AppellateAdvisor Law Library Background

Case 000897

Error and/or relief

On remand following the defendant’s earlier appeal, the trial court imposed an upper term based on impermissible aggravating recidivism factors.

Holding:

Under the Sixth Amendment, a defendant is entitled to a jury trial on all aggravating facts, other than the bare fact of a prior conviction and its elements, that expose the defendant to imposition of a sentence more serious than the statutorily provided midterm.

Here, the court imposed the upper term based on the aggravating facts that the defendant’s prior convictions were numerous and of increasing seriousness and his performance on probation was unsatisfactory.

Because the defendant did not stipulate to these facts, which go beyond the bare fact of his prior convictions and their elements, he was entitled to a jury trial on them. That he did not receive one renders the sentence unauthorized.

Accordingly, we vacate the sentence and remand the matter to give the People an opportunity to retry the aggravating facts.

Authority:

People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1086, 1091

People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 776 [proper remedy where aggravating facts were not tried to a jury is to remand and give the People an opportunity to retry the aggravating facts]

 

Second Holding:

Add holding blurb here

Authority:

ADD AUTHORITIES HERE

Case 000896

Error and/or relief

The defendant’s 10-year prison terms constitute ex post facto punishment. We reverse the judgment and remand for a new sentencing hearing.

First Holding:

The trial court instructed the jurors that the offenses charged in counts 1 through 4 allegedly occurred sometime between a specific date in 2007 and a specific date in 2015.

The jurors made no specific finding about the dates of the acts on which they convicted the defendant for counts 1 through 4. The jury made no finding that the offenses in counts 1 through 4 occurred before the Legislature increased the sentencing triad from 3-6-8 years to 5-8-10 yearson September 9, 2010. In addition, the record does not establish that the jury must have based its verdicts on acts occurring after that date.

Thus, we conclude the trial court violated the prohibition against ex post facto laws by imposing 10-year terms for the defendant’s convictions on counts 1 through 4.

Authority:

People v. Hiscox (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 253, 257–262

Second Holding:

As to the remedy for the ex post facto violation, we exercise our discretion to vacate the defendant’s sentence and remand the matter for full resentencing. On remand, the trial court should impose prison terms on counts 1 through 4 in accordance with the triad in effect prior to September 9, 2010.

Authority:

PEN 1260

People v. Hiscox (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 253, 262

People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893

Case 000895

Error and/or relief

We remand solely as to the fines and ancillary costs ordered in this case on appeal.

First Holding:

Kopp allows challenges based on the excessive fines and equal protection clauses of the federal or state Constitutions.

Authority:

People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1

Second Holding:

Kopp addresses the proper means by which a criminal defendant may challenge the various court ordered payments imposed at criminal sentencings. Those payments fall into three broad categories: fines, ancillary costs, and victim restitution. As to fines, such as restitution and parole revocation payments under Penal Code sections 1202.4 and 1202.45, there is no due process requirement to hold an ability to pay hearing before imposing every punitive fine. Instead, excessive fines analysis, which includes consideration of ability to pay, is the proper vehicle to challenge punitive fines under either the federal or state Constitutions.

Authority:

People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1, 17, 23

Third Holding:

As to ancillary costs, under Penal Code section 1465.8 and Government Code section 70373, Kopp explains an equal protection analysis is appropriate and holds that equal protection principles require a court, upon request, to consider a defendant’s inability to pay before imposing a court operations assessment.

(Gary note: This stems from the recognition that in civil cases, the same fees are due, but the superior court may waive them for civil litigants. Kopp concludes that criminal defendants must be given the same consideration, as there is no legitimate reason to discriminate between civil cases and criminal cases for administrative assessments that go toward support of the court system and are not punitive in nature.)

Authority:

People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1, 30

Case 000894

Error and/or relief

The record discloses that the trial court imposed an unauthorized sentence by imposing a fine without specifying the basis of the penalty assessments.

(Gary note: This was not a victory in the purest sense, as it changed nothing for the defendant, whom the trial court found had the ability to pay. I have included this summary for its authority that the court must specify the breakdown of the fine with its various penalty assessments. In the case, the appellate court reversed the imposition of the fine and directed the trial court to reimpose it but specifying the authority for the various assessments that turned the $300 fine into $1170.)

First Holding:

Section 290.3 provides in pertinent part, that every person who is convicted of any offense specified in section 290(c) shall, in addition to any imprisonment or fine, or both, imposed for violation of the underlying offense, be punished by a fine of $300 upon the first conviction or a fine of $500 upon the second and each subsequent conviction, unless the court determines that the defendant does not have the ability to pay the fine.

Authority:

PEN 290.3(a)

Second Holding:

The imposition of a section 290.3 fine in the total amount of $1,170 or the imposition of a $300 base fine plus $870 in penalty assessments without citing the statutory basis for the penalty assessments are both unauthorized sentences. An unauthorized sentence may be corrected at any time even if there was no objection in the trial court. Such an unauthorized sentence may be corrected even when raised for the first time on appeal.

Authority:

People v. Valenzuela, (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1246, 1248-1249 [The fine imposed in this case constituted an unauthorized sentence]

In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 886,

People v. Smith (2001) 24 Cal.4th 849, 854

Third Holding:

The trial court imposed the sex offender fine in the amount of $1,170 as set forth in the probation report. We construe the court’s statement to mean that it intended to impose the section 290.3 fine and the corresponding penalty assessments, which are listed in the probation report, but erroneously failed to list each penalty assessment and their respective corresponding amounts at sentencing.

We shall therefore modify the judgment to include a $300 section 290.3 fine and penalty assessments in the following amounts: a $60.00 Court Surcharge (sec. 1465.7), a $150.00 State Court Facilities Construction Fund Fee (Gov. Code, sec. 70372(a)), a $300.00 State Penalty Assessment (sec. 1464), a $210.00 County Penalty Assessment (Gov. Code, sec. 76000), a $30.00 DNA Identification Fund Fee (Gov. Code, sec. 76104.6), and a $120.00 DNA Identification Fund fee (Gov. Code, sec. 76104.7).

Authority:

PEN 290.3

PEN 1465.7

GOV 70372(a)

PEN 1464

GOV 76000

GOV 76104.6

GOV 76104.7

Case 000893

Error and/or relief

It was error for the judge to stay the section 12022.1 enhancement under section 1385(b)(1). An enhancement may be stricken or imposed, unless there is some other legal reason it must be stayed rather than imposed.

First Holding:

Ordinarily, an enhancement must be either imposed or stricken in furtherance of justice under section 1385. Section 1385(b)(1) adds that, if the court has the authority pursuant to subdivision (a) to strike or dismiss an enhancement, the court may instead strike the additional punishment for that enhancement in the furtherance of justice in compliance with subdivision (a).

The trial court has no authority to stay an enhancement, rather than strike it—not, at least, when the only basis for doing either is its own discretionary sense of justice.

There are exceptions to this rule that permit courts to stay the punishment imposed for an enhancement, for example section 654 and rule 4.447 of the California Rules of Court. These exceptions are not discretionary; they are limited to the situation in which an enhancement that otherwise would have to be either imposed or stricken is barred by an overriding statutory prohibition. In that situation—and that situation only—the trial court can and should stay the enhancement.

Authority:

PEN 1385(b)(1)

People v. Lopez (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 355, 364

Second Holding:

According to the transcript of the sentencing hearing, the trial court here relied on section 1385(b)(1) when it purported to stay the section 12022.1 enhancement. It does not appear that any overriding statute prohibits imposition of the enhancement in this case.

As a result, the court lacked the authority to stay the enhancement. In general, we presume a trial court knew and followed the law. Based on the statutory provision cited by the court, we conclude the court intended to strike the punishment for the enhancement rather than imposing an unauthorized stayed sentence.

The minute order from the sentencing hearing supports this conclusion by indicating that the court struck the enhancement, though it suggests the court did so at a prior hearing, which is not supported by the transcript. We will modify the judgment accordingly.

Authority:

People v. Ramirez (2021) 10 Cal.5th 983, 1042