Tag Archives: Diversion

Error and/or relief

The trial court denied the defendant’s application for mental health diversion, finding that although defendant was eligible for diversion, he was not suitable because he posed an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety if treated in the community.

There is insufficient evidence of an unreasonable risk that defendant will commit a super strike offense if treated in the community. We will reverse the judgment and remand the matter for a new hearing on defendant’s present suitability for mental health diversion.

First Holding:

Penal Code section 1001.36 gives a trial court discretion to grant pretrial diversion for individuals with certain mental health disorders. The trial court can postpone prosecution at any time in the judicial process, either temporarily or permanently, to allow the defendant to undergo treatment. The Legislature intended the mental health diversion program to apply as broadly as possible.

Authority:

People v. Frahs (2020) 9 Cal.5th 618, 626

People v. Whitmill (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1138, 1147-1149

Vaughn v. Superior Court (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 124, 133

Second Holding:

A defendant must be both eligible and suitable for mental health diversion. A defendant is eligible under section 1001.36 (b) if (1) the defendant has been diagnosed by a qualified mental health expert with a mental disorder as identified in the most recent edition of the DSM; and (2) the defendant’s mental disorder was a significant factor in the commission of the charged offense.

Authority:

Vaughn v. Superior Court (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 124, 133

Sarmiento v. Superior Court (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 882, 891

Third Holding:

As for suitability, four circumstances must be satisfied: (1) in the opinion of a qualified mental health expert the defendant’s mental disorder would respond to treatment; (2) the defendant consents to diversion and agrees to waive his or her speedy trial rights; (3) the defendant agrees to comply with treatment requirements; and (4) if treated in the community, the defendant will not pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety as defined in section 1170.18.

Authority:

PEN 1001.36(c)(1)-(4)

Sarmiento v. Superior Court (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 882, 891-892

Fourth Holding:

A defendant poses an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety under section 1170.18(c) if there is an unreasonable risk that the defendant will commit a new violent felony within the meaning of section 667(e)(2)(C)(iv), otherwise known as a super strike.

The enumerated super strike offenses include murder, attempted murder, solicitation to commit murder, assault with a machine gun on a police officer, possession of a weapon of mass destruction, a serious or violent felony punishable by death or life imprisonment, a sexually violent offense, or a sexual offense committed against a minor under the age of 14.

Authority:

Gomez v. Superior Court (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 671, 679

Fifth Holding:

We review a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion for mental health diversion for abuse of discretion. A trial court abuses its discretion when it makes an arbitrary decision by applying the wrong legal standard or bases its decision on express or implied factual findings that are not supported by substantial evidence.

There is no evidence defendant had been previously charged with a super strike offense, and his current offense is not a super strike. Defendant’s criminal history consists of two nonviolent felonies and four misdemeanor offenses. At the time of the hearing on his application, defendant was doing well in an outpatient program. He had successfully engaged in a treatment program for six months, he was maintaining housing and a job, he had not reoffended, and his treatment provider recommended defendant continue treatment in the community.

On this record, there is insufficient evidence to support a finding of an unreasonable risk that defendant will commit a super strike offense if treated in the community.

Authority:

Vaughn v. Superior Court (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 124, 135

Error and/or relief

We conclude the finding of unreasonable risk to public safety is not supported by substantial evidence and the trial court abused its discretion in finding the defendant unsuitable for diversion.

(Gary note: I have set out the various holdings and authorities below that represent the applicable law and principles, but I have not recited the court’s analysis of the facts in this case on which it based there was no substantial evidence to support the court’s conclusion that the defendant was a danger to the community. Suffice it to say, the appellate court found the court’s reasoning inadequate to support denial of the request for mental health diversion.)

First Holding:

Section 1001.36 authorizes courts to grant pretrial mental health diversion to defendants who meet six qualifying requirements. The stated purpose of the diversion statute is to promote all of the following: (a) Increased diversion of individuals with mental disorders to mitigate the individuals’ entry and reentry into the criminal justice system while protecting public safety. (b) Allowing local discretion and flexibility for counties in the development and implementation of diversion for individuals with mental disorders across a continuum of care settings. (c) Providing diversion that meets the unique mental health treatment and support needs of individuals with mental disorders.

If the defendant successfully completes diversion, including having in place a plan for long-term mental health care, the criminal charges shall be dismissed. However, if after diversion is granted, a qualified mental health expert concludes the defendant is performing unsatisfactorily in the assigned program, the court shall, after notice to the defendant, hold a hearing to determine whether criminal proceedings should be reinstated or treatment modified.

Authority:

PEN 1001.36

PEN 1001.35

People v. Williams (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 990, 995

People v. Frahs (2020) 9 Cal.5th 618, 626

People v. Whitmill (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1138, 1149–1150

Second Holding:

Effective January 1, 2023, mental health diversion requires the trial court to find that the defendant is both eligible for diversion and suitable for the program. A defendant is eligible if they meet two criteria: first, the defendant must have been diagnosed with a mental disorder as identified in the most recent edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, within the last five years, by a qualified mental health expert.

Second, the disorder must be a significant factor in the commission of the charged offense. The court shall find that the defendant’s mental disorder was a significant factor in the commission of the offense unless there is clear and convincing evidence that it was not a motivating factor, causal factor, or contributing factor to the defendant’s involvement in the alleged offense.

Authority:

PEN 1001.36(b)

Third Holding:

This presumption cannot be overcome by the mere absence of evidence demonstrating the defendant’s mental illness was a factor in the alleged offenses. If a mere absence of evidence were sufficient, the court would effectively be impermissibly shifting the burden to the defendant to affirmatively prove that his mental disorder contributed to the offenses.

Authority:

Lacour v. Superior Court (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 391, 404

Gomez v. Superior Court (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 671, 688–689

Fourth Holding:

If the defendant satisfies the statutory eligibility requirements, the court must then consider whether the defendant is suitable for pretrial diversion. The four criteria to assess suitability are grouped in section 1001.36, subdivision (c). As with the diagnosis eligibility requirement, the first of these relies on input from a medical professional, in this instance the opinion of a qualified mental health expert, that the symptoms of defendant’s mental disorder would respond to mental health treatment.

The second and third requirements are satisfied if the defendant agrees to waive their speedy trial rights and to comply with treatment as a condition of diversion. Only the fourth requirement necessitates a trial court finding, to wit, that the defendant will not pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety if treated in the community.

Authority:

PEN 1001.36(c)

Sarmiento v. Superior Court (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 882, 892–894

Fifth Holding:

Even here, however, the Legislature has narrowly defined the applicable criteria. Borrowing from sections 1170.18(c) and 667(e)(2)(C)(iv), an unreasonable risk to public safety means a likelihood that the defendant will commit one of the violent felonies specifically enumerated in the statute.

The listed felonies are colloquially known as “super strikes.” Super strikes are a narrowly drawn subset of violent felonies involving extreme violence. We note that the lack of a criminal record is strong evidence that a defendant is unlikely to commit a future super strike offense.

Authority:

PEN 1001.36(c)(4)

Sarmiento v. Superior Court (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 882, 892

People v. Williams (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 990, 1001

People v. Moine (2011) 62 Cal.App.5th 440, 450

People v. Hoffman (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1304, 1310

Sixth Holding:

Assuming the defendant is both eligible and suitable, the trial court must also be satisfied that the recommended inpatient or outpatient program of mental health treatment will meet the specialized mental health treatment needs of the defendant. This is not an additional eligibility or suitability requirement the defendant must meet. Rather, section 1001.36(f)(1) read as a whole appears to contemplate an ongoing assessment to assure that defendant will receive appropriate treatment for their particular conditions as part of the diversion program.

Authority:

PEN 1001.36(f)(1)(A)(i)

People v. Gerson (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 1067, 1079

Sarmiento v. Superior Court (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 882, 892

Seventh Holding:

Finally, even if a defendant has made a prima facie showing that all the express statutory eligibility and suitability requirements are met, the court may still exercise its discretion to deny diversion. But this residual discretion is not unfettered; it must be exercised consistent with the principles and purpose of the governing law. Where the court chooses to exercise that residual discretion to deny diversion, its statement of reasons should reflect consideration of the underlying purposes of the statute and explain why diversion would not meet these goals.

Authority:

People v. Qualkinbush (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 879, 891

Sarmiento v. Superior Court (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 882, 892

Eighth Holding:

We review the trial court’s factual findings as to the enumerated statutory criteria for substantial evidence. Under this deferential standard of review, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the People and must presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence. Although we must ensure the evidence is reasonable, credible, and of solid value, nonetheless it is the exclusive province of the trial judge or jury to determine the credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the facts on which that determination depends.

Authority:

People v. Gerson (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 1067, 1079

Ninth Holding:

We review the trial court’s ultimate decision whether to grant mental health diversion for an abuse of discretion. By its terms, section 1001.36 is designed to encourage trial courts to broadly authorize pretrial mental health diversion, providing treatment for qualifying mental disorders that result in criminal behavior. As with any principled exercise of discretion, the court must utilize the appropriate criteria consistent with the principles and purposes of the governing law, only drawing conclusions supported by substantial evidence.

Authority:

People v. Gerson (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 1067, 1080

Error and/or relief

The court’s finding that the People overcame the statutory presumption that the defendant’s mental health diagnosis was a significant factor in the commission of the offenses was not supported by substantial evidence. Therefore, its denial of his application on that basis was an abuse of discretion.

As a result, we conditionally reverse the judgment and remand with instructions for the trial court to find the defendant eligible for diversion and hold a hearing to determine the defendant’s suitability for diversion.

If the court determines the defendant is suitable for diversion, it may grant his application. If the court determines the defendant is not suitable, the defendant’s convictions and sentence shall be reinstated.

First Holding:

We review a trial court’s ruling on an application for mental health diversion for an abuse of discretion and its factual findings for substantial evidence. A court abuses its discretion when it applies the wrong legal standard or bases its decision on findings that are not supported by substantial evidence. By definition, substantial evidence’ requires evidence and not mere speculation.

Authority:

Lacour v. Superior Court (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 391, 401

People v. Moine (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 440, 449

People v. Ramon (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 843, 851

Second Holding:

In reviewing a trial court’s finding that a fact has been proven by clear and convincing evidence, the question before us is whether the record contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could have found it highly probable that the [disputed] fact was true. To answer that question, we review the record in the light most favorable to the prevailing party and give due deference to how the trier of fact may have evaluated the credibility of witnesses, resolved conflicts in the evidence, and drawn reasonable inferences from the evidence.

Authority:

Lacour v. Superior Court (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 391, 401

Third Holding:

The Legislature enacted sections 1001.35 and 1001.36 to authorize trial courts to grant pretrial mental health diversion to defendants diagnosed with qualifying mental disorders. To be eligible for mental health diversion, a defendant must meet two requirements. First, the defendant must have been diagnosed within the past five years with a mental disorder identified in the most recent edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. Second, the defendant’s mental disorder must be a significant factor in the commission of the offense.

Authority:

PEN 1001.36(b)

Gomez v. Superior Court (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 671, 677

Lacour v. Superior Court (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 391, 400

Fourth Holding:

To ensure that diversion applies as broadly as possible, the Legislature amended section 1001.36 to include a presumption that a defendant’s mental disorder diagnosis was a significant factor in the commission of the offense if the diagnosis occurred within the past five years. Once the presumption is established, to overcome it, the People must prove by clear and convincing evidence that defendant’s mental disorder was not a motivating, causal, or contributing factor in defendant’s commission of the offense.

Authority:

PEN 1001.36(b)(2)

Siam v. Superior Court (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 67, 80

Gomez v. Superior Court (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 671, 688

Fifth Holding:

Even if a defendant meets the eligibility requirements, before the court can grant a defendant diversion, the court must also find the defendant suitable for diversion using the four criteria outlined in section 1001.36(c). Specifically, the court must find that (1) a qualified mental health expert has determined the defendant’s symptoms would respond to mental health treatment; (2) the defendant has consented to diversion and waived the right to a speedy trial; (3) the defendant has agreed to comply with treatment as a condition of diversion, and (4) the defendant will not pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety if treated in the community.

Authority:

PEN 1001.26(c)

Lacour v. Superior Court (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 391, 400-401

Sixth Holding:

Even after finding a defendant eligible and suitable for diversion, however, a trial court may exercise its residual discretion to deny diversion. But this residual discretion must be exercised consistent with the principles and purpose of the governing law. That purpose includes a strong legislative preference for treatment of mental health disorders because of the benefits of such treatment to both the offending individual and the community.

Authority:

Sarmiento v. Superior Court (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 882, 896

Seventh Holding:

In 2024, a mental health professional diagnosed the defendant with PTSD, major depressive disorder with psychotic features, and alcohol use disorder. Defendant’s diagnosis established a presumption that his mental health disorder was a significant factor in the commission of the robberies.

In response, the People argued that that it was simply impossible to believe that PTSD or depression caused the defendant and his cohorts to plan the robberies, which were obviously coordinated and planned out. The People offered no evidence, and the trial court did not identify any, establishing by clear and convincing evidence, that defendant’s mental disorder was not a motivating, causal, or contributing factor to defendant’s commission of the offenses. Their speculation about the cause of the robberies is not substantial evidence.

The absence of evidence proving that the defendant’s mental disorder was a factor in the commission of the [robberies] is not substantial evidence supporting a finding by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant’s mental disorder was not a factor in the commission of the offenses.

By finding the presumption was overcome even though the People offered no evidence that would establish that defendant’s mental disorder was not a motivating, causal, or contributing factor to defendant’s commission of the offenses, the trial court effectively shifted the burden to the defendant to affirmatively prove that his mental disorder contributed to the offenses. That is not the showing the statute requires.

Authority:

PEN 1001.36(b)(2)

People v. Ramon (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 843, 851

Gomez v. Superior Court (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 671, 688

Lacour v. Superior Court (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 391, 404

Eighth Holding:

A court abuses its discretion when it bases its decision on express or implied factual findings that are not supported by substantial evidence. Because substantial evidence does not support the trial court’s finding that the presumption was overcome, it abused its discretion in denying defendant diversion based on that finding.

Authority:

Siam v. Superior Court (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 67, 81

People v. Moine (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 440, 449

Ninth Holding:

We review the trial court’s factual findings for substantial evidence. A substantial evidence inquiry examines the record in the light most favorable to the judgment and upholds it if the record contains reasonable, credible evidence of solid value upon which a reasonable trier of fact could have relied in reaching the conclusion in question.

Once such evidence is found, the substantial evidence test is satisfied. The trial court found defendant would not pose an unreasonable risk to public safety as defined within the statute. Meaning that he was not likely to commit a super-strike offense if granted diversion. An appellate tribunal is neither authorized nor warranted in substituting its judgment for the judgment of the trial judge. Because the record contains substantial evidence to support that finding, we do not disturb it.

Authority:

Lacour v. Superior Court (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 391, 401

People v. Armstrong (2016) 1 Cal.5th 432, 450

People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 377