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Case Summaries

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Equal protection, Juveniles, Sentencing

Case 000552

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The trial court erred in concluding that a sentence of 45 years to life is not the functional equivalent of a sentence to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole (LWOP), within the context of section 1170(d) for those who committed an offense as a juvenile and were convicted as an adult.

First Holding:

Section 1170(d)(1)(A) provides that when a defendant who was under 18 years of age at the time of the commission of the offense for which the defendant was sentenced to imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole has been incarcerated for at least 15 years, the defendant may submit to the sentencing court a petition for recall and resentencing. Where the length of a sentence is the functional equivalent of LWOP, it is a denial of equal protection to exclude the defendant from consideration under section 1170(d).

Authority:

PEN 1170

People v. Heard (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 608

People v. Contreras (2018) 4 Cal.5th 349 [50 years to life is the functional equivalent of LWOP for a nonhomicide juvenile offender in the Eighth Amendment context]

Second Holding:

The People contend that defendant’s current eligibility for early youth offender parole under section 3051 and future eligibility at age 50 for elderly parole under section 3055 render him ineligible for relief under section 1170(d). However, that question is being considered by the Supreme Court in Munoz. Pending that decision, we agree with the reasoning in Heard that section 3051 eligibility does not defeat defendant’s section 1170(d) petition.

Authority:

People v. Munoz (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 499, review granted June 25, 2025, S290828

People v. Sorto (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 435

People v. Bagsby (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 1040

Jury trial

Case 000551

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The trial court erred by overruling his Code of Civil Procedure section 231.7 objection to the prosecutor’s use of a peremptory challenge against a prospective juror who disclosed a negative experience with law enforcement.

First Holding:

Prior to January 1, 2022, trial courts examined peremptory challenges under the three-step inquiry established by Batson and Wheeler. Recognizing the limitations of the Batson/Wheeler inquiry, the Legislature enacted AB 3070 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) to add Code of Civil Procedure section 231.7, which creates new procedures for identifying unlawful discrimination in the use of peremptory challenges. Section 231.7(a) prohibits the use of a peremptory challenge to remove a prospective juror on the basis of the prospective juror’s race, ethnicity, gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, national origin, or religious affiliation, or the perceived membership of the prospective juror in any of those groups.

The statute is designed to address both purposeful discrimination and implicit unconscious bias in the jury selection process, and the Legislature has instructed that it is to be broadly construed to eliminate both forms of discrimination and the use of group stereotypes and discrimination, whether based on conscious or unconscious bias in the exercise of peremptory challenges.

Authority:

CCP 231.7

Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79,

People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258,

People v. Jaime (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 941, 943,

People v. Ortiz (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 768, 791-792

Second Holding:

A party or the trial court on its own motion may object that a party’s use of a peremptory challenge violates section 231.7(a). The statute does not require any threshold showing by the objecting party. The party seeking to challenge the prospective juror must then state the reasons the peremptory challenge has been exercised. It is then up to the trial court to correctly apply the procedure set forth in section 231.7 when deciding whether to sustain the objection.

The trial court must evaluate the reasons given to justify the peremptory challenge in light of the totality of the circumstances, considering only the reasons actually given and not any other possible justifications. If the court finds a substantial likelihood that an objectively reasonable person would view race, ethnicity, or another prohibited characteristic as a factor in the use of the peremptory challenge, then the objection shall be sustained. A substantial likelihood means more than a mere possibility but less than a standard of more likely than not. The court must explain the reasons for its ruling on the record.

Authority:

CCP 231.7

People v. Ortiz (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 768, 792

People v. Aguilar (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 1, 8–9

Third Holding:

Section 231.7(e) lists 13 reasons that are presumed to be invalid when offered as justifications for a peremptory challenge, including expressing a distrust of or having a negative experience with law enforcement or the criminal legal system. A party that relies on one of those presumptively invalid reasons must show by clear and convincing evidence that an objectively reasonable person would view the rationale as unrelated to a prospective juror’s race or other prohibited factor, and that the reasons articulated bear on the prospective juror’s ability to be fair and impartial in the case.

For purposes of overcoming this presumption of invalidity, clear and convincing evidence exists when the court determines it is highly probable that the reasons given for the exercise of a peremptory challenge are unrelated to conscious or unconscious bias and are instead specific to the juror and bear on the juror’s ability to be fair and impartial in the case.

Authority:

CCP 231.7

People v. Gonzalez (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 1, 14

Fourth Holding:

Section 231.7(g) lists an additional set of three presumptively invalid reasons for exercising a peremptory challenge, all of which relate to a prospective juror’s demeanor, behavior, or manner. These reasons are: The prospective juror was inattentive, or staring or failing to make eye contact; the prospective juror exhibited either a lack of rapport or problematic attitude, body language, or demeanor; and the prospective juror provided unintelligent or confused answers.

These three reasons are presumptively invalid unless the trial court is able to confirm that the asserted behavior occurred, based on the court’s own observations or the observations of counsel for the objecting party. Even with that confirmation, the counsel offering the reason shall explain why the asserted demeanor, behavior, or manner in which the prospective juror answered questions matters to the case to be tried.

Authority:

CCP 231.7

Fifth Holding:

We review the trial court’s denial of an objection under section 231.7 de novo, with the trial court’s express factual findings reviewed for substantial evidence. The reviewing court shall not impute any findings to the trial court that the court did not expressly state on the record. The appellate court is to consider only reasons actually given under subdivision (c) and shall not speculate as to or consider reasons that were not given to explain the party’s use of the peremptory challenge. Section 231.7 precludes a finding of harmless error. If the appellate court concludes that the trial court erred by overruling an objection under the statute, that error shall be deemed prejudicial, the judgment shall be reversed, and the case remanded for a new trial.

Authority:

CCP 231.7

People v. Ortiz (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 768, 795

Sixth Holding:

Section 231.7(e) prescribes how the court must analyze this issue and requires clear and convincing evidence.

Authority:

CCP 231.7

People v. Alston (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 575, 587

Appellate Principles, Duty of the court, Sentencing

Case 000550

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The amount of credit for time served was short by three days. The judgment is modified to include those three days.

Holding:

The appellate court has authority to modify the judgment to correct the credit for time served.

Authority:

People v. Jones (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 485, 493–494 [modifying judgment to correct custody credits]

Juveniles, Sentencing

Case 000549

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

Upon determining that the minor violated probation by using marijuana, the juvenile court committed the minor to juvenile hall for 18 months, a sentence that the court had initially stayed in favor of home detention on probation with GPS monitoring. On appeal, the minor argues that the juvenile court abused its discretion in automatically lifting the stay and imposing the commitment without a reassessment of the minor’s circumstances. The juvenile court erred in imposing the 18-month commitment without considering relevant factors and will vacate the disposition order and remand for the court to conduct a new disposition hearing.

First Holding:

The juvenile court’s decision may be reversed on appeal only upon a showing that the court abused its discretion in committing the minor to juvenile hall.

Authority:

In re Jose T. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 1142, 1147

Second Holding:

A juvenile court cannot lift an imposed, stayed or suspended term of confinement without meeting the requirements of Welfare and Institutions Code section 777. Section 777 requires that an order changing or modifying a previous order by removing a minor from the physical custody of a parent and directing commitment to a county institution shall be made only after a noticed hearing.

Authority:

In re Gabriel T. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 952, 960

In re Jose T. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 1142, 1147

Third Holding:

In order to commit the minor to juvenile hall, the court must be fully satisfied that the minor’s mental and physical condition and qualifications render it probable the minor will benefit from the commitment. To determine what is appropriate under a given set of circumstances, a court must review those circumstances every time the minor appears for a dispositional hearing. Juvenile courts must consider safety and protection of the public and the best interests of the minor in all deliberations. Violation of a juvenile court’s order cannot lead automatically to imposition of some reserved measure, but requires a complete review of the order and such amendments as the court finds meet and proper under the governing statutory criteria.

Authority:

WIC 734

WIC 202

In re Gabriel T. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 952, 960

In re Jose T. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 1142, 1147-1148 [The juvenile court must determine the best manner in which to facilitate the rehabilitation of the minor]

In re Chad S. (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 607, 614

In re Ronnie P. (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1079, 1088-1089

Appellate Principles, Duty of counsel, Duty of the court, Sentencing

Case 000548

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

(GARY note: This case actually provided no relief at all to the defendant. It is included because it teaches a valuable lesson on the burden an appellant bears to prevail on appeal. The defendant argued that the protective order was unlawful because he was not convicted of a crime eligible for protective orders.

(But the Court of Appeal concluded that the defendant did not show that he did not commit the crime in the course of a domestic violence course of conduct, and the Court of Appeal must assume that the trial court made such a finding or it would not have imposed the order.

(The defendant was required to prove a negative. It is entirely possible that there was nothing in the record that would disprove there was or was not a domestic relationship. The conviction resulted from a plea bargain with a stipulated sentence. No objection was interposed at the time the protective order was issued.

But the case highlights the importance of understanding that an appellate court is not bound to help the defense. The conviction shifted the presumption from innocence to guilt, and the burden shifted likewise. The California Constitution requires upholding a conviction in the absence of a miscarriage of justice. Thus, the appellate courts start with a mandate that the conviction be affirmed. It is appellate counsel’s role to chip away at the presumption that orders of the superior court were properly issued. Don’t make any assumptions that cannot be backed up by the record.)

First Holding:

The defendant contends the trial court erred in issuing a criminal protective order pursuant to section 136.2(i) because his conviction for assault with a semiautomatic firearm (section 245(b)) is not an offense enumerated under the statute.

Assault with a semiautomatic firearm is not an explicitly enumerated offense under section 136.2(i). However, assault with a semiautomatic firearm can qualify under the statute as a crime involving domestic violence if the defendant’s abusive conduct is directed at someone with a qualifying relationship to him.

The record on appeal is silent as to the nature of the relationship between the defendant and the victim. The defendant has not remedied this silence with an adequate record from which we can discern whether his conviction constituted a crime involving domestic violence. On this silent record, we indulge all intendments and presumptions to support the criminal protective order, including the existence of a qualifying relationship between Hooks and the victim. Because the record does not support the defendant’s claim, he fails to meet his burden on appeal.

Authority:

PEN 13700

FAM 6203(a), 6211(c)

Second Holding:

The People assert the defendant forfeited his contention by failing to object in the trial court. As a general rule, an appellant waives issues on appeal that he or she did not initially raise in the trial court. But there are exceptions to this rule for unauthorized sentences and sentencing decisions that are in excess of the trial court’s jurisdiction. Because this case involves the jurisdictional validity of the trial court’s decision to issue a protective order during sentencing, we will consider the defendant’s claim on the merits.

Authority:

People v. Ponce (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 378, 381-382

Third Holding:

Perhaps the most fundamental rule of appellate law is that the judgment challenged on appeal is presumed correct, and it is the appellant’s burden to affirmatively demonstrate error. This presumption also applies to a lower court’s orders. All intendments and presumptions are indulged to support the order on matters as to which the record is silent, and error must be affirmatively shown. On appeal, the defendant must affirmatively demonstrate error below and provide an adequate record to support his arguments. Any uncertainty in the record must be resolved against the defendant. We will not presume error.

Authority:

People v. Sanghera (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1567, 1573

People v. Sullivan (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 524, 549