Category Archives: Duty of counsel

Case: 000279

Error and/or relief

We find merit in the defendant’s claim of prejudicially ineffective assistance with respect to the court’s admission of the law enforcement witness testimony, and therefore reverse.

First Holding:

A verdict or finding shall not be set aside, nor shall the judgment or decision based thereon be reversed, by reason of the erroneous admission of evidence unless there appears of record an objection to or a motion to exclude or to strike the evidence that was timely made and so stated as to make clear the specific ground of the objection or motion.

Authority:

EVID 353

People v. Flinner (2020) 10 Cal.5th 686, 726 [a defendant forfeits an argument on appeal where [s]he fails to object at all to the evidence in the trial court or when [s]he objects on substantively distinct grounds]

People v. Wilson (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 1020, 1030 [defendant forfeited claim of prosecutor misconduct in closing argument, including based on an asserted violation of the Racial Justice Act, by failing to assign misconduct and request a jury admonishment]

Second Holding:

To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that (1) counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms, and (2) counsel’s deficient performance was prejudicial, i.e., there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s failings, the result would have been more favorable to the defendant. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.

Authority:

People v. Rices (2017) 4 Cal.5th 49, 80

Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 694

Third Holding:

In determining whether counsel’s performance was deficient, we exercise deferential scrutiny. The appellant must affirmatively show counsel’s deficiency involved a crucial issue and cannot be explained on the basis of any knowledgeable choice of tactics. We presume counsel’s performance fell within the wide range of professional competence and that his or her actions and inactions can be explained as a matter of sound trial strategy. When the record on direct appeal sheds no light on why counsel failed to act in the manner challenged, defendant must show that there was no conceivable tactical purpose for counsel’s act or omission.

Authority:

People v. Loza (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 332, 351

People v. Aguirre (2025) 18 Cal.5th 629, 679

People v. Mickel (2016) 2 Cal.5th 181, 198

Fourth Holding:

An attorney may choose not to object for many reasons, and the failure to object rarely establishes ineffectiveness of counsel.

Authority:

People v. Gurule (2002) 28 Cal.4th 557, 609-610

People v. Torres (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 37, 48 [counsel’s decision not to object is generally a matter of trial tactics]

Fifth Holding:

This is the rare case where there is no satisfactory explanation for counsel’s failure to object to the testimony of the two police officers concerning whether a drug exchange took place and the defendant’s involvement. Opinions on guilt or innocence are inadmissible because they are of no assistance to the trier of fact. To put it another way, the trier of fact is as competent as the witness to weigh the evidence and draw a conclusion on the issue of guilt.

[GARY NOTE: the balance of this issue was very fact-dependent, with the court implicitly finding that there could have been no legitimate tactical reason for the attorney to not object to the testimony.]

Authority:

People v. Coffman and Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 77

People v. Torres (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 37, 47

People v. Brown (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 820, 827-829

People v. Duong (2020) 10 Cal.5th 36, 61 [trial court properly excluded proposed expert testimony that certain wounds were accidental and essentially that the defendant lacked the required intent, which was tantamount to expressing an opinion as to defendant’s guilt because it proposed to dispose of an essential element of the crime]

Case: 000240

Error and/or relief

The defendant entered the United States in 1991 and obtained permanent residency in the mid-2000s. She was convicted by plea in 2009 of grand theft and was ordered to serve one year in the county jail as a condition of probation. At the time of her plea, she was advised under section 1016.5 that conviction may have the consequences of deportation, exclusion of admission to the United States, or denial of naturalization. There was no indication that her then-attorney discussed immigration consequences with her. She was not aware that a jail term of 364 days instead of 365 days would have made a difference regarding her immigration status.

Because service of at least 365 days in custody constitutes an aggravated felony, in 2010 she was notified by immigration authorities that she was subject to removal. She conceded removability and was deported. In 2023, someone she had kept in contact with over the years suggested she contact the public defender. She did, and a petition to vacate her conviction was filed under section 1473.7 Based on our independent review, we conclude the defendant has shown prejudicial error based on the totality of the circumstances. It was error to deny the defendant’s petition under section 1473.7 to vacate her conviction because prejudicial error impaired her ability to understand the immigration consequences of her plea.

First Holding:

Section 1473.7 allows noncitizens who have served their sentences to vacate a conviction if they can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that their conviction is legally invalid due to prejudicial error damaging their ability to meaningfully understand, defend against, or knowingly accept the actual or potential adverse immigration consequences of a conviction or sentence. If the required showings are made, the court must vacate the conviction or sentence.

Authority:

PEN 1473.7(a)(1), (e)(1)

People v. Espinoza (2023) 14 Cal.5th 311, 316

Second Holding:

Appeals from section 1473.7 hearings are subject to independent review. Under this standard, an appellate court exercises its independent judgment to determine whether the facts satisfy the rule of law. We give deference to the trial court’s factual determinations if they are based on the credibility of witnesses the superior court heard and observed. But when the trial court’s findings derive entirely from written declarations and other documents, the trial court and the reviewing court are in the same position, and no deference is owed.

Authority:

People v. Espinoza (2023) 14 Cal.5th 311, 319-320

Third Holding:

Subject to statutory exceptions, a motion to vacate based on immigration consequences shall be deemed timely filed at any time in which the individual filing the motion is no longer in criminal custody. The exceptions state the motion may be deemed untimely filed if it was not filed with reasonable diligence after the later of several events: receipt of a notice to appear in immigration court, notice from immigration authorities asserting adverse consequences from the conviction or sentence, or notice of a final removal order.

Authority:

PEN 1473.7(b)(1) and (b)(2)

Fourth Holding:

The statutory exceptions to timeliness do not apply here. Because the defendant was given notice of immigration consequences before the 2017 effective date of section 1473.7, the test is: What event in her life that occurred after section 1473.7 became effective would have given her a reason to look for the existence of new legal grounds for relief or, at a minimum, put her on notice of the need to investigate? We assess the reasonableness of the petitioner’s diligence from that point forward. In so doing, we must take into account the totality of the circumstances. The record does not suggest some event occurred between the time the legislation became effective in 2017 and her contact with her attorney in 2023 that put her on notice. We conclude the motion was timely.

Authority:

People v. Alatorre (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 747, 762, 765-766

Fifth Holding:

Relief pursuant to section 1473.7 requires that the defendant show prejudicial error damaging the moving party’s ability to meaningfully understand, defend against, or knowingly accept the actual or potential adverse immigration consequences of a conviction or sentence. Because the defendant’s conviction of theft with a one-year sentence constituted an aggravated felony, she was subject to mandatory deportation and permanent exclusion from the United States and was also ineligible for cancellation of removal, a form of discretionary relief allowing some deportable aliens to remain in the country.

Authority:

8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(G)

8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)

8 U.S.C. 1229b(a)(3), (b)(1)(C)

People v. Carrillo (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 1, 15

Sixth Holding:

A defendant seeking section 1473.7 relief must demonstrate that the error is prejudicial, meaning a reasonable probability that the defendant would have rejected the plea if the defendant had correctly understood its actual or potential immigration consequences. This might be based either on the desire to go to trial or on the hope or expectation of negotiating a different bargain without immigration consequences. Relief is available if the defendant establishes he or she would have rejected the existing bargain to accept or attempt to negotiate another.

Authority:

People v. Espinoza (2023) 14 Cal.5th 311, 316

People v. Vivar (2021) 11 Cal.5th 510, 529

People v. Martinez (2013) 57 Cal.4th 555, 559

Seventh Holding:

Her ignorance of the immigration consequences of her conviction and sentence was an error that damaged her ability to meaningfully understand and knowingly accept those consequences. A showing of ineffective assistance of counsel was not required because the motion was based on the inadequate advisement by the trial court that the conviction may have immigration consequences and the defendant’s own error in not knowing that her plea would subject her to mandatory deportation and permanent exclusion from the United States. There was no indication her attorney considered the immigration consequences of her plea even though a social worker had expressed concern and the defendant had expressed concern to probation. This failure impeded the defendant’s ability to understand the consequences of her plea.

Authority:

PEN 1473.7(a)(1)

People v. Mejia (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 859, 871

People v. Padron (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 950, 960–961

Eighth Holding:

Defense counsel has a duty to advise criminal defendant clients of the immigration consequences.

Authority:

PEN 1016.2

PEN 1016.3

Padilla v. Kentucky (2010) 559 U.S. 356, 371

People v. Carrillo (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 1, 17-18

Case: 000237

Error and/or relief

The sentencing court erred by considering aggravating circumstances not proven at trial. Because we reverse and remand for resentencing, we need not address the defendant’s contention that the court committed dual use error by relying on same fact—that he was was armed with or used a firearm—to both impose enhancements and sentence him to the upper term. He may raise his dual use argument at resentencing.

First Holding:

The defendant’s attorney did not object to dual use of facts or reliance on factors in aggravation that were not proved at trial. In general, claims not raised in the trial court may not be raised for the first time on appeal. This includes claims involving the trial court’s failure to properly make or articulate its discretionary sentencing choices.

However, an appellate court may decline to apply the forfeiture rule. Where an otherwise forfeited claim presents an important question of constitutional law or a substantial right, the appellate court may exercise discretion to review the claim. Thus, in People v. Gonzalez, this court declined to apply forfeiture to the defendant’s section 1170(b) claim where the defendant did not refer to the statute at sentencing, citing the defendant’s alternative claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and stating the application of amended section 1170(b) implicates a constitutional right.

Authority:

People v. Gonzalez (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 312, 326-327

People v. Coddington (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 562, 568

People v. Denard (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 1012, 1030, fn. 10

Second Holding:

The court may impose a sentence exceeding the middle term only when there are circumstances in aggravation of the crime that justify the imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding the middle term and the facts underlying those circumstances have been stipulated to by the defendant or have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a court trial.

Authority:

PEN 1170

Third Holding:

Under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, any fact that exposes a defendant to a greater potential sentence must be found by a jury, not a judge, and established beyond a reasonable doubt. Virtually any fact that increases the prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal defendant is exposed must be resolved by a unanimous jury beyond a reasonable doubt (or freely admitted in a guilty plea). Under the current version of section 1170(b)(2), a Sixth Amendment violation occurs when the trial court relies on unproven aggravating facts to impose an upper term sentence, even if some other aggravating facts relied on have been properly established.

Authority:

Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. 270, 281

Erlinger v. United States (2024) 602 U.S. 821, 834

People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 768

Fourth Holding:

When a trial court has given both proper and improper reasons for a sentence choice, a reviewing court will set aside the sentence only if it is reasonably probable that the trial court would have chosen a lesser sentence had it known that some of its reasons were improper. When the trial court actually relies on improperly proven aggravating facts to justify an upper term sentence, a Sixth Amendment violation occurs and the Chapman standard of reversal unless harmless beyond a reasonable doubt must be satisfied.

Authority:

People v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 492

Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18

Case: 000161

Error and/or relief

The abstract of judgment must be corrected to accurately reflect the sentence orally imposed by the court. Here, the abstract incorrectly states that the court imposed an enhancement term of 25 years to life for gang-related firearm enhancements. In fact, those enhancements were not retried; they both must be stricken from the abstract. The abstract also incorrectly states that the enhancement imposed and stayed on count 3 was imposed under both subdivisions (d) and (e)(1) of section 12022.53.

First Holding:

An abstract of judgment is not the judgment of conviction; it does not control if different from the trial court’s oral judgment and may not add to or modify the judgment it purports to digest or summarize.

Authority:

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185

Second Holding:

A defendant who fails to object before the trial court to a sentence on the ground that it is being imposed in a procedurally or factually flawed manner generally forfeits the right to challenge such error on appeal. The objections must be specifically articulated, to provide the trial court with a meaningful opportunity to evaluate the claims and correct any errors. Appellant did not object when the court stated its reasons for imposing consecutive sentences, nor did he object when given the opportunity to do so at the conclusion of the hearing. We accordingly find these arguments forfeited.

Authority:

In re F.M. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 701, 710

People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 354

People v. De Soto (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1, 9

To Save, Or Not To Save (the client’s file)

How This Article Came About.

I was placing a “Gary note” for a summary I was writing on an unpublished opinion filed recently, but won’t be posted on my summary for, well, maybe a couple ‘nother months.  I wasn’t sure whether I was going to use the case as a summary, because it didn’t really constitute a victory, even under my very liberal connotation for the term. But it may be important to trial counsel, and as soon as July 1, 2026. I will probably post the summary when it comes up to the top of the chronological list, but I figured it’s worthy of mention now.

Get On With It, Gary!

It pertains to Penal Code section 1054.9, whose impact is mainly on the process for post-conviction discovery, but it carries a new obligation on either ALL or MANY (aye, that’s the question!) trial court attorneys whose clients are punished for felonies.  (Well, the section used to impose the requirement but only where the defendant has been sentenced to a term of at least 15 years.  That minimum has been eliminated.  But read on.)

Here is Penal Code section 1054.9, subdivision (g), the focus of this article:  

“(g) In criminal matters involving a conviction for a felony resulting in incarceration in the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, trial counsel shall retain a copy of a former client’s files for the term of that client’s imprisonment. An electronic copy is sufficient only if every item in the file is digitally copied in color and preserved. To the extent this section imposes new requirements on trial counsel, trial counsel shall begin retaining their physical files and digital color copies of evidence for all felony convictions on or after July 1, 2026.”

I Have To Do WHAT?

Sneak preview: Does the section require trial counsel to retain a copy the client’s file in every single felony case? Or does the requirement extend to only those felony cases in which a defendant was sent to the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, and then, only for the term of incarceration? (Classic state prison.) Or does it also apply to felons sentenced under Realignment to what would formerly have been “prison terms” but are served in local county jails under Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (h)?

Say Again?

Equivocal answer: If the statute is interpreted literally and is determined not to be ambiguous (by interpreting the final sentence of subdivision (g) only in context of its first sentence), then it would seem to apply to only those committed to CDCR (classic state prison). If the section is deemed ambiguous (because the final sentence does not seem to be limited to those mentioned in the first sentence), then the appellate court will have to resolve the ambiguity, most likely by examining the legislative history to determine the Legislature’s intent. But going back to “if the statute is interpreted literally and is determined not to be ambiguous” (by determining that the first sentence has a meaning and the last sentence has a different meaning but they are nonetheless reconcilable), well, then, I’m not sure what the duty is.

WWGD?*

I know what I would do, but that’s only because when I want to be in compliance with a rule, I would much rather do far more than I’m required by the rule to do than to fall short of what it requires. Until it was clarified, I would keep a copy of all my felony clients’ files, whether sent to prison or to county jail or even if just granted probation with no time ordered as a condition. That is not a recommendation. That is merely a recitation of what I would do.

That’s The Spirit!

The spirit behind subdivision (g) is to make it easy for a defendant to get some sort of relief from a judgment imposed some time in the past. One can never predict what legislation will be enacted down the road that might favor the client. In the 1980s and maybe especially the 1990s, who would have imagined that a felon denied probation could at worst be sentenced to local confinement, and even then have a split sentence (maybe not having to serve the whole period ordered)? Who would have predicted the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012? Who would have predicted Proposition 47? Who would have dreamed that a getaway driver could no longer be considered guilty of felony murder except under seriously culpable circumstances?

Defense attorneys may have dreamed of those things (and obviously, some defense-minded folks DID, in order to get the ball rolling on the amelioration). But the era was such that it made them seem like pipe dreams. (Whatever a pipe dream is.)

And many’s the time trial counsel has had to reconstruct “what happened back then” in order to demonstrate that the client is eligible for relief. Having access to trial counsel’s file from years earlier can be critical for new counsel seeking to get some new ameliorative benefit for the client, or even to revisit the basis of the conviction under its law at that time, because new evidence has come to light. Think of the incidents we have all read about from time to time, where a previously-respected forensic analyst–or even the employing lab–is discovered to have been perhaps less reliable than warranted at the time of the conviction. Or where questionable practices of police agencies came to light years later. It doesn’t necessarily take new legislation to trigger a need for the defendant to get a thorough review of the evidence on which the conviction was based long ago.

But Don’t We Already?

There is likely already a duty for the attorney to maintain the client’s file, because the operative word is “the client’s file.” Unlike the medical profession, where apparently the medical file belongs to the doctor, not the patient, the files attorneys keep belong to the clients, at least to the extent that the file contains information pertinent to the client’s cause. Maybe it doesn’t include administrative materials related to the case but irrelevant to the merits of the case, I don’t know. I just know that if a client ever asks for his or her file, the attorney is required to provide everything related to the client’s case that might assist the client in further proceedings.

Here’s what the California Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 1.16(e)(1) says, upon the termination of a representation for any reason: Subject to any applicable protective order, non-disclosure agreement, statute or regulation, the lawyer promptly shall release to the client, at the request of the client, all client materials and property. “Client materials and property” includes correspondence, pleadings, deposition transcripts, experts’ reports and other writings, exhibits, and physical evidence, whether in tangible, electronic or other form, and other items reasonably necessary to the client’s representation, whether the client has paid for them or not.

Permissive vs. Directory.

But section 1065.9 makes it a statutory duty in whatever cases it applies to, and even a little more. That is, under the State Bar professional responsibility approach, the attorney has to turn over to the client the files on the client’s request. The attorney is permitted to keep a copy at the attorney’s expense (implying that the attorney cannot charge the client for the handing off of the file, and if the attorney wants to make a copy, that’ll be at the attorney’s expense), but by “permitted,” it implies “not required” to make a copy. Under section 1065.9, if the client falls into the class it applies to, the attorney MUST KEEP A COPY. And in the format specified.

Tell Me More.

Though the summary discusses the discovery process and review of the court’s denial, there isn’t much to elucidate the extent of counsel’s obligation.  The appellate case concluded that the denial of discovery under section 1054.9 was not an appealable order, but the denial may be reviewed by petition for writ of mandamus.  It exercised its discretion to treat the appeal as a petition for writ of mandate, and proceeded to affirm the action taken (i.e., denial) by the lower court.  So it didn’t touch on the questions I have about the section.

To me, subdivision (g) is a bit ambiguous, because the first sentence refers trial counsel having to retain a copy of their client’s files for the term of that defendant’s imprisonment in cases resulting in a CDCR prison sentence. But the last sentence could be read as requiring counsel to retain physical files and digital color copies of all evidence in ALL felony convictions, with no mention of a limitation to those where the client has been committed to CDCR.

Looking At Some Legislative Analyses.

Here’s how the Legislative Counsel’s Digest expresses it: “The bill would additionally require trial counsel, for all criminal convictions on or after July 1, 2026, that result in a sentence of incarceration in the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation to retain digital color copies of every item in the file.”

First There Was A Mountain, Then ….

But the final Assembly Floor Analysis dated 9/12/2025 states, in part, under “Major Provisions: 4) Clarified that a defendant’s trial counsel maintain a copy of a former client’s case file for any felony for which the defendant was sentenced to state prison or county jail.” I don’t see a reference to county jail in the first portion of the subdivision, only those to CDCR, which is state prison, not county jail. Does that sentence then contemplate that the final sentence that ” … trial counsel shall begin retaining their physical files and digital color copies of evidence for all felony convictions…”?

On page 2 of that Assembly Floor Analysis dated 9/12/2025, under “According to the Author,” it states, “AB 1036 seeks to address these inequities by expanding access to post-conviction discovery to all individuals convicted of felonies with sentences of one year or more. It eliminates the burdensome requirement of first seeking discovery from trial counsel and broadens the definition of “discovery materials” to include exculpatory and mitigating evidence and jury selection notes. Additionally, this bill ensures transparency and accountability by requiring trial counsel to maintain digital color copies of case files, preventing the loss of crucial records.” There is no reference or limitation to sentences to the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. Once Realignment was enacted effective for all sentenced on or after 10/1/2011 (shifting incarceration on low level felonies to local county facilities instead of state prison), many felony sentences are served in county jails, not in the custody of the CDCR.

Then There Was No Mountain ….

The Senate Floor Analysis of 9/2/2025 characterizes it as “8) Clarifies that a defendant’s trial counsel shall maintain a copy of a former client’s case file for any felony conviction resulting in incarceration in state prison. Digital copies must be preserved in color. 9) Provides that to the extent this imposes new requirements on trial counsel, trial counsel shall begin retaining their physical files and digital color copies of evidence for all felony convictions resulting in incarceration in state prison on or after July 1, 2026.” So the Senate analysis does not refer to any county jail sentence, and it seems to read into the last sentence that the duty on trial counsel is to retain the files only for those convictions resulting in incarceration in state prison, and does not seem as expansive to ALL convictions as the last sentence of subdivision (g) might be interpreted. I don’t have an answer.

In The Big Inning ….

According to the first Bill Analysis by the Assembly Public Safety Committee, submitted 3/31/2025, this bill (as it was first introduced, before amendments) “4) Clarifies that a defendant’s trial counsel maintain a copy of a former client’s case file for any felony for which the defendant was sentenced for up to [sic] one year. 5) States, beginning January 1, 2026, the electronic copies are sufficient only if every item in the file is digitally copied in color and preserved.”

On pages 4 and 5, the author states, “Finally, this bill proposes to require criminal defense attorneys to retain records for any felony resulting in a sentence of a year or more [sic] for the term of the defendant’s incarceration. Over the past ten years, California has enacted several post-conviction remedies, including the opportunity for re-sentencing if a person is the defendant suffered racial bias during their case, suffered a sentence that is disproportionately harsh giving the facts, was under the age of 18 at the time of sentencing, where it is in the interests of justice, and re-sentencing in gang cases where there was insufficient evidence of gang involvement. (See Pen. Code, secs. 1109, 1172.1, 1385, and 1437.) Given the plethora of new opportunities for post-conviction relief, this bill requires an opportunity for post-conviction discovery beyond just Brady material at the time of trial. For instance, the Racial Justice Act (Pen. Code, sec. 1437) confronts the possibility that a defendant suffered racial bias in their charge, conviction, or sentence. Therefore, something more than just Brady material may be necessary to demonstrate the bias.

Darwin and Evolution At Work?

So it seems that the bill contemplated originally that trial counsel retain copies of the file if the client was sentenced to one year or more. When the bill was introduced, it read “for a felony resulting in a sentence of one year of incarceration or more.” That was subsequently amended to “incarceration in the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation,” which suggests the subdivision may not apply to anyone sentenced on a felony to incarceration in county jail under section 1170(h) (commonly referred to as “under realignment”) no matter how long the term. In the Senate Public Safety Committee analysis of 6/30/2025, it does state at page 4, “This bill allows for post-conviction discovery in any felony case resulting in incarceration in state prison ….”  So at THAT stage, the author of the analysis had “state prison” in mind as an important eligibility facrtor.

The Long And The Short And The Tall.

The long and the short of it is, I don’t know what the answer is. I see what the statute says in subdivision (g), but I get mixed senses when I read the legislative analyses. Does it apply to ONLY those whose sentences are served in facilities under the jurisdiction of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation?

That seems to be the clarity in the first sentence of section 1054.9(g), and the reference to CDCR first appeared in the amended version passed by the Senate on 8/29/2026. Or does it apply to ALL felony convictions (as of July 1, 2026), the language in the last sentence? Does it NOT apply to felons whose terms are served in the local county jails under Realignment? Is there a legitimate rationale for providing the requirement if a defendant is sentenced to state prison for two years (state prisons falling under the oversight of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation) but not if a defendant was sentenced to, say, eight years in the county jail for a different felony governed by section 1170, subdivision (h)?

If It Is A Distinction With A Difference …

For answers to these questions and more, you probably need to ask someone else, for I’m certainly confused. If this is a question that needs a briefable answer, you probably should obtain a legislative history fully researched by and  available through any of the reputable legislative research firms in the state. I have my favorite, but I’m not going to identify it here in the blog, because I have to confess that it’s my favorite because I’m a friend of its founders and have used the firm’s services over the years with satisfaction. But I have not used any of its competitors to see whether one is any better than another. I have my bias, but I’m not educated enough to validate it. The companies that do provide legislative intent research have access to a huge amount of documents that are not posted on the Legislature’s website. Or at least, anywhere that I can find it all.

 

*”What Would Gary Do?”