Tag Archives: Credit for time served

Case: 000297

Error and/or relief

The defendant is entitled to a full resentencing because Penal Code section 1172.75 applies to enhancements imposed as part of the defendant’s original judgment, regardless of whether the enhancement was stayed or executed. We reverse and remand for the trial court to conduct a full resentencing. the trial court erred when it failed to recalculate his presentence custody credit

First Holding:

Effective January 1, 2020, the Legislature eliminated these one-year prior-prison-term enhancements except in cases involving prior terms for sexually violent offenses. Two years later, the Legislature made the change retroactive. In Penal Code section 1172.75, the Legislature declared that, aside from enhancements imposed for sexually violent offenses, any sentence enhancement that was imposed prior to January 1, 2020, pursuant to Penal Code section 667.5(b) is legally invalid. In the same provision, the Legislature established a mechanism for resentencing individuals currently serving a term for a judgment that includes’ such an enhancement.

Authority:

PEN 1172.75

PEN 667.5

Second Holding:

Penal Code section 1172.75 entitles a defendant to resentencing if the underlying judgment includes a prior-prison-term enhancement that was imposed before January 1, 2020, regardless of whether the enhancement was then executed or instead stayed.

Authority:

People v. Rhodius (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1050

Third Holding:

Defendant’s actual presentence custody credits must be recalculated at this resentencing.

Authority:

People v. Sek (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 657, 673

People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 29, 37

Case: 000290

Error and/or relief

On resentencing following remand from the prior appeal, the court failed to recaculate the credit for time served.

First Holding:

When a prison term already in progress is modified as the result of an appellate sentence remand, the sentencing court must recalculate and credit against the modified sentence all actual time the defendant has already served, whether in jail or prison, and whether before or since he was originally committed and delivered to prison custody.

Authority:

People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 29

Second Holding:

The trial court must calculate the credits. It is not the proper function of the Court of Appeal to engage in this business of correction of clerical errors in the computation of credits.

Authority:

People v. Fares (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 954, 959

Case: 000267

Error and/or relief

Error and/or relief:
The trial court failed to calculate her presentence custody credits correctly. We agree the defendant is entitled to three additional days of presentence custody credit. We direct the trial court to prepare an amended abstract of judgment to reflect the correct amount of credit and transmit it to the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.

Holding:

[GARY NOTE: There was no authority indicated in the opinion for the correction of the credit for time served, likely because the error is so obvious. For sake of completeness, the following authorities would support the court’s ruling.]

Authority:

PEN 2900.5(d) [It is the duty of the court imposing the sentence to determine the date or dates of any admission to, and release from, custody prior to sentencing and the total number of days to be credited pursuant to this section. The total number of days to be credited shall be contained in the abstract of judgment provided for in Section 1213.]

People v. Smith (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 523 [A sentencing court must award credits for all days in custody up to and including the day of sentencing.]

People v. Duff (2010) 50 Cal.4th 787, 793 [At the time of sentencing, credit for time served, including conduct credit, is calculated by the court. The total number of days to be credited is memorialized in the abstract of judgment and shall be credited upon the defendant’s term of imprisonment. The credit in effect, becomes part of the sentence.]

Case: 000266

Error and/or relief

At the hearing on the defendant’s petition for recall of sentence under section 1172.75, the trial court struck some of the enhancements, but resentenced him to a life term on the balance under the Three Strikes Law as before. Under subsequently decided case law, the trial court should have considered imposing a sentence under the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012. The matter must be remanded for resentencing. In addition, the abstract of judgment must be corrected to including the correct custody credits.

First Holding:

Section 1172.75 provides that once the trial court has confirmed that a defendant’s current judgment includes a prior prison term enhancement that is now legally invalid, the court shall recall the sentence and resentence the defendant. In so doing, the trial court is directed to follow specific instructions while resentencing. For example, it provides that resentencing pursuant to this section shall result in a lesser sentence than the one originally imposed as a result of the elimination of the repealed enhancement, unless the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that imposing a lesser sentence would endanger public safety. Resentencing pursuant to section 1172.75 shall not result in a longer sentence than the one originally imposed. In addition, when resentencing, the court shall apply any other changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion so as to eliminate disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing.

Authority:

PEN 1172.75

Second Holding:

The court may consider postconviction factors, including, but not limited to, the disciplinary record and record of rehabilitation of the defendant while incarcerated, evidence that reflects whether age, time served, and diminished physical condition, if any, have reduced the defendant’s risk for future violence, and evidence that reflects that circumstances have changed since the original sentencing so that continued incarceration is no longer in the interest of justice.

Authority:

PEN 1172.75

Third Holding:

In 2012, the electorate passed the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012 (Prop. 36), which amended the law to reduce the punishment prescribed for certain third strike defendants. The electorate additionally authorized persons presently serving an indeterminate term of life imprisonment imposed under the prior version of the Three Strikes law to seek resentencing under the amended penalty scheme by filing a petition for recall of sentence. If the petitioner would have qualified for a shorter sentence under the Reform Act version of the law, taking into consideration the disqualifying factors, section 1170.126 provides that he or she shall be resentenced pursuant to the Reform Act unless the court, in its discretion, determines that resentencing the petitioner would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. The Act, therefore, enacted two kinds of reforms: prospective, by exempting some newly-charged defendants from an indeterminate term, and retrospective, by permitting resentencing for some already convicted

Authority:

PEN 1170.126

People v. Frierson (2017) 4 Cal.5th 225, 231

Fourth Holding:

In Guevara, the California Supreme Court addressed the question of whether a full resentencing under section 1172.75 also permitted the trial court to consider resentencing in accordance with the Reform Act. It held that, as a matter of constitutional avoidance, section 1172.75 must be construed as incorporating the public safety determination under section 1172.126 as a condition for nonserious, nonviolent felony offenders to obtain the benefit of the Reform Act during resentencing.

The court noted that the voters’ intention in passing the Reform Act, particularly by including the requirement of whether resentencing poses an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety, was to strike a balance between reform and safety, and such an intention would be honored by interpreting section 1172.75 as incorporating section 1170.126’s public safety override. Therefore, if a defendant demonstrates eligibility under the Reform Act at a section 1172.75 resentencing, the trial court must first determine whether resentencing the defendant under the revised provisions of the Reform Act would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. If no such risk is demonstrated, the court shall resentence the defendant pursuant to the revised penalty provisions of the Reform Act.

[GARY NOTE: Proposition 47 in 2014 included a definition of “unreasonable risk of danger to public safety” that was much more specific and more restrictive on what qualified as such than the undefined same language contained in the Proposition 36, the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012. Because Proposition 36 was an initiative, it cannot be amended by the Legislature except as state in Proposition 36. Section 1172.75’s enactment does not qualify to amend Proposition 36. Therefore, the more restrictive definition in PC 1170.18, enacted by Proposition 47, is not the measure for determining whether relief would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. Instead, the standard arising from Proposition 36 applies. Although not in conjunction with section 1172.75, the Supreme Court has previously determined that the more restrictive definition enacted in Proposition 47 did not change the broader standard enacted by Proposition 36 two years earlier. See People v. Valencia (2017) 3 Cal.5th 347]

Authority:

People v. Superior Court (Guevara) (2025) 18 Cal.5th 838

People v. Valencia (2017) 3 Cal.5th 347

Fifth Holding:

At the conclusion of the resentencing proceedings, the trial court indicated that it did not need credits; as a result, the number of credits on the abstract of judgment was left blank with a note indicating that “CDCR to recalculate credits.” When a trial court resentences a defendant who is currently in custody, it must calculate and credit him with all actual days spent in custody up to that time, including time in custody after the original sentencing, as well as the conduct credits ordered at the original sentencing.

Authority:

People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 37

People v. Dean (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 391, 397

Case: 000254

Error and/or relief

Penal Code section 654 prohibits punishment for both the murder and the burglary during which it occurred. In addition, the defendant is entitled to one more day credit for time served.

First Holding:

Section 654 provides in relevant part that an act or omission that is punishable in different ways by different provisions of law may be punished under either of such provisions, but in no case shall the act or omission be punished under more than one provision. It bars the imposition of multiple sentences for a single act or omission, even though the act or omission may violate more than one provision of the Penal Code. It has long been interpreted to preclude multiple punishments not only for a single act that violates more than one statute, but for an indivisible course of conduct. If all of the offenses were merely incident to, or were the means of accomplishing or facilitating one objective, defendant may be found to have harbored a single intent and therefore may be punished only once.

Authority:

People v. Dowdell (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1388, 1413

People v. Mejia (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 1036, 1042–1043

Second Holding:

On appeal, we review factual determinations under the deferential substantial evidence test, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People. We review de novo the legal question of whether section 654 applies.

Authority:

People v. Valli (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 786, 794

Third Holding:

Burglary consists of entry into a house with the intent to commit a felony. Thus, ordinarily, if the defendant commits both burglary and the underlying intended felony, section 654 will permit punishment for one or the other but not for both. Here, the record reflects that the intent and objective of both the burglary and the murder were the same, and this was the prosecution’s theory of the case at trial. Accordingly, in light of the evidence introduced at trial, the jury instruction on burglary, and the prosecutor’s argument, substantial evidence does not support the trial court’s order to sentence defendant consecutively on these counts. Rather, one of the sentences on counts 1 or 2 should be stayed pursuant to section 654. And, because section 654 provides the court with discretion with regard to which sentence will be stayed, remand is necessary for the court to exercise its discretion in modifying defendant’s sentence.

[GARY NOTE: Don’t ignore the importance of this last statement. While it may be hard to imagine a case in which a judge would sentence on the burglary and stay the sentence for the murder, the judge does have that discretion under section 654. You may have a case where your client may be more sympathetic and the crimes not so divergent in their relative seriousness. It is not inconceivable that you could persuade a judge to impose and execute sentence on the lesser evil committed by your client, staying execution of the sentence on the more serious offense.]

Authority:

People v. Centers (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 84, 98

People v. Islas (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 116, 130 [When a defendant is convicted of burglary and the intended felony underlying the burglary, section 654 prohibits punishment for both crimes]

Fourth Holding:

Defendant was entitled to one additional day of presentence custody credit because the court failed to include the day of his arrest.

Authority:

PEN 2900.5


People v. Taylor (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 628, 647


People v. Valdes (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 953, 955 [the day of arrest counts as a custody credit day]