Error and/or relief
The court erred in imposing the upper term on factors that were not submitted to a jury for proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The prosecution concedes the court prejudicially erred, but argues that the defendant forfeited the issue by failing to raise it below. Remanded for resentencing. On remand, the prosecution may choose to prove the necessary aggravating circumstances by any appropriate vehicle.
First Holding:
In order to encourage prompt detection and correction of error, and to reduce the number of unnecessary appellate claims, reviewing courts have required parties to raise certain issues at the time of sentencing. In such cases, lack of a timely and meaningful objection forfeits or waives the claim. This includes complaints about the manner in which the trial court exercises its sentencing discretion and articulates its supporting reasons.
Authority:
People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 351, 356
Second Holding:
Achane held that a defendant forfeited a claim that a low-term sentence was mandated under section 1170(b)(6), which requires a factual basis that triggers the low term. Presented with a similar issue, Frederickson that where there was a presumption of a particular term without any factual findings, a defendant did not forfeit the benefit of the presumption, which is not subject to forfeiture. Lopez-Tapia sided with Frederickson.
Authority:
People v. Achane (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 1037, 1044
People v. Frederickson (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 984, 994 fn.8.
People v. Lopez-Tapia (2026) 120 Cal.App.5th 690, 697
Third Holding:
Here, unlike the cases involving a low term presumption when facts support it, the defendant needed make no argument nor offer any evidence to obtain the benefit of the middle-term presumption, nor to trigger the requirement that the trial court state the reasons for choosing a higher sentence. What he is arguing for was required by statute.
Authority:
PEN 1170(b)(2), (b)(5)
Fourth Holding:
In any event, neither forfeiture nor application of the forfeiture rule is automatic. An appellate court may choose to refrain from applying the forfeiture bar, under its discretion. Here, we decline to decide whether there was any forfeiture; even if there were, we would exercise our discretion to address the issue on the merits to forestall a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Authority:
People v. McCullough (2013) 56 Cal.4th 589, 593
People v. Lua (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1004, 1014
People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161, fn. 6
People v. Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 146
Fifth Holding:
Under section 1170(b)(2) the court may impose a sentence exceeding the middle term only when there are circumstances in aggravation and the facts underlying those circumstances have been stipulated to by the defendant or have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a court trial.
A defendant is entitled to a jury trial on all aggravating facts, other than the bare fact of a prior conviction and its elements, that expose the defendant to imposition of a sentence more serious than the statutorily provided midterm. The burden is on the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the facts relied on to justify an upper term sentence.
If those facts are properly proven, the court may take them into account and exercise its discretion under section 1170(b) to determine what sentence to impose. The court shall set forth on the record the facts and reasons for choosing the sentence imposed.
Authority:
PEN 1170(b)(2), (b)(5)
People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1086
Sixth Holding:
When a defendant is deprived of a jury trial on aggravating facts used to justify imposition of an upper term sentence, the reviewing court must apply the Chapman standard of review. Under that standard, a sentence imposed under section 1170(b) must be reversed and remanded unless the reviewing court concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury, applying that same standard, would have found true all of the aggravating facts upon which the court relied to conclude the upper term was justified, or that those facts were otherwise proved true in compliance with the current statute. As the prosecution concedes here, we cannot find the error to have been harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Authority:
Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18
People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1087