Category Archives: Discretion

Appellate Principles, Discretion, Standard of review

Case 000479

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

In this People’s appeal from the order of the juvenile court denying its motion to transfer the juvenile matter to adult court, the order retaining jurisdiction in juvenile court is affirmed, even though the respondent is well over 25 years of age.

First Holding:

We review the juvenile court’s ruling on a transfer motion for abuse of discretion. The court’s factual findings are reviewed for substantial evidence, and its legal conclusions are reviewed de novo. A decision based on insufficient evidence or the court’s erroneous understanding of applicable law is subject to reversal. But we do not reweigh the evidence and we do not substitute our discretion for the discretion exercised by the trial court. We draw all reasonable inferences in support of the court’s findings, not against them. We are concerned only with whether the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact’s findings. When evidence reasonably justifies the trier of fact’s findings, the opinion of the reviewing court that the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant a reversal of the judgment.

Authority:

In re Miguel R. (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 152, 165, 169

Kevin P. v. Superior Court (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 173, 187

In re J.S. (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 205, 211

Second Holding:

The ultimate question for the juvenile court in a transfer petition is whether a minor is amenable to rehabilitation before the juvenile court’s jurisdiction expires. To order a minor’s transfer to a court of criminal jurisdiction, the juvenile court must find by clear and convincing evidence that the minor is not amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, which for persons 25 years or older extends for up to two years from the date of disposition. the prosecution bears the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the minor is not amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.

Authority:

WIC 607(d) [The court may retain jurisdiction over a person who is 25 years of age or older for a period not to exceed two years from the date of disposition if the person is found to be a person described in Section 602 by reason of the commission of an offense listed in subdivision (b) of Section 707. The court shall exercise jurisdiction in conformance with the objectives of the juvenile court.]

WIC 707(a)(3)

In re E.P. (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 409, 416

In re Miguel R. (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 152, 167

Third Holding:

In making that determination, the juvenile court must consider five specific factors. The statute also sets forth a nonexhaustive list of relevant factors for the juvenile court to consider with respect to each of the five criteria. If the juvenile court orders a transfer to criminal court, it must recite the basis for its decision in an order entered upon the minutes, which shall include the reasons supporting the court’s finding that the minor is not amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.

Authority:

WIC 707(a)(3)

In re J.S. (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 205, 212

Fourth Holding:

The language used in a statute or constitutional provision should be given its ordinary meaning, and if the language is clear and unambiguous there is no need for construction, nor is it necessary to resort to indicia of the intent of the Legislature (in the case of a statute) or of the voters (in the case of a provision adopted by the voters). Courts generally must accord significance, if possible, to every word, phrase and sentence in pursuance of the legislative purpose, and a construction making some words surplusage is to be avoided.

The words of the statute must be construed in context, keeping in mind the statutory purpose, and statutes or statutory sections relating to the same subject must be harmonized, both internally and with each other, to the extent possible. We examine statutory language, not in isolation, but in the context of the statutory framework as a whole to discern its scope and purpose and to harmonize the various parts of the enactment.

Authority:

People v. Valencia (2017) 3 Cal.5th 347, 357

Lungren v. Deukmejian (1988) 45 Cal.3d 727, 735

Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment and Housing Com. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1379, 1387

People v. Prudholme (2023) 14 Cal.5th 961, 975

Fifth Holding:

Language in a judicial opinion is to be understood in accordance with the facts and issues before the court. An opinion is not authority for propositions not considered. Thus, a decision is authority only for the points actually involved and actually decided.

Authority:

People v. Knoller (2007) 41 Cal.4th 139, 154–155

People v. Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1, 110

Sixth Holding:

Failure to offer reasoned analysis of an issue constitutes a waiver. When an appellant fails to raise a point, or asserts it but fails to support it with reasoned argument and citations to authority, we treat the point as waived. The People’s failure to develop a legal analysis that is tethered to the issue they raised and is supported by relevant authority compels rejection of their claim of error. We will not develop that analysis for them.

Authority:

Rule 8.204(a)(1)(B) [Each brief must state each point under a separate heading or subheading summarizing the point, and support each point by argument and, if possible, by citation of authority]

Trinity Risk Management, LLC v. Simplified Labor Staffing Solutions, Inc. (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 995, 1008

Perry v. City of San Diego (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 172, 188, fn. 8 [It is not this court’s role to connect the dots]

Discretion, Standard of review

Case 000478

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

Before jury selection, the defendant requested mental health diversion. The trial court denied the request as untimely. This was error. The judgment is conditionally reversed, and the matter is remanded to the trial court to consider defendant’s application for mental health diversion under section 1001.36. If the trial court grants diversion and defendant successfully completes mental health diversion, the court shall dismiss the charges. If the court denies defendant’s application for mental health diversion, or if defendant does not successfully complete diversion, then the court shall reinstate the judgment and sentence.

First Holding:

Section 1001.36 authorizes pretrial mental health diversion for defendants with qualifying mental health disorders. The trial court must find a defendant is both eligible and suitable for diversion.

Authority:

PEN 1001.36

People v. Whitmill (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1138, 1147

Second Holding:

We review a trial court’s order denying mental health diversion for abuse of discretion and its factual findings for substantial evidence. A court abuses its discretion when it makes an arbitrary or capricious decision by applying the wrong legal standard, or bases its decision on express or implied factual findings that are not supported by substantial evidence.

Authority:

People v. Moine (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 440, 448-449

Third Holding:

In a jury trial, to be timely, a request for diversion must be made before attachment of jeopardy. The defendant is deemed to have been placed in jeopardy when the jurors have been impaneled and sworn. Here, the jury had not been impaneled or sworn when defendant requested mental health diversion. The trial court abused its discretion in denying his unopposed request for mental health diversion solely on the ground that it was untimely.

Authority:

People v. Braden (2023) 14 Cal.5th 791, 819

People v. Fields (1996) 13 Cal.4th 289, 299

Amelioration, Discretion, Sentencing

Case: 000472

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

On this appeal from the defendant’s resentencing under section 1172.75, the matter is remanded for the court to exercise its discretion on whether to resentence the defendant under the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012.

First Holding:

Under the Three Strikes law as originally enacted in 1994, an individual convicted of a felony offense following two prior convictions for serious or violent felonies was subject to an indeterminate term of life imprisonment with a minimum term of no less than 25 years. The Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012 lessened the prescribed sentence for a third strike defendant whose current offense was not a serious or violent felony. It included a retrospective provision – section 1172.126 – that provides relief to prisoners already serving third strike sentences where the third strike was not a serious or violent felony.

Authority:

People v. Conley (2016) 63 Cal.4th 646, 651, 652

People v. Superior Court (Kaulick) (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1279, 1292

Second Holding:

In 2021, the Legislature enacted section 1172.75 that invalidates certain sentencing enhancements and requires courts to recall sentences with those enhancements and resentence them by applying any changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion so as to eliminate disparity of sentences and promote uniformity of sentencing

Authority:

PEN 1172.75

Third Holding:

The Reform Act applies at a section 1172.75 resentencing if section 1170.126’s substantive requirements are satisfied, including the following: (1) the defendant is eligible under the Reform Act; and (2) the trial court does not determine that resentencing the defendant would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. Eligibility for resentencing must be decided on a count-by-count basis. A defendant is ineligible under the Reform Act if he was armed with a firearm during the offense for which the third strike sentence was imposed.

As to the public safety component, the People must prove the facts upon which the determination is based by a preponderance of the evidence. Relevant factors include: (1) the defendant’s criminal conviction history, including the type of crimes committed, the extent of injury to victims, the length of prior prison commitments, the remoteness of the crimes; (2) the defendant’s disciplinary record and record of rehabilitation while incarcerated; and (3) any other evidence the court, within its discretion, determines to be relevant in deciding whether a new sentence would result in an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.

Authority:

PEN 1170.126

People v. Superior Court (Guevara) (2025) 18 Cal.5th 838, 850, 852, 878

People v. Johnson (2015) 61 Cal.4th 674, 688

People v. Estrada (2017) 3 Cal.5th 661, 669

Fourth Holding:

Defendants are entitled to sentencing decisions made in the exercise of the informed discretion of the sentencing court. When a court is unaware of the scope of its discretionary powers, the appropriate remedy is to remand for resentencing unless the record clearly indicates that the trial court would have reached the same conclusion even if it had been aware that it had such discretion.

In applying the clearly indicates test, it is almost always speculative for a reviewing court to say what the sentencing court would have done if it had known the scope of its discretionary powers at the time of sentencing. Remand for resentencing is required unless the sentencing court (1) announced it was aware of forthcoming legislation and explained how it would exercise its discretion under that legislation or (2) made “the kind of definitive statements to clearly indicate it would not impose a lesser sentence under any circumstances.

Authority:

People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1391

People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 776

Fifth Holding:

The trial court’s focus on defendant’s public safety risk was under Romero and section 1385(c). Those standards do not cover the section 1170.126(g) standard for purposes of satisfying the clearly indicates test. Under section 1385(c), the court has discretion to dismiss an enhancement unless there is a likelihood that the dismissal of the enhancement would result in physical injury or other serious danger to others.

This likelihood standard is not equivalent to or inclusive of the unreasonable risk of danger to public safety standard described in section 1170.126 for purposes of the clearly indicates test. And in denying the defendant’s request to dismiss his prior strikes under Romero, the trial court operated under a circumscribed power to depart from the sentencing norm established by the Three Strikes law. The circumstances had to be extraordinary for defendant to be deemed to fall outside the spirit of that law.

Authority:

People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497

People v. Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024, 1029

People v. Buford (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 886, 902-903

People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 378

People v. Mayfield (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 1096, 1105

Sixth Holding:

On remand, the trial court may consider the entire sentencing scheme given the inherently integrated nature of felony sentencing for a multiple-count conviction.

Authority:

People v. Burbine (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 1250, 1257-1258

People v. Valenzuela (2019) 7 Cal.5th 415, 424-425 [the full resentencing rule allows a court to revisit all prior sentencing decisions when resentencing a defendant]

Discretion, Elements of crime, Standard of review, Sufficiency of and substantial evidence

Case 000468

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The trial court applied an incorrect legal standard in ruling on the defendant’s petition for mental health diversion, and substantial evidence does not support its ineligibility finding. The court also erred by accepting a guilty to plea to conduct that is not criminal. We reverse defendant’s possession of marijuana conviction, conditionally vacate the remainder of defendant’s guilty pleas, conditionally reverse the judgment, and remand the matter for further proceedings consistent with section 1001.36 and this opinion.

First Holding:

Section 1001.36 authorizes pretrial diversion for criminal defendants suffering from certain recognized mental disorders. To qualify, criminal defendants must show they are both eligible and suitable for the program. A defendant accused of a qualifying offense is eligible for mental health diversion if, within the last five years, a qualified mental health expert has diagnosed the defendant with a qualifying mental health disorder that was a significant factor in the commission of the charged offense.

A qualifying diagnosis creates a rebuttable presumption that the disorder was a significant factor in the commission of the offense, which may only be overcome if there is clear and convincing evidence that the disorder was not a motivating factor, casual factor, or contributing factor to the defendant’s involvement in the alleged offense. For purposes of the diversion statute, a qualified mental health expert includes, but is not limited to, a psychiatrist, psychologist, or a person whose knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education qualifies them as an expert. The statute’s plain language does not limit a qualified mental health expert to a psychiatrist, psychologist, or other medical doctor.

Authority:

PEN 1001.36(b), (f)

People v. Whitmill (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1138, 1147

Sarmiento v. Superior Court (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 882, 891

People v. Gonzalez (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1138, 1141 [appellate court interprets a statute to effectuate the law’s purpose, applying a plain and commonsense meaning to the statute’s text]

Second Holding:

A substance use disorder registered counselor must complete hundreds of hours of classroom education and supervised training regarding addiction counseling, at least over 2,000 hours of work providing counseling services in an alcohol or drug program, and must pass an examination confirming their skill and ability. Under these circumstances, a substance abuse disorder registered counselor possesses the knowledge, skill, experience, training and education to make a substance use disorder diagnosis under the statute.

Authority:

Cal. Code Regs., tit. 9, sec. 13040(a)-(d)

Third Holding:

Where there has been a qualifying diagnosis, it is the People’s burden to overcome by clear and convincing evidence the statutory presumption that the disorder was a significant factor in the commission of the offense. Here, the People did not present any evidence to support a finding that defendant’s substance use disorders were not a motivating, causal, or contributing factor to his commission of the charged drug and firearm possession offenses. Argument by counsel is not evidence in the case and cannot be relied upon to support the trial court’s order.

Despite the lack of evidence, the trial court ruled, based on “common sense,” that possession for sale offenses like defendant’s could not be causally connected to a substance use disorder and that the Legislature could not have intended section 1001.36 to apply to possession of narcotics for sale cases because a vast majority of the felony cases before the court involved drugs. In essence, the trial court carved out a wholesale exception to mental health diversion for possession for sale offenses that does not appear in the plain text of the statute. This was error. It is a corollary to fundamental principles of separation of powers that courts must apply the statutes as written unless doing so would yield absurd results.

Authority:

People v. Harlow (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 485, 491

Fourth Holding:

The absence of evidence showing defendant’s mental disorder was a factor in the commission of the offenses cannot satisfy the People’s burden to rebut the statutory presumption by clear and convincing evidence.

Authority:

Lacour v. Superior Court (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 391,404 [the absence of evidence proving that a petitioner’s mental disorder was a factor in the commission of the offenses is not substantial evidence supporting a finding by clear and convincing evidence that the petitioner’s mental disorder was not a factor in the commission of the offenses]

Gomez v. Superior Court (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 671, 687-689 [By finding the statutory presumption had been overcome by the lack of indication in the police reports that the defendant was suffering from the mental disorder at the time of a robbery, the trial court improperly shifted the burden to the defendant to affirmatively prove that her mental disorder contributed to the offense.]

Fifth Holding:

We review a trial court’s order denying mental health diversion for abuse of discretion and its factual findings for substantial evidence. When reviewing a finding that a fact has been proved by clear and convincing evidence, the question before the appellate court is whether the record as a whole contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could have found it highly probable that the fact was true. A court abuses its discretion when it makes an arbitrary or capricious decision by applying the wrong legal standard, or bases its decision on express or implied factual findings that are not supported by substantial evidence. We presume a trial court’s order is correct and indulge all intendments and reasonable inferences to support it. Absent evidence to the contrary, we presume a trial court knew and applied the law.

Authority:

People v. Moine (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 440, 448-449

Lacour v. Superior Court (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 391, 401

People v. Giordano (2007) 42 Cal.4th 644, 666

People v. Ramirez (2021) 10 Cal.5th 983, 1042

Sixth Holding:

It was error for the court to accept the defendant’s guilty plea to an act that was not criminal. The information alleged that he was in possession of not more than 28.5 grams of marijuana. Possession of marijuana is not criminal unless it is of more than 28.5 grams. By accepting defendant’s guilty plea to conduct that is not criminal, and sentencing him for that offense, the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction. Accordingly, we shall modify the judgment to vacate defendant’s conviction and sentence on that count.

Authority:

People v. Mutch (1971) 4 Cal.3d 389, 395-396, 399 [conviction for conduct not prohibited by statute is void]

People v. Soriano (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 781, 784-785 [the defendant could not have been guilty of violating Penal Code section 115 by attempting to file a forged instrument because, as a matter of law, the writing he was charged with and admitted forging, a death certificate, is not an instrument within the meaning of section 115]

Appellate Principles, Discretion, Sixth Amendment, Standard of review

Case 000462

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The trial court prejudicially violated the Confrontation Clause (U.S. const., amend. VI) by overly restricting defendant’s cross-examination of two sheriff’s deputies, whose testimony was the only prosecution evidence presented on counts 2 and 4. And although our reversal on counts 2 and 4 likewise moots defendant’s Pitchess request, we exercise our discretion to address the issue and find that the trial court should have ordered the production of two civilian complaints.

Given this disposition, we need not address defendant’s claim that the abstract of judgment is incorrect, since the trial court must enter a new judgment on remand. Defendant’s sentence is therefore vacated. On remand, if the People do not timely retry defendant on counts 2 and 4, the trial court shall resentence him on counts 1, 3, and 5 accordingly. If the People timely retry defendant on counts 2 and 4, the trial court is directed to disclose the Pitchess records consistent with this opinion and afford defendant a reasonable opportunity to investigate the disclosed material before retrial.

First Holding:

Defendants have a Sixth Amendment right to cross-examine witnesses. But they have a right only to reasonable cross-examination. Trial courts therefore have wide discretion in determining the appropriate scope of cross-examination.

Authority:

People v. Royal (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 121, 149

Olden v. Kentucky (1988) 488 U.S. 227, 231

People v. Gonzalez (2021) 12 Cal.5th 367, 406

Second Holding:

Although trial courts may reasonably limit a defendant’s cross-examination of a witness’s bias, the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause restricts the court’s discretion. A criminal defendant states a violation of the Confrontation Clause by showing that he was prohibited from engaging in otherwise appropriate cross-examination designed to show a prototypical form of bias on the part of the witness, and thereby to expose to the jury the facts from which jurors could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness.

The trial court’s restrictions on a defendant’s cross-examination of a witness for bias does not violate the Sixth Amendment unless the defendant shows that a reasonable jury might have received a significantly different impression of the witness had the defendant been permitted to pursue his proposed line of cross-examination. However, excluding evidence of marginal impeachment value generally does not violate the Confrontation Clause.

Authority:

People v. Pearson (2013) 56 Cal.4th 393, 455-456

Delaware v. Van Arsdall (1986) 475 U.S. 673, 680

People v. Quartermain (1997) 16 Cal.4th 600, 623

People v. Castaneda-Prado (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 1260, 1282

Third Holding:

We review the trial court’s order restricting defendant’s cross-examination of the deputies for an abuse of discretion. We likewise review the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion for a new trial for an abuse of discretion.

Authority:

People v. Peoples (2016) 62 Cal.4th 718, 765

People v. Hoyt (2020) 8 Cal.5th 892, 957

Fourth Holding:

The tactical decision (which was defendant’s to make) has no bearing on whether the trial court properly limited defendant’s cross-examination of the deputies. The issue is whether defendant had a reasonable opportunity to cross-examine the deputies’ potential bias, not whether that cross-examination might benefit the prosecution.

Authority:

Delaware v. Van Arsdall (1986) 475 U.S. 673, 678-679

Fifth Holding:

That defendant could have asked other witnesses about the 2015 incident to attack the deputies’ credibility is beside the point. Defendant had a Sixth Amendment right to reasonably probe the deputies’ credibility by cross-examining the deputies. The issue here is, again, whether the trial court’s limitation on defendant’s cross-examination of the deputies violated the Confrontation Clause, not whether defendant had other available means to explore the deputies’ bias beyond cross-examining them.

Authority:

People v. Smith (2007) 40 Cal.4th 483, 513 [Confrontation Clause allows appropriate cross-examination designed to show a prototypical form of bias on the part of the witness]

People v. Quartermain (1997) 16 Cal.4th 600, 623 [The right of confrontation includes the right to cross-examine adverse witnesses on matters reflecting on their credibility]

Sixth Holding:

The testimony of the deputies was effectively the only evidence presented on the assault on an officer and felony evading charges, since they were the only witnesses to those offenses. Evidence about the deputies’ knowledge of the earlier incident was thus not of marginal impeachment value, nor was it not relevant, as the trial court incorrectly concluded. This was the only evidence that showed the deputies might have been biased against defendant, despite their denials, and could have influenced the jury’s view of their testimony.

Given that defendant’s guilt on the two counts hinged on the deputies’ testimony, their credibility was a critical issue on those counts. The trial court’s ruling allowed defendant to ask the deputies only whether they knew defendant and whether they were biased against him. When both deputies said they were not biased against him, defendant could not then probe any potential bias stemming from the 2015 incident, even though the jury might have reasonably found that the incident gave the deputies a motive for favoring the prosecution. In our view, the trial court’s ruling made defendant’s cross-examination of the deputies an exercise in futility.

Authority:

United States v. Abel (1984) 469 U.S. 45, 52 [Proof of bias is almost always relevant because the jury, as finder of fact and weigher of credibility, has historically been entitled to assess all evidence which might bear on the accuracy and truth of a witness’ testimony]

People v. Castaneda-Prado (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 1260, 1280-1282[Bias has traditionally been viewed as especially powerful.]

Abatti v. Superior Court (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 39, 52 [Impeachment of a witness can make the difference between acquittal and conviction, especially where credibility is the major issue in a case and evidence at trial will consist of opposing stories presented by the defense and the prosecution witnesses.]

Delaware v. Van Arsdall (1986) 475 U.S. 673, 679 [“blanket” ruling prohibiting all inquiry into a witness’s potential bias violated Confrontation Clause]

Seventh Holding:

The second step of the analysis asks whether a reasonable jury might have received a significantly different impression of the challenged witness’s credibility if the proposed line of cross-examination had been permitted. This requires us to focus on the witness’s cross-examination rather than the outcome of the trial as a whole, examining whether the defense had other means of impeachment of the witness during cross-examination. We review the issue de novo.

Authority:

People v. Castaneda-Prado (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 1260, 1282

Eighth Holding:

In Davis, the United States Supreme Court reasoned: “While counsel was permitted to ask [the witness] whether he was biased, counsel was unable to make a record from which to argue why the witness might have been biased or otherwise lacked that degree of impartiality expected of a witness at trial. On the basis of the limited cross-examination that was permitted, the jury might well have thought that defense counsel was engaged in a speculative and baseless line of attack on the credibility of an apparently blameless witness.”

So too here. Because we conclude the trial court’s ruling violated defendant’s Confrontation Clause right to cross-examine the deputies, we must reverse the convictions on counts 2 and 4 unless the People show the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The People have not done so.

Authority:

Davis v. Alaska (1974) 415 U.S. 308, 317-318

Delaware v. Van Arsdall (1986) 475 U.S. 673, 684

Ninth Holding:

A review of the Pitchess materials reveals that complaints had previously been filed against the deputies. Those materials should have been released to the defendant. The fact that the complaints were found by the internal police investigation to be unfounded is immaterial because unsustained complaints are discoverable. This is because “the burden for preparing a criminal defendant’s case rests with his counsel, not with the police department. That burden cannot be properly discharged unless counsel has direct access to potential witnesses, for it is counsel who must decide if they can aid his client, not the police department’s internal affairs division, however sincere and well motivated the latter may be.

Authority:

Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531

People v. Gaines (2009) 46 Cal.4th 172, 182

People v. Zamora (1980) 28 Cal.3d 88, 93 fn. 1, 101

Kelvin L. v. Superior Court (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 823, 829