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Fines and fees, Juveniles, Retroactivity

Case: 000137

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The minor contends, and the People concede, that recent amendments to Welfare and Institutions Code section 730.6 apply retroactively, requiring that the restitution fine imposed by the juvenile court be stricken.

First Holding:

While this appeal was pending, the Legislature amended section 730.6 and removed the requirement that a minor pay a restitution fine. The relevant portion of the statute now provides that the court shall not impose a separate and additional restitution fine against a minor found to be a person described in Section 602.

Authority:

WIC 730.6

Second Holding:

Appellant is entitled to the ameliorative benefits of this amendment.

Authority:

In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 745-746 [ameliorative legislation changes applicable to cases pending on appeal]

Sentencing

Case: 000136

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The trial court erred by imposing sentences for both counts 2 and 3 in violation of section 654.

First Holding:

An act or omission that is punishable in different ways by different provisions of law may be punished under either of such provisions, but in no case shall the act or omission be punished under more than one provision. Therefore, section 654 prohibits multiple punishment for offenses committed during a single or indivisible course of conduct.

Authority:

PEN 654

People v. Hester (2000) 22 Cal.4th 290, 294

People v. Latimer (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1203, 1207–1208

Second Holding:

Section 654 prohibits the imposition of concurrent sentences for offenses committed during a single or indivisible course of conduct. The accepted procedure for such offenses is to sentence defendant for each count and stay execution of sentence on certain counts to which section 654 is applicable.

Authority:

People v. Jones (2012) 54 Cal.4th 350, 353

Third Holding:

The trial court erred by imposing punishment for both count 2 and count 3 because both offenses arose out of a single or indivisible course of conduct. Both counts 2 and 3 were committed during the defendant’s single or indivisible course of conduct of driving his car and causing injury to one victim. Therefore, section 654 prohibits punishment of the defendant for both counts. Because under amended section 654, the trial court has discretion whether to punish the defendant for either count 2 or count 3, we reverse its imposition of punishment for both counts and remand the matter for the limited purpose of resentencing him on count 2 and count 3.

Authority:

PEN 654

Amelioration, Sentencing

Case: 000135

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

We find that in making the prima facie determination, the trial court properly reviewed the preliminary hearing and partial trial transcripts as part of the record of conviction, completely independent from the factual basis stipulation at the plea hearing, to find defendant was the actual killer and ineligible for resentencing under section 1172.6. Defendant’s contrary claims, including his alleged “immunity” and ineffective assistance arguments, are refuted by the record. As in Patton, however, we grant defendant’s request to remand the matter for him to have the opportunity to file a supplemental petition in the trial court.

First Holding:

Effective January 1, 2019, SB 1437 amended the felony-murder rule by adding section 189(e). It provides that a participant in the qualifying felony is liable for felony murder only if the person: (1) was the actual killer; (2) was not the actual killer but, with the intent to kill, acted as a direct aider and abettor; or (3) was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life. The Legislature also amended the natural and probable consequences doctrine by adding subdivision (a)(3) to section 188, which states that malice shall not be imputed to a person based solely on his or her participation in a crime.

Authority:

People v. Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45, 50–51

People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 707–708

People v. Reyes (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 292, 295

Second Holding:

While this appeal was pending, the California Supreme Court decided Patton and held that in making the prima facie determination as to whether a petitioner, who entered a plea instead of going to trial, was convicted under a now-invalid imputed malice theory of homicide in a section 1172.6 petition, the trial court may rely on unchallenged, relief-foreclosing facts within a preliminary hearing transcript to refute conclusory, checkbox allegations made in a form section 1172.6 petition. It disapproved of appellate decisions that conditioned the use of preliminary hearing transcripts to make the prima facie determination on whether a petitioner previously admitted the truth of testimony contained therein or stipulated to the transcript as the factual basis of a plea. It affirmed the trial court’s denial of the section 1172.6 petition in that case but granted the defendant’s request to remand the matter for the opportunity to file an amended petition consistent with the Supreme Court’s ruling.

Authority:

People v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549, 569 fn. 12, 564, 569-570

Third Holding:

As relevant herein, the petitioner must declare (1) A complaint, information, or indictment was filed against the petitioner that allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory of felony murder, murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine or other theory under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in a crime, or attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine. (2) The petitioner was convicted of murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter following a trial or accepted a plea offer in lieu of a trial at which the petitioner could have been convicted of murder or attempted murder. (3) The petitioner could not presently be convicted of murder or attempted murder because of changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019.

Authority:

PEN 1172.6(a)(1)–(3)

People v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549, 569 fn. 12, 564, 558

Fourth Holding:

When a petitioner files a facially sufficient petition, the trial court must appoint counsel to represent the petitioner. The trial court may consider the record of conviction to determine whether the petitioner makes a prima facie showing only after the appointment of counsel and the opportunity for briefing has occurred.

Authority:

People v. Reyes (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 292, 298

People v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549, 569 fn. 12, 564, 559

Fifth Holding:

The amendments to sections 188 and 189 did not invalidate murder convictions based on the theory that the defendant was the actual killer. Where the record of conviction shows the defendant was the actual killer, he was not convicted under a now-invalid imputed malice theory and is ineligible for relief as a matter of law, and no evidentiary hearing is required. If the trial court commits error in making the prima facie finding to deny the petition without an evidentiary hearing, the error is harmless if the defendant is ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law.

Authority:

People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 707

People v. Mares (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 1158, 1166–1167

People v. Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45, 52

People v. Garcia (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 956, 973

People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 973–974

Retroactivity, Sentencing

Case: 000134

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

On resentencing under section 1172.75, the court erred in imposing the upper term on factors that had not been proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.

First Holding:

A criminal judgment does not become final for purposes of Estrada when an appellate court affirms a conviction, but leaves sentencing issues pending before the trial court following remand. During the resentencing on remand, the benefits of supervening ameliorative legislation apply retroactively.

Authority:

People v. Lopez (2025) 17 Cal.5th 388, 392

In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740

Second Holding:

Absent waiver or stipulation, aggravating factors such as the increasing seriousness of a defendant’s prior convictions and unsatisfactory performance on probation must be found true beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury before those facts can be used to justify an upper term sentence.

Authority:

PEN 1170

People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1082

Third Holding:

This case must be distinguished from Brannon-Thompson, which found that the plain language of section 1172.75(d)(4) indicated the Legislature intended the new burden of proof amendments to section 1170(b) to apply only if the trial court is imposing the upper term for the first time at a section 1172.75 resentencing. In this case, the defendant was not being resentenced after a prior sentence that imposed an upper term was recalled.

Instead, he was on remand from the prior appeal directive to strike prior prison term enhancements before section 1172.75 even went into effect (which the court did). As such, when the trial court proceeded to resentence defendant in 2023, his sentence already lacked any enhancements imposed pursuant to former section 667.5(b). Defendant accordingly was not eligible for resentencing under section 1172.75 in 2023, making the provision inapplicable. Instead, appearing for resentencing based on a remand in the prior appeal, the defendant was entitled to the benefits of supervening ameliorative legislation, including the new evidentiary standards of section 1170(b).

Authority:

PEN 1170(b)

People v. Lopez (2025) 17 Cal.5th 388

People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1087

People v. Brannon-Thompson (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 455

Discretion, Juveniles, Standard of review, Statutory interpretation

Case: 000133

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

In 2000, appellant was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole after being tried as an adult for two murders he committed when he was 17. In 2021, his sentence was recalled under Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (d). The prosecution filed a motion to again transfer appellant’s case from juvenile court to criminal court. The court granted the motion, and appellant challenges that ruling on appeal. We conclude that the court misapprehended one aspect of its discretion, reverse the order transferring appellant to criminal court, and remand for reconsideration of the issue.

First Holding:

In determining at a transfer hearing whether a juvenile should be tried as an adult, the court must consider five statutory factors, one of which is whether the minor can be rehabilitated prior to the expiration of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction. The court stated that juvenile jurisdiction would have ended when appellant turned 25 years old. The court was quite clear that its consideration of the relevant factor was always directed at determining whether appellant would have been rehabilitated by the age of 25.

However, the court was incorrect. The juvenile court may retain jurisdiction over a person who is 25 years of age or older for a period not to exceed two years from the date of disposition if the person is found to be a person described in Section 602 by reason of the commission of an offense listed in subdivision (b) of Welfare and Institutions Code, Section 707. In this instance, the defendant would have been in his 40s two years after disposition hearing held in this case.

Authority:

WIC 707(d)

Second Holding:

When the appellant presents an issue of statutory interpretation, we review it de novo.

Authority:

In re Noah S. (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 410, 414

Third Holding:

Reversal is required unless the record clearly indicates that the trial court would have reached the same conclusion even if it had been aware that it had such discretion. Here, the court did not express how it would have ruled had it known juvenile jurisdiction could have lasted longer. One of the few comments the court made about the defendant’s post-age 25 conduct cuts against a finding of harmlessness. Paraphrased, the court stated that there was no question before it that the defendant has grown as an adult, but that the question was whether or not that growth would have occurred before age 25. It stated that the evidence it considered at the hearing indicates his growth occurred well past the age of 25.

Authority:

People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 139

Fourth Holding:

In order to transfer a minor from juvenile court to criminal court, the court must find by clear and convincing evidence that the minor is not amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.

Authority:

WIC 707(a)(3)