Error and/or relief
The trial court improperly imposed the upper term for the attempted murder conviction based on unpleaded and unproven aggravating factors. Accordingly, we will remand for resentencing and otherwise affirm the judgment.
First Holding:
In selecting a term of imprisonment, a trial court may impose a sentence exceeding the middle term only when there are circumstances in aggravation of the crime that justify the imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding the middle term and the facts underlying those circumstances have been stipulated to by the defendant or have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a court trial. Notwithstanding this rule, a court may consider the defendant’s prior convictions in determining sentencing based on a certified record of conviction without submitting the prior convictions to a jury.
Authority:
PEN 1170
Second Holding:
With the exception of prior conviction allegations, under the Sixth Amendment, any fact that exposes a defendant to a greater potential sentence must be found by a jury and established beyond a reasonable doubt. A Sixth Amendment violation occurs when the trial court relies on unproven aggravating facts to impose an upper term sentence, even if some other aggravating facts relied on have been properly established. Further the United States Supreme Court rejected the argument that the prior conviction exception to the Sixth Amendment permits a judge to find perhaps any fact related to a defendant’s past offenses. Rather, a judge may do no more, consistent with the Sixth Amendment, than determine what crime, with what elements, the defendant was convicted of.
Authority:
People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 747, 768
Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. 270, 281
Erlinger v. United States (2024) 602 U.S. 821, 837-838
Third Holding:
A trial court’s reliance on aggravating circumstances not found in accordance with section 1170(b) is prejudicial unless an appellate court can conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury would have found true all of the aggravating facts relied upon by the trial court to justify an upper term sentence, or that those facts were otherwise proved true in compliance with the current statutory requirements. If the reviewing court cannot so determine, applying the Chapman standard of review, the defendant is entitled to a remand for resentencing. When assessing prejudice under Chapman, the proper inquiry is whether any rational fact finder could have come to the opposite conclusion. If a rational juror could have reached the opposite conclusion, the error is not harmless under Chapman. The Attorney General bears the burden of establishing that the federal constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Authority:
Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18
People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 768
People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1090
People v. Avalos (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 926, 953
Fourth Holding:
The error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The record does not necessarily reflect that defendant’s convictions were increasing in seriousness. He was subject to a sustained juvenile petition for robbery, and his adult conviction was for unlawful firearm activity. A rational jury could have concluded that his felony conduct was not increasing in seriousness. The trial court’s remaining findings are subjective determinations that go beyond the mere fact of a prior conviction.
Authority:
People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 767 [The Sixth Amendment jury trial right attaches to every aggravating fact, other than a prior conviction, used to justify imposition of the upper term]