Error and/or relief
The trial court erred in concluding the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel.
First Holding:
A defendant in a criminal case possesses two constitutional rights with respect to representation that are mutually exclusive. The Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant a right to counsel but also allows him to waive this right and to represent himself without counsel.
Authority:
People v. Sullivan (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 524, 545
Second Holding:
In any case in which a Faretta request for self-representation has been made, the court must evaluate two countervailing considerations: on one hand, the defendant’s absolute right to counsel, which must be assiduously protected; on the other hand, the defendant’s unqualified constitutional right to discharge counsel if he pleases and represent himself.
The right to representation by counsel persists until a defendant affirmatively waives it, and courts indulge every reasonable inference against such waiver.
The waiver of counsel must be knowing and voluntary—that is, the defendant must actually understand the significance and consequences of the decision, and the decision must be uncoerced. The purpose of the knowing and voluntary inquiry is to determine whether the defendant actually does understand the significance and consequences of a particular decision and whether the decision is uncoerced.
Authority:
Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806
People v. Sullivan (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 524, 545
People v. Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 20 [Courts must indulge every reasonable inference against waiver of the right to counsel]
Third Holding:
When confronted with a request for self-representation, a trial court must make the defendant aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.
Nevertheless, no particular form of words is required in admonishing a defendant who seeks to forgo the right to counsel and engage in self-representation. The test of a valid waiver of counsel is not whether specific warnings or advisements were given but whether the record as a whole demonstrates that the defendant understood the disadvantages of self-representation, including the risks and complexities of the particular case.
Authority:
People v. Dent (2003) 30 Cal.4th 213, 217–218
Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806,. 835
People v. Lawley (2002) 27 Cal.4th 102, 140
Fourth Holding:
On appeal, a reviewing court independently examines the entire record to determine whether the defendant knowingly and intelligently invoked his right to self-representation. The defendant bears the burden of affirmatively demonstrating the waiver was invalid.
Authority:
People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 453
People v. Sullivan (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 524, 549
Fifth Holding:
In Jackio, the court held that trial courts are required to advise a defendant desiring to represent himself at trial of the maximum punishment that could be imposed if the defendant is found guilty of the crimes, with enhancements, alleged at the time the defendant moves to represent himself.
In Bush, the court distinguished Jackio and held that, while the better practice would be to inform the accused, on the record, of the maximum sentence, including any maximum monetary fine that could be imposed on a conviction, we have not found any case specifically concluding that an advisement on this point is a constitutional minimum in every case.
Authority:
People v. Jackio (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 445, 454
People v. Bush (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 457, 473
Sixth Holding:
It is not entirely clear whether the invalid waiver is structural error that is reversible per se or whether the error should be reviewed for prejudice under the standard of Chapman, under which error is reversible unless harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
We need not resolve that question because, even if the error was not structural, respondent has not shown the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The evidence against appellant was overwhelming. There is certainly a reasonable possibility that, faced with a sentence three times longer than he initially had in mind and with no plausible defense to the charges, appellant would have opted to forgo self-representation. And there is also a reasonable possibility appointed counsel could have negotiated a plea agreement with the prosecution that would have resulted in a sentence less than that appellant received.
Authority:
People v. Burgener (2009) 46 Cal.4th 231, 244 [acknowledging but not resolving split of authority]
People v. Ruffin (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 536, 549