AppellateAdvisor Law Library Background

Case 000572

Error and/or relief

The gang and gang-related firearm enhancements must be vacated in light of the amendments under AB 333.

First Holding:

AB 333, which amended section 186.22, was enacted in 2021 and became effective on January 1, 2022. The amendments AB 333 made to section 186.22 apply retroactively to the defendant’s case. The substantive amendments to section 186.22 require us to vacate the jury’s findings on the gang allegations and gang-related firearm allegations. We remand the matter to afford the prosecution the opportunity to retry these allegations, should it choose to do so.

Authority:

PEN 186.22

People v. Burgos (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1, 7

People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1206–1207

In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740

Second Holding:

AB 333 added new elements to the substantive gang offense and gang enhancements in section 186.22—for example, by requiring proof that gang members collectively engage in a pattern of criminal gang activity, that the predicate offenses were committed by gang members, that the predicate offenses benefitted the gang, and that the predicate and underlying offenses provided more than a reputational benefit to the gang. These changes had the effect of increasing the threshold for conviction of the section 186.22 offense and the imposition of the enhancement.

Authority:

PEN 186.22

People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1207

People v. Burgos (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1, 9

People v. Clark (2024) 15 Cal.5th 743, 749

Third Holding:

When a substantive change occurs in the elements of an offense and the jury is not instructed as to the proper elements, the omission implicates the defendant’s right to a jury trial under the Sixth Amendment, and reversal is required unless it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury verdict would have been the same in the absence of the error. On this record, reversal of the gang enhancements is required, and the prosecution must be given the opportunity to establish the additional elements on remand, should it choose to do so.

Authority:

People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1207

People v. Eagle (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 275, 280

Fourth Holding:

In addition to amending section 186.22, AB 333 added section 1109, which requires that the trial of a gang enhancement charged under section 186.22(b), be bifurcated from and follow trial of the underlying offenses when requested by the defendant. AB 333’s enactment of section 1109 became effective almost two years after defendant’s trial. But section 1109 is not retroactive and therefore does not apply.

Authority:

PEN 1109

People v. Ramos (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 1116, 1129 [disapproved of on other grounds in People v. Burgos (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1, at p. 31]

People v. Burgos (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1, 9

Fifth Holding:

The same rationale applies to the jury’s findings on the section 12022.53(e)(1) firearm allegations, which require findings under section 186.22(b). Section 12022.53(e)(1) provides for enhanced firearm penalties for any person who is a principal in the commission of an offense if the prosecution pleads and proves that (1) the person violated section 186.22(b), and (2) any principal in the offense committed a firearm violation specified in section 12022.53(b), (c), or (d).

Here, the jury found three section 12022.53(e)(1) allegations true as to the defendant. Because this enhancement depends on a finding pursuant to section 186.22(b), the changes to section 186.22 made by AB 333 require that the true findings on these allegations also be vacated and the matter remanded to the trial court.

Authority:

PEN 12022.53(e)(1)

People v. Lopez (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 327, 346-348

Case 000571

Error and/or relief

The court erred in imposing fees regardless of the defendant’s inability to pay. We strike the fees.

Holding:

In Kopp, our Supreme Court recently held that, if a defendant requests, a trial court must consider the defendant’s inability to pay before imposing a court operations assessment under section 1465.8(a)(1), or a court facilities assessment under Government Code section 70373(a)(1). Here, defendant argued he had not been working and was therefore unable to pay any fines and fees, and the trial court agreed as to the court operations and court facilities assessments.

However, instead of waiving these fees as a court would do for an indigent civil litigant, the trial court imposed and stayed the ancillary costs. Given that the Legislature has provided fee waivers to indigent civil litigants, equal protection principles require a court, upon request, to consider a criminal defendant’s inability to pay before imposing either assessment. No similar differences justify denying criminal defendants the right to seek a waiver of certain ancillary costs when civil litigants facing the same costs may receive such a waiver. While the trial court did not have the benefit of our Supreme Court’s recent decision in Kopp at the time it imposed fines and fees, the order nonetheless violated defendant’s equal protection rights, and we must strike the fees.

Authority:

People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1, 30

Case 000570

Error and/or relief

The abstract of judgment must be corrected, as the fines and fees it lists were not ordered by the court.

Holding:

At sentencing, the trial court imposed the prison sentence and awarded custody credits, but did not impose any fines or fees on the record. The abstract of judgment, however, lists a $300 restitution fine, a $300 parole revocation fine, suspended unless parole is revoked, a $40 court operations fee, and a $30 criminal conviction assessment fee. Where there is a discrepancy between the oral pronouncement of judgment and the minute order or the abstract of judgment, the oral pronouncement controls.

If the clerk includes fines in the court’s minutes or the abstract of judgment that were not part of the oral pronouncement of sentence, those fines must be stricken from the minutes and the abstract of judgment.Courts may correct clerical errors at any time, and appellate courts (including this one) that have properly assumed jurisdiction of cases have ordered correction of abstracts of judgment that did not accurately reflect the oral judgments of sentencing courts. Because the trial court did not orally impose any fines or fees, we order the court to prepare a corrected abstract of judgment striking the fines and fees.

Authority:

People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 385

People v. Clark (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 248, 261

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185

Case 000569

Error and/or relief

The court erred in sentencing on a prior strike where the defendant did not waive a trial and did not admit the prior. Errors in the minute order must be corrected to reflect that a sentence on one count was 364 days in the county jail, not 365 days.

First Holding:

Whenever the fact of a previous conviction of another offense is charged in an accusatory pleading, and the defendant is found guilty of the offense with which he is charged, the jury, or the judge if a jury trial is waived, must unless the answer of the defendant admits such previous conviction, find whether or not he has suffered such previous conviction. The prosecution bears the burden of proving a strike prior allegation beyond a reasonable doubt.

Authority:

PEN 1158

People v. Frierson (2017) 4 Cal.5th 225, 233

Second Holding:

This procedure was not followed here. While the defendant expressed his intention to admit the strike prior, the record shows he never actually did so. Nor did a jury or the trial court find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant suffered the alleged strike prior. Accordingly, we must reverse the true finding as to the strike prior allegation and remand for the trial court to hold a hearing on whether the defendant elects to admit the strike prior allegation or proceed to trial on it and hold further proceedings accordingly.

Authority:

People v. Strike (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 143, 154 [when true finding on strike prior allegation is reversed, the appropriate remedy is to remand the case to the trial court for a new hearing on the prior strike allegation]

Third Holding:

Every offense which is prescribed by any law of the state to be punishable by imprisonment in a county jail up to or not exceeding one year shall be punishable by imprisonment in a county jail for a period not to exceed 364 days. Count 2 is subject to this 364-day limit on imprisonment. Yet here, the Felony Minutes—Pronouncement of Judgment dated specify the defendant’s term of imprisonment for count 2 to be 365 days. Under section 18.5, this length of imprisonment is improper. Accordingly, on remand we direct the trial court to amend the Felony Minutes—Pronouncement of Judgment to reflect a term of imprisonment of 364 days on count 2.

[GARY Note: the court listed no authority for directing the correction of the minute order, so I have listed some cases that it could have relied on.]

Authority:

PEN 18.5

People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 387-38

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185

Case 000568

Error and/or relief

The juvenile court erred in not declaring whether it found the minor’s wobbler offense (section 29610) to be a misdemeanor or a felony.

First Holding:

An offense under Penal Code section 29610 is a wobbler punishable by imprisonment or jail.

Authority:

In re D.D. (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 824, 829

Second Holding:

Welf. and Inst. Code section 702 requires the juvenile court to declare on the record at a hearing before or at the time of disposition its choice whether to treat an alleged wobbler as a misdemeanor or as a felony. Neither the pleading, the minute order, nor the setting of a felony-level period of confinement may substitute for the required declaration. The juvenile court’s failure to make this declaration as to each wobbler offense is error. A juvenile court’s failure to comply with section 702’s express declaration requirement must be corrected on remand unless the record as a whole establishes that the juvenile court was aware of, and exercised its discretion to determine the felony or misdemeanor nature of a wobbler.

Authority:

WIC 702

In re F.M. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 701, 712

Third Holding:

The oral pronouncement of judgment ordinarily controls when there is a discrepancy between it and the clerical recording of the judgment. Although the minute order reflects that the court declared the offense in count 1 a felony, the reporter’s transcript of the oral pronouncement reflects no such declaration. The latter controls.

Authority:

People v. Serrano (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 1324, 1340