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Racial Justice Act

Case 000817

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

Though brought as an appeal, the appellate court exercised its discreation and treated the matter as a petition for writ of mandate, the proper vehicle to challenge an order denying the defendant’s motion for discovery under the Racial Justice Act [RJA], as the order was an interlocutory, nonappealable order. We grant the petition.

First Holding:

The petitioner is only authorized to bring an RJA claim by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus because he is incarcerated and his judgment is already final. Petitioner has not filed such a petition.

Authority:

PEN 745

PEN 1473

People v. Hodge (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 985, 999–1000

People v. Serrano (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 276, 292–293

In re Montgomery (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 1062, 1070–1072, review granted Dec. 11, 2024, S287339

Second Holding:

Until recently, appellate courts were divided over whether courts have jurisdiction to rule on a postjudgment RJA discovery motion unattached to a petition for writ of habeas corpus. This dispute, however, was resolved when the Legislature enacted AB 1071 (2025–2026 Reg. Sess.), effective January 1, 2026, which added Penal Code section 1473,(e)(2).

This new provision expressly authorizes a petitioner, or their counsel, to file a discovery motion under section 745(d), upon the prosecution of a petition under this subdivision, or in preparation to file a petition.

Authority:

PEN 745(d)

PEN 1473(e)(2)

People v. Serrano (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 276, 291

Third Holding:

The trial court’s erroneous denial of petitioner’s discovery motion, as an interlocutory order, is not appealable and is challengeable only by petition for writ of mandate. We exercise our discretion to treat the appeal as a petition for writ of mandate, as both parties have thoroughly briefed the merits of the petitioner’s claim of right to discovery under the RJA.

Authority:

People v. Serrano (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 276, 292-293

Gonzales v. Superior Court (2024) 108 Cal.App.5th Supp. 36, 53–54 [Writ review is appropriate in discovery matters where, as here, it is necessary to address questions of first impression that are of general importance to the trial courts and to the legal profession, and where general guidelines can be laid down for future cases.]

Olson v. Cory (1983) 35 Cal.3d 390, 401 [treating an appeal as a writ petition is appropriate when an issue under review has been thoroughly briefed and argued, such that dismissing the appeal would be unnecessarily dilatory and circuitous]

Fourth Holding:

A petitioner seeking to pursue an RJA claim must show good cause to obtain discovery in anticipation of filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus. This good cause standard is more lenient than the prima facie showing required for obtaining relief under section 745(a). Nonetheless, the statute’s good cause language serves a gatekeeping function.

Authority:

PEN 745(d)

Young v. Superior Court (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 138, 166 [whether the allegations underscoring [the petitioner’s racial profiling theory are enough to support a plausible justification that a violation of section 745(a) could or might have occurred in his or her case is an issue for the trial court to assess, exercising its discretion upon an application of the correct legal standard governing good cause]

In re Montgomery (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 1062, 1075 [review granted Dec. 11, 2024, S287339] (conc. opn. of Kelety, J.) [Nor would an interpretation of section 745(d) that allows habeas corpus petitioners to obtain such discovery trigger a right to unlimited discovery]

People v. Serrano (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 276, 293

Fifth Holding:

In Young, the appellate court concluded that the good cause standard for discovery under the RJA is akin to the good cause standard for Pitchess motions [pertaining to discovery of police personnel records in criminal cases]. It observed that the Pitchess good cause standard includes the requirement for a defendant to establish a plausible factual foundation for officer misconduct.

The Young court concluded that the same standard applies in RJA cases. In order to establish good cause for discovery under the RJA, a defendant is required only to advance a plausible factual foundation, based on specific facts, that a violation of the RJA could or might have occurred in his case.

Authority:

Young v. Superior Court (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 138, 158-159

People v. Superior Court (Lalo) (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 707, 712

McDaniel v. Superior Court (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 228, 244

Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531

Sixth Holding:

Based on the evidence presented by the petitioner in his motion, we conclude that he met the foundational requirement of presenting a plausible justification for discovery under section 745(d).

Authority:

Young v. Superior Court (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 138, 144-145

Seventh Holding:

It has long been the law that a criminal defendant who has established his indigent status is constitutionally entitled to those defense services for which he demonstrates a need, which services may include discovery costs, investigative costs, transcript costs, expert fees, etc.

In this matter, petitioner did not assert in the superior court a right to free copies of discovery materials with a demonstration of his indigent status. Unless or until petitioner does so, he is not entitled to free copies of any material discoverable under the RJA. [it does not offend the Constitution to require a nonindigent defendant to pay reasonable fees for duplicating discovery materials disclosed by the district attorney pursuant to section 1054.1]

Authority:

Schaffer v. Superior Court (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1235, 1245 [it does not offend the Constitution to require a nonindigent defendant to pay reasonable fees for duplicating discovery materials disclosed by the district attorney pursuant to section 1054.1]

Juveniles, Sentencing

Case 000816

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

Given that the minor was not removed from his home, it was error for the court to set the maximum term of confinement.

Holding:

When a minor is removed from the physical custody of a parent or guardian, a juvenile court must specify the maximum term of confinement. But the statute authorizes the juvenile court to specify the maximum confinement term only when a minor is removed from parental custody. Because the juvenile court did not remove the minor from his mother’s custody, the maximum confinement term should be stricken.

Authority:

WIC 726(d)(1)

In re Matthew A. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 537, 541

 

Discretion, Probation Parole PRCS, Sentencing, Standard of review

Case 000815

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

It was error to impose a condition of probation that the defendant must submit to chemical testing for the use of alcohol at any time as directed by probation officer or other law enforcement officer.

First Holding:

As an initial matter, we address and reject the Attorney General’s argument that the defendant’s failure to object to the alcohol testing condition forfeited the issue on appeal. Neither forfeiture nor application of the forfeiture rule is automatic, and appellate courts have discretion to review otherwise forfeited challenges. Here, we exercise our right to decide the appeal on its merits, in order to eliminate the need to address the defendant’s alternative ineffective assistance of counsel claim. We now turn to the reasonableness of condition

Authority:

People v. McCullough (2013) 56 Cal.4th 589, 593

In re Victor L. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 902, 928

Second Holding:

The defendant challenges the imposition of probation condition 13, which required him to submit to alcohol testing, as unreasonable under Lent. He contends the condition does not make sense because the trial court struck condition 12 that prohibited him from consuming or possessing alcohol.

Authority:

People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481

Third Holding:

We review conditions of probation for abuse of discretion. That is, a reviewing court will disturb the trial court’s decision to impose a particular condition of probation only if, under all the circumstances, that choice is arbitrary and capricious and is wholly unreasonable.

Authority:

People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 379

People v. Moran (2016) 1 Cal.5th 398, 403

Fourth Holding:

A condition of probation will not be held invalid unless it ‘(1) has no relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct which is not reasonably related to future criminality. The Lent test is conjunctive—all three prongs must be satisfied before a reviewing court will invalidate a probation term.

The conditions of probation aimed at rehabilitating the offender need not be so strictly tied to the offender’s precise crime as long as they are reasonably directed at curbing an offender’s future criminality. But there must be a strong connection between the burdens imposed by the challenged condition and a probationer’s criminal conduct or personal history.

Authority:

People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481, 486

People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 379

In re Ricardo P. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1113, 1120

Fifth Holding:

Notably, when asked to strike the condition requiring the defendant to abstain from drinking alcohol, the sentencing court freely did so without any apparent reservation. This striking shows the court was not concerned that the defendant’s alcohol consumption had the potential for abuse or was likely to lead to future criminality.

As such, because the defendant was allowed to possess and consume alcohol, there was no rational need to test the defendant for alcohol consumption as a condition of probation. Therefore, we conclude the testing condition here has no deterrent effect on the defendant’s future criminality and is unreasonable.

Authority:

People v. Kiddoo (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 922, 928, disapproved on other grounds in People v. Welch (1993) 5 Cal.4th 228, 236–237 [court struck a probation condition that appellant not possess or consume alcohol or frequent places where alcohol was sold because there was no factual indication in the record that the proscribed behavior is reasonably related to future criminal behavior]

Sixth Holding:

Because the court’s imposition of condition 13 was therefore an abuse of discretion, we order it stricken.

Authority:

In re Malik J. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 896, 901 [In an appropriate case, a probation condition that is not sufficiently precise or narrowly drawn may be modified in this court and affirmed as modified]

Sentencing, Sixth Amendment, Standard of review

Case 000814

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The trial court prejudicially erred in imposing the upper term based on the aggravating circumstance that the defendant’s prior convictions as an adult or sustained petitions in juvenile delinquency proceedings are numerous or of increasing seriousness, without either a true finding by a jury or the defendant’s admission.

First Holding:

Section 1170(b)(2) provides that the trial court may impose a sentence exceeding the middle term only when aggravating circumstances justify imposition of an upper term sentence, and the facts underlying those circumstances have been stipulated to by the defendant or have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial.

Authority:

PEN 1170(b)(2)

Second Holding:

This trial right is not merely a state law entitlement, but is constitutionally required. Under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the United States Constitution, any fact that exposes a defendant to a greater potential sentence must be found by a jury, not a judge, and established beyond a reasonable doubt, not merely by a preponderance of the evidence.

Authority:

People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1078

People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 755-767

Erlinger v. United States (2024) 602 U.S. 821, 834 [Virtually any fact that increases the prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal defendant is exposed must be resolved by a unanimous jury beyond a reasonable doubt (or freely admitted in a guilty plea).]

Third Holding:

The only exception to this rule is the fact of a prior conviction. A court may consider the defendant’s prior convictions in determining sentencing based on a certified record of conviction without submitting the prior convictions to a jury. Allegations of prior convictions may be tried by the court alone and proven by certified records of conviction. However, this exception is narrow. A judge may do no more, consistent with the Sixth Amendment, than determine what crime, with what elements, the defendant was convicted of.

Authority:

People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1079, 1083, 1084 [any fact, beyond the bare fact of a prior conviction, that exposes a defendant to harsher punishment, must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, unless the defendant stipulates to its truth or waives a jury trial]

Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 490

People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 742, 757 [Excluding properly proven prior convictions or a defense stipulation, a jury finding is now required for all facts actually relied on to impose an upper term.]

Erlinger v. United States (2024) 602 U.S. 821, 838

Fourth Holding:

Two aggravating factors under the rules of court—the increasing seriousness of a defendant’s prior convictions (rule 4.421(b)(2)) and unsatisfactory performance on probation (rule 4.421(b)(5))—involve something more than a narrow factual finding that the convictions were sustained and what elements were required to prove them. Accordingly, a defendant is entitled to a jury trial on those two factors before the factors can be used to justify an upper term sentence.

Authority:

People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1082-1085

Fifth Holding:

When a defendant is deprived of a jury trial on aggravating facts used to justify imposition of an upper term sentence, the reviewing court must apply the standard of review under Chapman. Under that standard, a sentence imposed under section 1170(b) must be reversed and remanded unless the reviewing court concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury, applying that same standard, would have found true all of the aggravating facts upon which the court relied to conclude the upper term was justified, or that those facts were otherwise proved true in compliance with the current statute.

Lack of a jury trial is not harmless under Chapman if the record contains evidence that could rationally lead to a contrary finding with respect to the aggravating fact at issue.

Authority:

People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1087

Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18

Sixth Holding:

The facts supporting every aggravating circumstance upon which the trial court relies to justify imposition of the upper term must be properly proven.

Authority:

People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 757

Sentencing, Sixth Amendment, Standard of review

Case 000813

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

In imposing the upper term the trial court erroneously relied on circumstances in aggravation that were not stipulated to nor submitted to a jury for proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

First Holding:

In support of the upper term, the court identified several circumstances in aggravation that it concluded did not need to be submitted to the jury. The trial court proceeded to find true that the defendant’s prior convictions as an adult or sustained petitions in juvenile delinquency proceedings were numerous or of increasing seriousness; that the defendant has served a prior term in prison or county jail under section 1170(h); and that the defendant was on probation, mandatory supervision, postrelease community supervision, or parole when the crime was committed.

At the sentencing hearing, the trial court also mentioned finding true a fourth aggravating factor, that the defendant’s prior performance on probation, mandatory supervision, postrelease community supervision, or parole was unsatisfactory. This was error.

In Wiley, the Supreme Court recognized that, under the Sixth Amendment and section 1170(b), a defendant is entitled to a jury trial on all aggravating facts, other than the bare fact of a prior conviction and its elements, that expose the defendant to imposition of a sentence more serious than the statutorily provided midterm. This right to a jury trial extends to the aggravating factor that a defendant’s prior convictions were of increasing seriousness. It also extends to the aggravating factor that a defendant’s prior performance on probation or parole was unsatisfactory.

Authority:

People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1076, 1083, 1086

Second Holding:

We apply the Chapman standard of review to determine if the error was prejudicial. A defendant is entitled to a reversal and remand for resentencing unless, after examining the entire cause, including the evidence as to all relevant circumstances, we can conclude that the omission of a jury trial was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt as to every aggravating fact the trial court used to justify an upper term sentence.

Authority:

People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1076, 1087

People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 768

Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18