Error and/or relief
The trial court prejudicially erred in imposing the upper term based on aggravating circumstances not proven in accordance with Penal Code section 1170(b). We will vacate defendant’s sentence and remand the matter to the trial court for further litigation of the aggravating circumstances and resentencing.
First Holding:
With the exception of prior conviction allegations, under the Sixth Amendment, any fact that exposes a defendant to a greater potential sentence must be found by a jury and established beyond a reasonable doubt.
Authority:
People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 747
Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. 270, 281
Second Holding:
A Sixth Amendment violation occurs when the trial court relies on unproven aggravating facts to impose an upper term sentence, even if some other aggravating facts relied on have been properly established.
Authority:
People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 768
Third Holding:
The United States Supreme Court rejected the argument that the prior conviction exception to the Sixth Amendment “permits a judge to find perhaps any fact related to a defendant’s past offenses. A judge may do no more, consistent with the Sixth Amendment, than determine what crime, with what elements, the defendant was convicted of.
Authority:
Erlinger v. United States (2024) 602 U.S. 821, 837-838
Fourth Holding:
The aggravating circumstances were not proven in accordance with section 1170(b)(2) and the prior conviction exception would not apply to them.e
Authority:
People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1083-1084 [We understand Erlinger to require that any fact, beyond the bare fact of a prior conviction, that exposes a defendant to harsher punishment, must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt]
Fifth Holding:
A trial court’s reliance on aggravating circumstances not found in accordance with section 1170(b) is prejudicial unless an appellate court can conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury would have found true all of the aggravating facts relied upon by the trial court to justify an upper term sentence, or that those facts were otherwise proved true in compliance with the current statutory requirements. If the reviewing court cannot so determine, applying the Chapman standard of review, the defendant is entitled to a remand for resentencing.
Authority:
Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18
People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 768
Sixth Holding:
When assessing prejudice under Chapman, the proper inquiry is whether any rational fact finder could have come to the opposite conclusion. If a rational juror could have reached the opposite conclusion, the error is not harmless under Chapman. The People bear the burden of establishing that the federal constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Authority:
People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 775-776 [To the extent a potential aggravating circumstance rests on a somewhat vague or subjective standard, it may be difficult for a reviewing court to conclude with confidence that, had the issue been submitted to the jury, the jury would have assessed the facts in the same manner as did the trial court]
People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1090 [deciding it could not conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that a properly instructed jury would have found the defendant’s criminal convictions were of increasing seriousness]
People v. Avalos (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 926, 953