Error and/or relief
Twenty-one years after his conviction of murder committed when he was 20, the defendant filed a motion for a hearing under Franklin. The court (Judge A) appointed counsel and set a hearing date to determine whether the defendant was entitled to a full evidence preservation hearing. The defendant’s attorney ultimately filed a motion to be relieved as counsel, requesting that the matter be taken off the calendar, stating that the defendant was not entitled to a Franklin hearing under Hardin. There was no indication that counsel had discussed this with the defendant. The defendant was not present. The court (Judge B) relieved counsel and took the matter off calendar.
The order relieving defendant’s appointed counsel is reversed. Upon remand, the trial court shall issue an order reinstating counsel and set the request for a formal, noticed hearing in which defendant is given notice and an opportunity to respond.
To the extent defendant maintains upon remand that appointed counsel’s representation is inadequate or ineffective, the trial court is directed to consider any such claim under the principles set forth in People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118
The trial court is further directed to set a new hearing for defendant’s Franklin motion if the defendant requests such relief upon remand.
First Holding:
Section 3051 offers youth offenders committed for long prison terms an opportunity for early release on parole. It requires the Board of Parole Hearings to conduct a youth offender parole eligibility hearing to determine if, based on certain criteria involving the controlling offense, the offender is eligible for parole. The hearing must provide for a meaningful opportunity to obtain release, and includes an assessment of the offender’s growth and maturity that takes into consideration the diminished culpability of youth as compared to that of adults and the hallmark features of youth.
Given these factors, the California Supreme Court held in Franklin that when a juvenile offender receives an indeterminate life sentence, the offender must be given adequate opportunity at sentencing to make a record of mitigating evidence tied to his youth.
Authority:
PEN 3051
People v. Williams (2024) 17 Cal.5th 99, 113
People v. Medrano (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 961, 967
People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261, 269
Second Holding:
In Cook, the California Supreme Court extended the availability of a Franklin hearing to a juvenile offender whose conviction and sentence have become final. Specifically, it held that an offender entitled to a youth offender parole hearing may seek the remedy of a Franklin proceeding even though the offender’s sentence is otherwise final. To initiate such a proceeding, an offender should file a motion requesting a hearing under the authority of section 1203.01.
Authority:
PEN 1203.01
People v. Ngo (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 116, 127
In re Cook (2019) 7 Cal.5th 439, 451
People v. Howard (2021) 74 Cal.App.5th 141, 150
Third Holding:
The proper avenue to request a Franklin proceeding is to file a motion in superior court under the original caption and case number, citing the authority of section 1203.01 and Cook. The motion should establish the inmate’s entitlement to a youth offender parole hearing and indicate when such hearing is anticipated to take place, or if one or more hearings have already occurred. Nothing in Cook indicates the motion must describe with precision the evidence the offender seeks to introduce.
There are no mandatory pleading requirements for a Franklin motion, and the required showing to initiate the process for a Franklin proceeding is minimal: due to the limited resources generally available to inmates, the Cook court reasonably envisioned a simple pleading mechanism to get the process started.
Authority:
People v. Howard (2021) 74 Cal.App.5th 141, 150
People v. Lipptrapp (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 886, 896
Fourth Holding:
A legally sufficient Franklin motion does not automatically guarantee a defendant the right to do so. Rather, such a motion only initiates the process for a Franklin proceeding. Based solely on the motion, the trial court may immediately find a Franklin proceeding is warranted. The trial court may also exercise its discretion to conduct this process efficiently, ensuring that the information introduced is relevant, noncumulative, and otherwise in accord with the governing rules, statutes, and regulations.
The court may, for example, require an offer of proof regarding the evidence the offender seeks to present, so that it can determine whether such evidence is relevant to youth-related factors and meaningfully adds to the already available record. It may also determine whether testimony is appropriate, or if other types of evidentiary submissions will suffice. After allowing a defendant an opportunity of this nature, the court may deny further proceedings if it finds they are unlikely to produce fruitful evidence.
Authority:
People v. Howard (2021) 74 Cal.App.5th 141, 152
In re Cook (2019) 7 Cal.5th 439, 149
Fifth Holding:
Courts have subsequently held that a Franklin motion may also be used to raise a challenge to section 3051’s limitations on the availability of youth offender parole hearings on equal protection grounds.
While the California Supreme Court has concluded that section 3051’s exclusion of offenders who are serving sentences of life in prison without the possibility of parole for a crime committed after the age of 18 from youth offender parole eligibility is not facially unconstitutional, it expressly left the door open to the potential validity of challenges to other exclusions set forth in section 3051 as well as as-applied challenges based on particular special circumstances or the factual circumstances of individual cases.
Authority:
People v. Sands (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 193, 201-202
People v. Briscoe (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 479, 486-489
People v. Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.5th 834, 864
Sixth Holding:
Generally, a trial court’s removal of appointed counsel for an indigent defendant is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Here, we have determined the trial court’s order granting appointed counsel’s request to be relieved constituted an abuse of discretion.
Authority:
People v. Mungia (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1101, 1119
People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1190
People v. Wright (2021) 12 Cal.5th 419, 440
Seventh Holding:
Generally, both the United States Constitution and California Constitution guarantee a basic right of due process, and the fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.
The Supreme Court has held that a prisoner may derive a due process liberty interest from either the Constitution or state law. When the asserted interest is derived exclusively from state law, it will be recognized as within the scope of due process liberty if the state statute protects the interest by permitting its forfeiture only on the happening of specified conditions.
Authority:
U.S. Const., 14th Amend.
Cal. Const., art. I, secs. 7, 15
People v. Allen (2008) 44 Cal.4th 843, 869
People v. Ramirez (1979) 25 Cal.3d 260, 265
Eighth Holding:
Generally, having undertaken the defense of a criminal case an attorney must continue with his services until he is released by the client or by the court. He may apply to the court for release from further services and for good cause shown may be released, but he may not abandon his representation at will. In light of this principle, it is established that the procedural requirements of sections 284 and 285 of the Code of Civil Procedure govern a change of attorney in a criminal, as well as in a civil, proceeding.
These statutes specify that in order to withdraw from representation, an attorney must either obtain the consent of the client or bring a formal application in the trial court with notice to the client. The legislative purpose of these provisions is to provide certain safeguards to protect the accused.
Authority:
CCP 284
CCP 285
People v. Prince (1968) 268 Cal.App.2d 398, 404, 406
Smith v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County (1968) 68 Cal.2d 547, 558-559 [The sole statutory authority for the removal of counsel is Code of Civil Procedure section 284. That statute is applicable in criminal cases.]
In re Martinez (1959) 52 Cal.2d 808, 813
People v. Bouchard (1957) 49 Cal.2d 438, 440
People v. Kerfoot (1960) 184 Cal.App.2d 622, 636
Ninth Holding:
Here, the trial court granted appointed counsel’s request to be relieved without complying with the statutory safeguards intended to afford defendant notice and an opportunity to be heard. The trial court conducted a hearing and granted the request the day after it was filed.
There is nothing in the record to show that defendant received any notice of appointed counsel’s request to be relieved. Nor was defendant present at the hearing. Such a procedure clearly violated defendant’s right to due process. And an order made in violation of a party’s due process right to notice and an opportunity to be heard constitutes an abuse of discretion.
Authority:
People v. Kerfoot (1960) 184 Cal.App.2d 622, 636 [Adequacy of notice is an element of due process of law. There is no due process of law in the complete absence of any notice.]
People v. Williams (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 828, 833 [Due process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard even where statutory procedures are unclear.]
People v. Johnson (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 5
Tenth Holding:
It is well established that a trial judge ordinarily may reconsider his or her own prejudgment rulings. There are limits, however, on the authority of one superior court judge to set aside the order of another judge of the same court. Under article VI, section 4, of the California Constitution, one judge or department of the superior court cannot enjoin, restrain, or otherwise interfere with the judicial act of another judge or department of the superior court.
This rule prevents a trial court judge from acting as a one-judge appellate court over another judge. This is true even if the first judge committed legal error in ruling on the matter. The rule also bars a second judge from reconsidering another judge’s discretionary appointment of counsel.
Here, the order relieving counsel was made by a different judge than the one who previously appointed counsel and set the Franklin motion for a hearing.
The record shows that the first judge reviewed defendant’s Franklin motion and, based upon that review, appointed counsel and set the matter for a hearing. Thus, the question of whether defendant had established a prima facie showing sufficient to entitle him to appointment of counsel was already considered and decided by the first judge.
Even if that determination was erroneous, the second judge could not relieve counsel by purportedly reviewing the sufficiency of defendant’s prima facie showing anew and determining that it was inadequate to warrant appointment of counsel. Doing so would have constituted an impermissible reconsideration.
To be clear, a motion to be relieved may be heard by a judge other than the one who initially appointed counsel. However, the motion must be determined on its own merits based upon the showing and arguments presented in conjunction with that request.
Authority:
Calif. Const. art VI, sec. 4
People v. Waldon (2023) 14 Cal.5th 288, 306
In re Alberto (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 421, 426-431 [second judge could not reconsider bail set by first judge even if first judge failed to correctly apply statutes in setting bail]
People v. Goodwillie (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 695, 712-713 [trial judge erred by relieving advisory counsel previously appointed by another judge]
Eleventh Holding:
In our view, the error in this case is akin to structural error requiring reversal. Typically, a defendant who has established error under state law must demonstrate there is a reasonable probability that in the absence of the error he or she would have obtained a more favorable result. However, under the California constitutional harmless-error provision some errors are not susceptible to the ordinary or generally applicable harmless-error analysis.
The kinds of errors that, regardless of the evidence, may result in a miscarriage of justice because they operate to deny a criminal defendant the constitutionally required orderly legal procedure all involve fundamental structural defects in the judicial proceedings.
Most errors are amenable to harmless error review because they can be quantitatively assessed in the context of other evidence presented.
Structural defects, on the other hand, defy analysis by harmless-error standards because they are not simply an error in the trial process, but rather an error affecting the framework within which the trial proceeds. A structural error requires per se reversal because it cannot be fairly determined how a trial would have been resolved if the grave error had not occurred.
Authority:
People v. Anzalone (2013) 56 Cal.4th 545, 553
People v. Lewis (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 1078, 1111