Tag Archives: Discretion

Discretion, Probation Parole PRCS, Sentencing, Standard of review

Case: 000304

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The defendant filed a petition for dismissal citing three different Penal Code sections—sections 1203.4, 1203.4a, and 1203.41. The trial court denied the petition based on section 1203.41, under which the defendant was not entitled to relief. We reverse and remand to allow the court to consider the defendant’s claim for relief under section 1203.4.

First Holding:

The trial court’s denial of relief under any of these statutes (1203.4, 1203.41, 1203.4a) is reviewed for abuse of discretion.

Authority:

People v. McLernon (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 569, 572

Second Holding:

Section 1203.4 authorizes the trial court to expunge a criminal record if the defendant has fulfilled the conditions of probation for the entire period, the defendant was discharged before the probation period ended, or if the court believes relief should be granted in the interests of justice.

Authority:

PEN 1203.4

Third Holding:

Section 1203.4a authorizes dismissal of charges against defendants who are convicted of misdemeanors but were not granted probation.
Authority:

Authority:

PEN 1203.4a

Fourth Holding:

Section 1203.41 allows an individual convicted of a felony, under certain circumstances, to withdraw a guilty or nolo contendere plea, or set aside a guilty verdict in the interests of justice, in the court’s discretion. The crime to which the defendant pleaded guilty is a wobbler. In this case, because the defendant was sentenced to probation with 364 days in county jail, it is a misdemeanor offense.

Authority:

PEN 1203.41

People v. McElroy (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 874, 880

Fifth Holding:

it appears the trial court may have been confused by the defendant’s petition, which sought relief under all three statutes. Relief was not authorized to the defendant under sections 1203.4a and 1203.41, and the court did not err in denying relief under section 1203.41. When a trial court evaluates a petition under the incorrect statute or misunderstands the scope of its discretion, this is an abuse of discretion and the case must be reversed and remanded for an exercise of informed discretion, unless the record clearly indicates the same result would follow.

Authority:

People v. Fuhrman (1997) 16 Cal.4th 930, 944 [where the record affirmatively discloses that the trial court misunderstood the scope of its discretion, remand to the trial court is required]

People v. Parker (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 498, 501–502 [case remanded because trial court mistakenly believed an imposed but suspended sentence is a bar to section 1203.4 relief]

Discretion, Probation Parole PRCS, Sentencing, Standard of review

Case: 000298

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

Although a trial court has broad discretion in imposing terms and conditions when sentencing a criminal defendant to probation instead of imprisonment, any conditions imposed must have some relationship to the crime and be designed to prevent future criminality. In this case, one of the probation conditions imposed required defendant to participate in mental health and substance abuse testing and treatment. Not only was this unconnected to the underlying crime, any suggestion in the probation and sentencing report that defendant suffered from mental health or substance abuse issues was wholly unsupported. Therefore, that probation condition must be stricken.

Holding:

A sentencing court has broad discretion to impose probation conditions to foster rehabilitation and to protect public safety pursuant to Penal Code section 1203.1. But such discretion is not unlimited: A condition of probation must serve a purpose specified in the statute and conditions regulating noncriminal conduct must be reasonably related to the crime of which the defendant was convicted or to future criminality. A probation condition will be upheld unless all of the following are true: it (1) has no relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct which is not reasonably related to future criminality. We review a challenge to the conditions of probation for abuse of discretion.

Authority:

PEN 1203.1

People v. Moran (2016) 1 Cal.5th 398, 403

People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481, 486

Discretion, Standard of review

Case: 000294

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The trial court abused its discretion when it found the defendant unsuitable for mental health diversion despite acknowledging he did not pose an unreasonable risk of committing a “super strike.”

First Holding:

Section 1001.36 authorizes pretrial mental health diversion for defendants with qualifying mental health disorders.

Authority:

PEN 1001.36

People v. Whitmill (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1138, 1147

Second Holding:

A trial court’s ruling on a request for mental health diversion is reviewed for abuse of discretion, and the court’s factual findings are reviewed for substantial evidence.

Authority:

People v. Moine (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 440, 448-449

Third Holding:

A court abuses its discretion when it makes an arbitrary or capricious decision by applying the wrong legal standard or bases its decision on express or implied factual findings that are not supported by substantial evidence. A trial court further abuses its discretion if its decision is so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it.

Authority:

People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 377

Fourth Holding:

A defendant is suitable for mental health diversion based on satisfaction of the following criteria: (1) In the opinion of a qualified mental health expert, the defendant’s symptoms of the mental disorder causing, contributing to, or motivating the criminal behavior would respond to mental health treatment; (2) The defendant consents to diversion and waives the defendant’s right to a speedy trial; (3) The defendant agrees to comply with treatment as a condition of diversion; and (4) The defendant will not pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety, as defined in Section 1170.18, if treated in the community.

Authority:

PEN 1001.36(c)(1)-(4)

People v. Graham (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 787, 795

Fifth Holding:

Under section 1170.18, an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety is an unreasonable risk that the petitioner will commit a “super strike,” which includes any homicide or attempted homicide offense, any serious or violent felony punishable by life imprisonment or death, and sexually violent offenses.

Authority:

PEN 1170.18(c)

PEN 667(e)(2)(C)(iv)

Sixth Holding:

A trial court may not deny diversion to an otherwise eligible defendant unless it finds the defendant is likely to commit one of these offenses. In making this determination, the trial court may consider the opinions of the district attorney, the defense, or a qualified mental health expert, and may consider the defendant’s treatment plan, the defendant’s violence and criminal history, the current charged offense, and any other factors that the court deems appropriate.

Authority:

PEN 1001.36(c)(4)

People v. Moine (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 440, 450

Seventh Holding:

The trial court found defendant unsuitable for mental health diversion despite acknowledging that he was not likely to commit a super strike offense. That acknowledgment was reasonable, given that defendant had never previously been convicted of a super strike offense and was not charged with a super strike in the underlying cases. Under the circumstances, there is no substantial evidence to support a conclusion defendant was likely to commit a super strike.

Authority:

Sarmiento v. Superior Court (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 882, 897

Eighth Holding:

To the extent the trial court was relying on defendant’s history of noncompliance with medication, self-medicating with methamphetamine, his unwillingness to obey court orders, and probation violations, this was also an error. None of these past personal flaws is a reason that the Legislature has identified as valid for denying mental health diversion. Further, none of these reasons is consistent with the underlying purpose of the mental health diversion statute, namely to provide treatment to break the cycle of criminal recidivism for those with diagnosed disorders. Given that the court’s rationale failed to justify its decision to deny defendant mental health diversion, we must vacate the trial court’s orders.

Authority:

Sarmiento v. Superior Court (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 882, 897 [expanding the reasons to deny diversion is inconsistent with the underlying purpose of the mental health diversion statute]E

 

Amelioration, Discretion, Fines and fees, Sentencing, Standard of review

Case: 000292

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

In this appeal following resentencing under section 1172.75, the abstract of judgment must be amended to accurately reflect his actual custody credits, and several fines and fees must be reduced or vacated.

First Holding:

Effective January 1, 2022, section 1172.75(a) invalidated sentence enhancements imposed prior to January 1, 2020, pursuant to subdivision (b) of section 667.5. With exceptions not relevant here, the statute requires that sentences that include these invalid enhancements be recalled and the defendant resentenced.

Authority:

PEN 1172.75

Second Holding:

We review the trial court’s sentencing decision at a section 1172.75 resentencing for an abuse of discretion. Section 1172.75(d), vests the superior court with broad discretion based on an inherently factual inquiry. Under an abuse of discretion standard, we ask whether the trial court’s findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, whether its rulings of law are correct, and whether its application of the law to the facts was neither arbitrary nor capricious.

Authority:

People v. Rogers (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 340, 364

People v. Garcia (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 848, 856–857

Third Holding:

An appellate court may not substitute its judgment about appropriate sentencing for that of the trial court, but instead must give due regard to the discretion vested in that court. The appellate court can find a reversible abuse of discretion only if it concludes that no reasonable judge would have agreed with the trial court’s decision. Unless that standard is met, the appellate court must affirm the decision, even if it might have ruled differentlyin the first instance.

Authority:

People v. Dain (2025) 18 Cal.5th 246, 258

Fourth Holding:

The abstract of judgment reflects credit for time served but reflects 326 fewer days than the defendant is entitled to. It must be corrected to reflect the correct number of days.

Authority:

PEN 2900.1

PEN 2900.5

People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 29 [defendant entitled to all actual custody days since arrest, including date of resentencing]

Fifth Holding:

The trial court imposed a $30 criminal conviction fee on each count pursuant to Government Code section 70373. It also imposed a court operation fee of $40 per count pursuant to section 1465.8, subdivision (a)(1). However, Government Code section 70373 only applies to convictions after the statute’s January 1, 2009 effective date. Similarly, the court operations fee is only applicable to convictions after the statute’s 2003 operative date. Because the defendant suffered the convictions in 1995, the criminal conviction and court operations fees must be stricken.

Authority:

PEN 1465.8

People v. Davis (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 998, 1000

People v. Alford (2007) 42 Cal.4th 749, 753, 754

Sixth Holding:

The restitution fine must be vacated, as it was imposed more than 10 years ago. Upon the expiration of 10 years after the date of imposition of a restitution fine pursuant to section 1202.4, the balance, including any collection fees, shall be unenforceable and uncollectible and any portion of a judgment imposing those fines shall be vacated.

Authority:

PEN 1465.9

In re Mattison (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 1062, 1066

SeventhHolding:

The parole revocation fine must be reduced from $300 to $200. At the resentencing hearing, the court imposed a $300 restitution fine and imposed and stayed a $300 parole revocation fine. However, because the trial court originally imposed a $200 restitution fine, and the court may not impose a more severe punishment on resentencing, we agree with the parties that the stayed parole revocation fine must be reduced to $200, matching the originally imposed restitution fine.

Authority:

PEN 1172.75

Amelioration, Discretion, Sentencing

Case: 000284

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

On resentencing under section 1172.75, the court only struck the now-invalid enhancement, and ortherwise left the original sentence intact. Because the court based its decision not to dismiss enhancements on the mistaken belief defendant was eligible for elderly parole, we conclude the trial court abused its discretion such that defendant’s case must be remanded for a full resentencing.

First Holding:

Section 1385(c)(1) provides that notwithstanding any other law, the court shall dismiss an enhancement if it is in the furtherance of justice to do so, except if dismissal of that enhancement is prohibited by any initiative statute. Section 1385(c)(2) provides in pertinent part, that in exercising its discretion under this subdivision, the court shall consider and afford great weight to evidence offered by the defendant to prove that any of the nine mitigating circumstances in subparagraphs (A) to (I) are present. Proof of the presence of one or more of these circumstances weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the enhancement, unless the court finds that dismissal of the enhancement would endanger public safety.

Authority:

PEN 1385

People v. Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024, 1032

Second Holding:

We review a trial court’s sentencing decisions under section 1385 for an abuse of discretion. When a sentencing court is unaware of its discretionary powers, it cannot exercise informed discretion. The appropriate remedy is to remand for resentencing unless the record clearly indicates that the trial court would have reached the same conclusion even if it had been aware that it had such discretion.

Authority:

PEN 1385

People v. Gonzalez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 215, 225

People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1391

Third Holding:

The trial court mistakenly believed defendant was eligible for elderly parole. (See sec. 3055(g).) Defendant’s sentenced under the Three Strikes law are not eligible for elderly parole. This mistaken belief tainted the trial court’s interests of justice analysis, as it relied heavily on the possibility defendant could obtain parole at a later, but certain, date regardless of its decision to dismiss enhancements. Because the trial court was mistaken about parole, we are uncertain the court would impose an identical sentence given the correct understanding that defendant’s future parole eligibility rested with the trial court alone. Accordingly, defendant is entitled to a full resentencing under the proper standard.

Authority:

People v. Salazar (2023) 15 Cal.5th 416, 419 [there must be clear indication the trial court would have reached the same conclusion with fully informed discretion]

People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893

Sentencing, Standard of review

Case: 000274

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

It was error for the trial court to deny the section 1172.6 petition for recall of sentence based on its conclusion that the defendant was ineligible for relief because there was substantial evidence that he was convicted on a still-valid theory of murder.

First Holding:

Effective January 1, 2019, SB 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) amended the felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life. As part of these ameliorative changes, malice, a key element the People must prove in a murder prosecution, may no longer be imputed to a defendant solely because the defendant participated in another crime. Defendants who were neither actual killers nor acted with the intent to kill can be held liable for murder only if they were major participants in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life, as described in subdivision (d) of section 190.2—that is, the statute defining the felony-murder special circumstance.

Authority:

SB 1437

PC 1172.6

People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 967

People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 708

People v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549, 558

Second Holding:

The trial court used an incorrect legal standard to deny the petition at the prima facie stage. The court erred by applying the substantial evidence standard in concluding defendant was ineligible for relief. The statute does not permit a court to deny a petition at the prima facie stage based on a determination that substantial evidence shows defendant is ineligible for relief. Instead, at this stage, the defendant need only make a prima facie case for relief. In this inquiry, the court takes petitioner’s factual allegations as true and makes a preliminary assessment regarding whether the petitioner would be entitled to relief if his or her factual allegations were proved.

Authority:

PEN 1172.6

People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 971

Third Holding:

Should a trial court encounter a material fact dispute, the court may not resolve that dispute at the prima facie stage and should instead grant petitioner an evidentiary hearing.

Authority:

People v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549, 567

Discretion, Racial Justice Act, Standard of review, Statutory interpretation

Case: 000271

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The petition for writ of habeas corpus, construed as a petition for mandate, is granted. The defendant filed a petition under the Racial Justice Act (RJA) to challenge his conviction of 25 years earlier. He petition contained statistical data showing that the prosecution charged far more Black defendants for specified offenses than White defendants in that same three-year period. He sought counsel in his petition. The trial court denied it in its entirety.

The trial court erred in ruling that the defendant had to make a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief to secure appointment of counsel. Rather, to obtain counsel, the Racial Justice Act requires habeas petitioners to plead a plausible allegation of a violation of the Act. Second, the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s request for counsel was erroneous because regardless of whether he satisfied the minimal pleading standard governing that request, the court was unaware of its discretion to grant him leave to amend the petition to plead a plausible allegation of a Racial Justice Act violation. Lastly, the trial court erred in invoking the prohibition on successive habeas petitions because the defendant was not required to address procedural bars to relief at this initial stage of the proceedings.

First Holding:

When the issue on review is purely legal, such as the proper interpretation and application of a statute or constitutional provision, our review is de novo. Our fundamental task in interpreting a statute is to ascertain the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate its purpose. We begin with the text of the statute and give the words their usual meaning while construing them in light of the statutory framework as a whole. If the statutory language is unambiguous, then its plain meaning controls. If the language permits more than one reasonable interpretation, courts may consider other aids, such as the statute’s purpose, legislative history, and public policy. Discretionary decisions by the trial court are generally subject to appellate review under the abuse of discretion standard to determine if they were within the bounds of some applicable legal criteria.

Authority:

In re Lugo (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1522, 1535

People v. Carter (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 960, 967

People v. Hodge (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 985, 998

Second Holding:

In 2020, the Legislature enacted the Racial Justice Act. The purpose of the Act is to purge racial discrimination from our criminal justice system, and to ensure that race plays no role at all in seeking or obtaining convictions or in sentencing’. In passing the Act, the Legislature recognized that racial bias persists in our criminal justice system because courts generally only address racial bias in its most extreme and blatant forms. The Act acknowledges that all persons possess implicit biases that impact the criminal justice system, and these biases tend to disfavor people of color. The RJA added section 745, which sets forth legal standards governing a claim for relief under the Act. The Act also amended section 1473, which identifies bases for prosecuting a petition for writ of habeas corpus, to add a subdivision governing the litigation of RJA claims.

Authority:

PEN 745

PEN 1473

McIntosh v. Superior Court (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 33, 39, 43

People v. Lawson (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 990, 993

Third Holding:

In the legislation amending section 1473(e) effective January 1, 2026, the Legislature emphasized the extremely low showing a petitioner must make to obtain counsel:  “The Act’s threshold to secure counsel is extremely low, and yet courts have denied counsel to litigants raising Racial Justice Act claims far more than they have appointed counsel The Legislature reaffirms that the threshold showing for appointment of counsel does not require a prima facie showing, as correctly held by McIntosh v. Superior Court (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 33, and should be construed as a minimal pleading requirement.”

Authority:

McIntosh v. Superior Court (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 33

Fourth Holding:

If the Legislature amends or reenacts the statute without changing the interpretation placed on that statute by the courts, the Legislature is presumed to have been aware of, and acquiesced in, the courts’ construction of that statute.

Authority:

People v. Brown (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 1430, 1436

Fifth Holding:

The statute now requires the appointment of counsel for an indigent habeas petitioner if the petition pleads a plausible allegation of a violation of RJA, and obligates the court to determine if the petitioner has made a prima facie showing, instead of a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief.

Authority:

McIntosh v. Superior Court (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 33, 39, 44

Sixth Holding:

The trial court’s denial of the defendant’s request for appointment of counsel was erroneous because the court was unaware of its discretion to permit him to amend his petition to satisfy the minimal pleading burden governing his request for counsel. If the court’s decision is influenced by an erroneous understanding of applicable law or reflects an unawareness of the full scope of its discretion, the court has not properly exercised its discretion under the law. Therefore, a discretionary order based on an application of improper criteria or incorrect legal assumptions is not an exercise of informed discretion and is subject to reversal. Simply stated, an abuse of discretion arises if the trial court based its decision on impermissible factors or on an incorrect legal standard.

Authority:

People v. K.D. (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 1, 19

Discretion, Juveniles, Probation Parole PRCS

Case: 000269

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

We conclude the electronics search condition as currently framed is invalid under Lent and In re Ricardo P. We therefore strike the condition and remand the matter to the juvenile court to consider the imposition of a modified electronics search condition in conformance with Ricardo P. and this opinion.

First Holding:

A juvenile court is authorized to impose any reasonable conditions that it may determine fitting and proper to the end that justice may be done and the reformation and rehabilitation of the ward enhanced. Notably, the permissible scope of discretion in formulating terms of juvenile probation is even greater than that allowed for adults, given that juveniles are deemed to be more in need of guidance and supervision than adults and that the state stands in the shoes of the parents in caring for the minor’s well being when it asserts jurisdiction over the minor.

Authority:

WIC 730(b)

In re Victor L. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 902, 909–910

Second Holding:

This broad discretion, however, is not unlimited. A probation condition is invalid if it (1) has no relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct which is not reasonably related to future criminality. The Lent test is conjunctive—all three prongs must be satisfied before a reviewing court will invalidate a probation term. As the Supreme Court has explained, a condition of probation that requires or forbids conduct which is not itself criminal is valid if that conduct is reasonably related to the crime of which the defendant was convicted or to future criminality.

Authority:

In re J.B. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 749, 754

People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481, 486

People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 379

Third Holding:

The first question is whether the minor’s use of an electronic device bore a relationship to his assault of the victim with force likely to produce great bodily injury. In the context of electronics search probation conditions, some Courts of Appeal have found that use of an electronic device is related to an offense when the device was used to commit, plan, or facilitate that offense. In this case there was no indication that the minor used an electronic device to commit, plan, or facilitate his assault of the victim.

Authority:

People v. Appleton (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 717, 719–720, 724 [electronic device was involved in the offense where defendant met his victim through social media]

People v. Castellanos (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 267, 270, 271, 275–276 [electronic devices involved in transportation of controlled substances where defendant had three cell phones in his car at the time of arrest and cell phones are frequently used in drug sales]

Fourth Holding:

Other Courts of Appeal have found that electronic devices were not related to an offense when the connection between electronic device usage and an offense was more tangential. For example, in Alonzo M., the mere fact that electronic devices were stolen during the minor’s commission of automobile burglaries and purse snatch robberies did not compel the conclusion that electronic devices related to these offenses. Similarly, in Amber K., the minor’s use of social media before and after a school fight was found to be insufficient to satisfy the first prong of Lent.

Authority:

In re Alonzo M. (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 156, 158-164 [observing the condition could not be upheld under either of first two Lent prongs]

In re Amber K. (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 559, 564–566

Fifth Holding:

As indicated, there appears no dispute the second prong of the Lent test has been met. And for good reason: it is well-established that there is nothing inherently illegal about using electronic devices.

Authority:

In re Amber K. (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 559, 566

Sixth Holding:

The third prong of Lent requires that we assess whether the electronics search condition requires or forbids conduct that is not reasonably related to future criminality. The third prong of Lent contemplates a degree of proportionality between the burden imposed by a probation condition and the legitimate interests served by the condition. An abstract or hypothetical relationship between the probation condition and preventing future criminality is insufficient. A condition can survive only when there is information in the record establishing a connection between the search condition and the probationer’s criminal conduct or personal history and when the burden imposed by the condition is proportionate to the legitimate interests served by that condition.

Authority:

In re Ricardo P. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1113, 1121-1122

In re Alonzo M. (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 156, 166

Seventh Holding:

Following Ricardo P. and Alonzo M., we conclude the broad-ranging electronics search condition burdens the minor’s privacy in a manner substantially disproportionate to the probation department’s legitimate interest in monitoring” his compliance with his probation terms, including the order to stay away from the victim.

Authority:

In re Alonzo M. (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 156, 168

Amelioration, Discretion, Sentencing, Standard of review

Case: 000261

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

At the defendant’s hearing under section 1172.75, the court abused its discretion when it declined to dismiss the prior serious felony conviction enhancements as to each count. Pursuant to section 1465.9, we vacate the balance of the restitution fine.

First Holding:

Section 1385 provides that, notwithstanding any other law, the court shall dismiss an enhancement if it is in the furtherance of justice to do so. It requires that a sentencing court give great weight to evidence offered by the defendant to prove that any of the nine mitigating circumstances in subparagraphs (A) to (I) are present. One or more mitigating circumstances weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the enhancement. The statute provides an exception when the court finds that dismissal of the enhancement would endanger public safety. “Endanger public safety” means there is a likelihood that the dismissal of the enhancement would result in physical injury or other serious danger to others.

Authority:

PEN 1385

Second Holding:

When a trial court finds that dismissal of an enhancement would endanger public safety, it must not exclusively consider whether the defendant currently poses a danger to the public. Although the current dangerousness of the petitioner is an appropriate factor to consider, as it will have some bearing on whether dismissing the enhancement would endanger the public, a crucial part of the inquiry is how the dismissal of the enhancement will impact the length of the defendant’s sentence. A currently dangerous defendant who will be released from prison within a short timeframe not necessarily the same as a currently dangerous defendant who has no prospect of release from prison until he is elderly. A trial court would find the former to pose a greater danger than the latter.

Authority:

People v. Gonzalez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 215, 228

Third Holding:

Absent a finding that dismissal would endanger public safety, a court retains the discretion to impose or dismiss enhancements provided that it assigns significant value to the enumerated mitigating circumstances when they are present. Stated simply, if the court does not conclude that dismissal would endanger public safety, then mitigating circumstances strongly favor dismissing the enhancement. But ultimately, the court must determine whether dismissal is in the furtherance of justice.

Authority:

People v. Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024, 1029, 1036

Fourth Holding:

We review a trial court’s decision not to strike sentencing enhancements under section 1385 for abuse of discretion. We must not disturb an exercise of discretion on appeal except on a showing that the court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice. A court abuses its discretion if it bases its decision on impermissible factors or on an incorrect legal standard.

Authority:

People v. Mendoza (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 287, 298

People v. Gonzalez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 215, 225

Fifth Holding:

During the resentencing hearing, the prosecutor argued that the superior court should not reduce the sentence beyond striking the prior prison term enhancement because the defendant posed a threat to public safety based on the underlying facts of the case. In response, defense counsel urged the court not to focus on his current risk to public safety. She reasoned that the defendant would still have to serve three consecutive life sentences even if the court struck the prior serious felony conviction enhancements.

The court’s discussion of the underlying offenses and the defendant’s prior convictions does not suggest a forward-looking inquiry. Instead, the court relied on past conduct to determine the defendant’s present dangerousness. The court applied a legal standard that was not consistent with Gonzalez. The record does not demonstrate that the superior court considered whether the defendant would endanger public safety if the enhancements were stricken and he was still subject to the indeterminate term. We conclude that the superior court abused its discretion by failing to consider his future dangerousness if the enhancements were stricken within the context of his indeterminate sentence.

Authority:

People v. Gonzalez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 215, 228

Sixth Holding:

The Attorney General argues that we should presume that the superior court correctly applied the law and conducted a forward-thinking inquiry as to the defendant’s dangerousness. But the superior court did not have the benefit of Gonzalez on the date of resentencing. We cannot presume the trial court knew a standard that did not yet exist.

Authority:

People v. Brugman (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 608, 637

People v. Chambers (1982) 136 Cal.App.3d 444, 457 [presumption does not apply when the sentencing law is not yet established]

People v. Jones (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1076, 1092

Discretion, Probation Parole PRCS, Standard of review

Case: 000244

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The court erred by imposing a probation condition that required the defendant to submit to searches of her computers, recordable media, and electronic devices. The electronic search condition is not reasonably related to criminality. Because we conclude the electronic search condition is unreasonable under the Lent test, we do not consider whether it is unconstitutionally overbroad. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of conviction in part and remand with instructions to strike the electronic search condition and consider whether a more narrowly tailored or alternative condition would be reasonable.

First Holding:

In Lent, the Supreme Court adopted a three-part test to determine whether a probation condition is reasonable and, therefore, statutorily valid. Generally, a condition of probation will not be held invalid unless it (1) has no relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct which is not reasonably related to future criminality. This test is conjunctive—all three prongs must be satisfied before a reviewing court will invalidate a probation term.

Authority:

People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481, 486

People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 379

Second Holding:

A probation condition that imposes limitations on a person’s constitutional rights must closely tailor those limitations to the purpose of the condition to avoid being invalidated as unconstitutionally overbroad. The essential question in an overbreadth challenge is the closeness of the fit between the legitimate purpose of the restriction and the burden it imposes on the defendant’s constitutional rights—bearing in mind, of course, that perfection in such matters is impossible, and that practical necessity will justify some infringement.

Authority:

In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 890

People v. Appleton (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 717, 723

Third Holding:

We review conditions of probation for abuse of discretion. Specifically, we review a probation condition for an indication that the condition is arbitrary or capricious or otherwise exceeds the bounds of reason under the circumstances.

Authority:

In re Ricardo P. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1113, 1118

Amelioration, Discretion, Sentencing, Standard of review, Sufficiency of and substantial evidence

Case: 000232

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The trial court abused its discretion in denying the defendant’s motion for mental health diversion because substantial evidence did not support the court’s conclusion that his mental illnesses were not a significant factor in the commission of the underlying offenses.

First Holding:

In 2018, the Legislature enacted provisions to create a pretrial diversion program for defendants with certain mental health disorders. Pretrial diversion allows for the suspension of criminal proceedings and potential dismissal of charges upon successful completion of mental health treatment. The statute expressly promotes increased diversion of individuals with mental disorders to mitigate the individuals’ entry and reentry into the criminal justice system while protecting public safety.

Authority:

PEN 1001.35

PEN 1001.36

Vaughn v. Superior Court (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 124, 133

Second Holding:

Section 1001.36 provides that a defendant is eligible for pretrial diversion if the defendant has been diagnosed with a specified mental disorder within the last five years by a qualified mental health expert, and the defendant’s mental disorder was a significant factor in the commission of the charged offense. If the defendant has been diagnosed with a mental disorder, the court shall find that the defendant’s mental disorder was a significant factor in the commission of the offense unless there is clear and convincing evidence that it was not a motivating factor, causal factor, or contributing factor to the defendant’s involvement in the alleged offense.

If the defendant is eligible, the court also must determine whether the defendant is suitable for pretrial diversion based on satisfaction of the following criteria: (1) In the opinion of a qualified mental health expert, the defendant’s symptoms of the mental disorder causing, contributing to, or motivating the criminal behavior would respond to mental health treatment; (2) The defendant consents to diversion and waives the defendant’s right to a speedy trial; (3) The defendant agrees to comply with treatment as a condition of diversion; and (4) The defendant will not pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety, as defined in Section 1170.18, if treated in the community.

Authority:

People v. Graham (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 787, 795

Third Holding:

We review a trial court’s ruling on a petition for pretrial mental health diversion for abuse of discretion. A court abuses its discretion when it makes an arbitrary or capricious decision by applying the wrong legal standard, or bases its decision on express or implied factual findings that are not supported by substantial evidence. Therefore, we review a trial court’s factual findings in support of its ruling for substantial evidence.

Authority:

People v. Graham (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 787, 795

People v. Whitmill (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1138, 1147

Fourth Holding:

The trial court failed to apply the presumption that, given the timely diagnoses of mental health disorders, the mental condition contributed to his behavior. The burden then was on the prosecution to rebut the presumption by producing clear and convincing evidence tha there was no causal connection.

Authority:

People v. Harlow (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 485, 490

Fifth Holding:

However, while eligibility and suitability are preconditions, mental health diversion remains discretionary even if they are met. Because of the existence of this residual discretion, the proper remedy is to remand with instructions for the trial court to consider both eligibility and suitability, along with making relevant findings, in accordance with the current law.

Authority:

Sarmiento v. Superior Court (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 882

People v. Qualkinbush (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 879, 888

Discretion, Sentencing, Standard of review

Case: 000230

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

At the defendant’s hearing on the recall of his sentence under section 1172.75, the court failed to recalculate his custody credits upon resentencing. We direct the trial court to correct the custody credits in the resentencing minute order and the abstract of judgment.

First Holding:

Everyone sentenced to prison for criminal conduct is entitled to credit against his term for all actual days of confinement solely attributable to the same conduct. When a defendant is imprisoned and later resentenced, the sentencing court must recalculate and credit against the modified sentence all actual time the defendant has already served, whether in jail or prison, and whether before or since he was originally committed and delivered to prison custody.

Authority:

PEN 2900.5

People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 29-30, 37

Second Holding:

We review a trial court’s decision not to strike a prior felony conviction for abuse of discretion. It is the defendant’s burden on appeal to show that the sentencing decision was irrational or arbitrary. Absent such a showing, the trial court is presumed to have acted to achieve legitimate sentencing objectives, and its discretionary determination to impose a particular sentence will not be set aside on review. In addition, we will not reverse a trial court’s sentencing decision merely because reasonable people might disagree. An appellate tribunal is neither authorized nor warranted in substituting its judgment for the judgment of the trial judge.

Authority:

People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 371, 376-377