Error and/or relief
It was error for the court to order a stay-away order upon sentencing the defendant. Otherwise, we affirm the court’s sentencing choices.
First Holding:
Under section 136.2, when the court has a good cause belief that harm to, or intimidation or dissuasion of, a victim or witness has occurred or is reasonably likely to occur, the court is authorized to issue a restraining order. Orders made under section 136.2 are operative only during the pendency of criminal proceedings and as prejudgment orders. The only purpose of a section 136.2 protective order is to protect victims and witnesses in connection with the criminal proceeding in which the restraining order is issued in order to allow participation without fear of reprisal.
Authority:
PEN 136.2
People v. Scott (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 1303, 1324–1325
People v. Ponce (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 378, 383, 384 [Where the Legislature authorizes a specific variety of available procedures, the courts should use them and should normally refrain from exercising their inherent powers to invent alternatives.]
Second Holding:
We also observe that courts must, at the time of sentencing for certain crimes, consider issuing a protective order prohibiting a defendant from contacting a victim. None of these other statutes are applicable in this matter. The order issued against the defendant therefore transcended the authorization of section 136.2 and must be vacated.
Authority:
PEN 136.2(i)(1)
PEN 273.5
PEN 646.9(k)
People v. Stone (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 153, 160
We review the trial court’s sentencing decisions for an abuse of discretion. Under this standard of review, the trial court’s findings of fact are reviewed for substantial evidence, its conclusions of law are reviewed de novo, and its application of the law to the facts is reversible only if arbitrary and capricious.
Authority:
People v. Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th 825, 847
Haraguchi v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 706, 711–712
Third Holding:
To prove an abuse of discretion, the burden is on the party attacking the sentence to clearly show that the sentencing decision was irrational or arbitrary. In the absence of such a showing, the trial court is presumed to have acted to achieve legitimate sentencing objectives, and its discretionary determination to impose a particular sentence will not be set aside on review
Authority:
People v. Fredrickson (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 984, 988
People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 377 [a sentencing court does not abuse its discretion unless its decision is so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it]
Fourth Holding:
Section 1170(b)(6) does not mandate a presumption in favor of the lower term in every case in which the defendant generally falls under one of the categories enumerated in the subdivision. Rather, the statute is clear that childhood trauma (or one of the other two categories in subdivision (b)(6)) must be a contributing factor to the offense in order to qualify for a presumption of the low term in sentencing. On this record, we cannot say that the court failed to consider section 1170(b)(6), or that its decision to impose the middle term notwithstanding the provision was so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it.
Authority:
People v. Fredrickson (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 984, 988, 991 [In the absence of such a showing, the trial court is presumed to have acted to achieve legitimate sentencing objectives, and its discretionary determination to impose a particular sentence will not be set aside on review.]
People v. Hilburn (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 189, 204, fn. 6
People v. Ramirez (2021) 10 Cal.5th 983 [Absent evidence to the contrary, we presume that the trial court knew the law and followed it]
People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 377