Error and/or relief
The trial court erred in instructing the jury that implied malice murder can be based on an act that was reasonably foreseeable to cause death rather than highly likely to cause death. The prosecutor erred by making arguments to the jury on the same point. The defendant’s convictions on the counts of murder are reversed. The charges may be retried on remand. [The defendant was convicted as a result of the death of three occupants of a vehicle he crashed into while he was driving under the influence.]
First Holding:
Malice may be implied when a defendant does an act with a high probability that it will result in death and does it with a base antisocial motive and with a wanton disregard for human life. The trial court erred here by requiring only that death be a reasonably foreseeable consequence of appellant’s act, rather than a highly probable one. Similarly, the prosecutor erred by arguing to the jury that it need not find that appellant’s act of driving impaired created a strong probability of death.
Authority:
People v. Dellinger (1989) 49 Cal.3d 1212, 1219
Second Holding:
When the trial court misinstructs the jury on an element of a charged crime, we consider prejudice under the standard of Chapman. Under that standard, we reverse the judgment unless the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Authority:
Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18
People v. Hendrix (2022) 13 Cal.5th 933, 942