal street gang under the version of Penal Code section 186.22 then in effect. The strike finding and prior serious felony enhancement must be vacated because legislation enacted after his sentencing (AB No. 333) added several elements to the gang enhancement statute and, if the current standard is applied to his 2012 conviction, the evidence in the record is insufficient to prove the new elements. Where a defendant has suffered a conviction under the prior version of section 186.22, AB 333 applies to the determination of whether the conviction qualifies as a prior serious felony conviction under section 1192.7(c)(28) for purposes of the Three Strikes law and prior serious felony enhancements. We will therefore remand for possible retrial as contemplated in Fletcher, or for resentencing without an increase to defendant’s sentence based on a prior serious felony conviction.

Authority:

People v. Fletcher (2025) 18 Cal.5th 576, 583

Fifth Holding:

Effective January 1, 2020, Penal Code section 667.5(b) was amended to limit prior prison term enhancements (for nonviolent offenses not listed in 667.5(c)) to sentences that were served for sexually violent offenses as defined in Welfare and Institutions Code section 6600(b). The amendment applies retroactively and requires the prior prison term enhancements to be vacated because they were not based on sexually violent offenses.

Authority:

SB 136

PEN 667.5

Sixth Holding:

The trial court imposed a concurrent prison term for possessing ammunition, which should have been stayed under section 654 because the ammunition offense is based on the same conduct as unlawfully possessing a firearm, for which the court also imposed a prison term. When resentencing defendant, the trial court shall apply section 654 to stay any prison terms arising from conduct for which punishment is otherwise imposed.

[GARY NOTE: Section 654 now gives the court the discretion to impose punishment for ANY ONE of multiple counts (and stay the punishment on the other(s)) where section 654 applies, and does NOT require that it impose the sentence on the count bearing the greater sentence.]

Authority:

PEN 654

Sixth Holding:

On resentencing, the defendant will be entitled to consideration under the amendments to section 1385 under SB 81 to to limit sentencing enhancements by requiring that great weight be given to evidence of certain mitigating circumstances. By its terms, amended Penal Code section 1385 applies to all sentencings after January 1, 2022, which will include defendant’s resentencing.

Authority:

PEN 1385