Category Archives: Discretion

Discretion, Standard of review

Case 000789

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

We conclude the trial court abused its discretion. It failed to follow the governing statute’s directions. Its conclusion that the defendant posed an unreasonable risk to public safety, as defined by section 1001.36(c)(4), was unsupported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, we issue the requested writ of mandate and direct the court to grant the defendant’s motion for mental health diversion.

First Holding:

In 2018, the Legislature enacted section 1001.36 to create a diversion program for criminal defendants with diagnosed mental health disorders. Diversion allows for the suspension of criminal proceedings and potential dismissal of charges upon successful completion of mental health treatment. By its terms, section 1001.36 was designed to encourage trial courts to broadly authorize pretrial mental health diversion, providing treatment for qualifying mental disorders that result in criminal behavior.

Authority:

PEN 1001.36

Sarmiento v. Superior Court (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 882, 887, 890

Second Holding:

The decision whether to grant diversion is a two-step process. First, the court determines if the defendant satisfies the eligibility requirements set forth in section 1001.36(b). Defendants are eligible if they have been diagnosed with a recognized mental disorder that was a significant factor in the commission of the criminal offense with which they are charged.

Authority:

PEN 1001.36(a) – (b)

Third Holding:

Second, the court determines if the defendant is suitable for diversion under the factors set forth in section 1001.36(c). Those factors are: (1) in the opinion of a qualified mental health expert, the defendant’s mental disorder would respond to treatment; (2) the defendant agrees to waive their speedy trial rights; (3) the defendant agrees to comply with treatment requirements; and (4) the defendant will not pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety as defined in sections 1170.18 and 667(e)(2)(C)(iv).

Authority:

PEN 1001.36(a) and (c)

Sarmiento v. Superior Court (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 882, 891

Fourth Holding:

Finally, even when all eligibility and suitability factors are met, courts have discretion to deny mental health diversion. But this residual discretion must be exercised consistent with the principles and purpose of the governing law.

Authority:

Sarmiento v. Superior Court (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 882, 895-896

People v. Qualkinbush (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 879, 888

Fifth Holding:

Our review is for abuse of discretion.

Authority:

People v. Whitmill (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1138, 1147

Sixth Holding:

Under section 1170.18, the Legislature has narrowly defined an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety to mean an unreasonable risk that the petitioner will commit a new violent felony within the meaning of section 667(e)(2)(C)(iv). The violent felonies encompassed in this definition are known as super strikes. The super strikes are murder, attempted murder, solicitation to commit murder, assault with a machine gun on a police officer, possession of a weapon of mass destruction, any serious or violent felony punishable by death or life imprisonment, or any sexually violent offenses or sexual offense committed against minors under the age of 14.

Authority:

PEN 1170.18(c)

People v Moine (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 440, 449

People v. Whitmill (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1138, 1150-1151

Seventh Holding:

By statute, when determining the risk of danger, t]he court may consider the opinions of the district attorney, the defense, or a qualified mental health expert, and may consider the defendant’s treatment plan, the defendant’s violence and criminal history, the current charged offense, and any other factors that the court deems appropriate. A defendant who seeks diversion is not being sentenced, so the general sentencing objectives set forth in rule 4.410 of the California Rules of Court are inapplicable.

Authority:

PEN 1001.36(c)(4)

People v. Whitmill (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1138, 1149

Eighth Holding:

A court abuses its discretion when it makes an arbitrary or capricious decision by applying the wrong legal standard or bases its decision on express or implied factual findings that are not supported by substantial evidence.

The trial court expressed that it could not know whether the defendant was going to commit a super strike, and based on his two violent incidents from 2007 and 2010, the trial court concluded that there was a danger that there was a likelihood that the defendant could commit a super strike, thereby permitting the trial court to exercise its residual discretion to deny diversion.

But the court misunderstood what was required. The plain language of the statute requires a finding that a defendant will not pose an unreasonable risk of committing a super strike.

The statute does not, as the trial court suggested, require a prediction that a defendant will not, in fact, commit a super strike. The correct analysis thus requires assessing probabilities; not predicting outcomes, as the trial court incorrectly understood.

These are two distinct types of inquiry. Applying the correct standard to the record before us, we conclude the evidence is insubstantial that the defendant is too dangerous to be treated in the community on the ground that he poses an unreasonable risk of committing a super strike.

A trial court abuses its discretion when the factual findings critical to its decision find no support in the evidence.

Authority:

PEN 1001.36(c)(4)

People v. Whitmill (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1138, 1147

People v. Cluff (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 991, 998

Ninth Holding:

The only question that remains is whether further proceedings are required. We conclude they are not. The trial court found that the defendant satisfied all criteria for diversion except the public safety factor, leaving nothing further to be decided. The People do not argue otherwise. Under these circumstances, we will reverse the court’s order with directions to grant the defendant’s motion unless the People present changed circumstances that warrant rehearing.

Authority:

People v. Williams (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 990, 1005

 

Discretion, Duty of the court, Standard of review

Case 000786

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

By shifting the burden of proof from the People to appellant, the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s petition to terminate his duty to register as a sex offender.

First Holding:

Before 2021, if an offender was required to register as a sex offender, they were required to register for life. Beginning on January 1, 2021, SB 384 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) restructured the sex offender registration requirement into three tiers: tier one, registrants must register for at least 10 years; tier two, for at least 20 years; and tier three, for their lifetimes.

Authority:

PEN 290(d)

People v. Franco (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 184, 190

People v. Thai (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 427, 432

Second Holding:

Appellant is a tier two registrant who is required to register for at least 20 years. Provided the registrant meets certain criteria, including registering for the required minimum period, a registrant can petition the superior court to terminate the registration requirement.

Authority:

PEN 290.5(a)-(c)

Third Holding:

Upon receiving notice of a petition to terminate registration, the district attorney may object and present evidence demonstrating that community safety would be significantly enhanced by continued registration.

The prosecutor has the burden of producing evidence to establish terminating the registration requirement would considerably raise the threat to society because the defendant is currently likely to reoffend. The trial court’s task is to assess whether the People have carried their burden of producing evidence establishing that requiring continued registration appreciably increases society’s safety.

Authority:

People v. Thai (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 427, 433

People v. Franco (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 184, 192

Fourth Holding:

In making this determination, the trial court may consider the following seven factors: [(1)] the nature and facts of the registerable offense; (2) the age and number of victims; (3) whether any victim was a stranger at the time of the offense (known to the offender for less than 24 hours); (4) criminal and relevant noncriminal behavior before and after conviction for the registerable offense; (5) the time period during which the person has not reoffended; (6) successful completion, if any, of a Sex Offender Management Board-certified sex offender treatment program; and (7) the person’s current risk of sexual or violent reoffense, including the person’s risk levels on SARATSO static, dynamic, and violence risk assessment instruments, if available.

The trial court may base its determination upon declarations, affidavits, police reports, or any other evidence submitted by the parties which is reliable, material, and relevant.

Authority:

PEN 290.5(a)(3)

Fifth Holding:

The standard of review applied by an appellate court reviewing a trial court’s order on a petition for termination is abuse of discretion. The showing required to establish an abuse of discretion is as follows: To establish an abuse of discretion, the defendant must demonstrate the trial court’s decision fell outside the bounds of reason, i.e., was arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd.

The abuse of discretion standard is not a unified standard; the deference it calls for varies according to the aspect of a trial court’s ruling under review. The trial court’s findings of fact are reviewed for substantial evidence, its conclusions of law are reviewed de novo, and its application of the law to the facts is reversible only if arbitrary and capricious. A trial court abuses its discretion when its factual findings are not supported by the evidence, or its decision is based on an incorrect legal standard.

Authority:

People v. Thai (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 427, 433

Sixth Holding:

Section 290.5 required the prosecutor to prove that appellant was currently likely to reoffend and that community safety would be significantly enhanced by continued registration. Here, the trial court denied the petition, at least in part, due to the absence of evidence that appellant no longer posed the threat he did when he committed the registrable offenses. Doing so placed the burden on appellant, rather than on the prosecutor, to produce evidence of the current threat, if any, posed by appellant. This was error. We remand for a new hearing.

Authority:

PEN 290.5(a)(2)-(3)

People v. Thai (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 427, 432-433

People v. Franco (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 184, 192

Seventh Holding:

(Gary Note: The court proceeded to explain why the error was prejudicial, applying the Watson standard, based on facts specific to this defendant, and the details need not be recited in this summary.)

Authority:

People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836

Amelioration, Discretion, Sentencing

Case 000759

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

At the hearing on a petition for resentencing (the opinion does not state under which statute the petition was filed, but in the body of the opinion it mentions section 1172.1, under which various entities can recommend the recall of sentence and resentencing), the trial court denied the defendant’s request to reduce his kidnap for robbery conviction to the lesser included offense of false imprisonment, stating that it did not have discretion to do so. The court erred, as it did have the discretion. We remand for the court to exercise its discretion.

First Holding:

Under section 1172.1(a)(3)(B), the trial court may in the interest of justice vacate the defendant’s conviction and impose judgment on any necessarily included lesser offense or lesser related offense then resentence the defendant to a reduced term of imprisonment. Defendant thus asked the trial court at the hearing on his petition to reduce his conviction on count 2 from a kidnap to false imprisonment as the other counts in his sentencing were false imprisonment. The trial court viewed the request as a challenge to the evidence and declined to revisit the evidence.

The court indicated that it did not have the discretion to do anything but impose the sentence on the count of conviction. The court’s comments confirm that it was unaware it had the discretion under section 1172.1, subdivision (a)(3)(B) to reduce defendant’s kidnapping-for-robbery conviction on count 2 to false imprisonment and resentence him to a reduced term for that offense. The trial court thus abused its sentencing discretion.

Authority:

PEN 1172.1(a)(3)(B)

In re White (2020) 9 Cal.5th 455, 470

Second Holding:

When, as here, the trial court is unaware of its sentencing discretion, we must remand for resentencing unless the record clearly indicates that the trial court would have made the same decision if it had been aware of its discretion. The record does not indicate that. If anything, it indicates that the trial court might have imposed a lesser sentence on count 2 if it believed it had the discretion to do so. We therefore remand for a full resentencing.

Authority:

People v. Salazar (2023) 15 Cal.5th 416, 424

People v. Terwilligar (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 585, 601

People v. Moseley (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 870, 874

People v. Marcus (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 201, 214 [Because there are multiple counts and discretionary decisions at play, the trial court may consider the entire sentencing scheme and reconsider all sentencing choices.]

People v. Byucks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893

Amelioration, Discretion, Sentencing

Case 000756

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

At the resentencing hearing under section 1172.75, the court erred in believing that it had no discretion to consider defendant’s motion pursuant to dismiss prior serious felony enhancements under Romero. The matter is reversed and remanded to the trial court with directions to hold a full resentencing hearing at which the court must consider defendant’s Romero motion.

First Holding:

In 2019, in an effort to reduce the societal and fiscal burdens of incarceration, the Legislature passed SB 136, which amended section 667.5(b) to eliminate prior-prison-term enhancements for all prior crimes except for sexually violent offenses as defined in section 6600(b) of the Welfare and Institutions Code.

In 2021, SB 483 made this change retroactive. It enacted what is now Penal Code section 1172.75, which states that any sentence enhancement that was imposed prior to January 1, 2020, pursuant to section 667.5(b), except for any enhancement imposed for a prior conviction for a sexually violent offense as defined in section 6600(b) of the Welfare and Institutions Code is legally invalid.

Authority:

PEN 1172.75

People v. Rhodius (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1050, 1054

Second Holding:

A defendant serving a term for a judgment that includes a now-invalid enhancement is entitled to resentencing. To facilitate the process, the statute directs California’s Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) to identify those persons in their custody currently serving a term for a judgment that includes an enhancement described in subdivision (a).

Upon receiving that information, the sentencing court must review the judgment and verify that the current judgment includes a sentencing enhancement described in subdivision (a). If the court determines that the current judgment includes an enhancement described in subdivision (a), the court shall recall the sentence and resentence the defendant. The statute provides separate deadlines for identification, review, and resentencing of individuals currently serving a sentence based on the enhancement and all other individuals.

Authority:

PEN 1172.75

People v. Rhodius (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1050, 1055

Third Holding:

Section 1172.75(d) sets forth detailed instructions for resentencing once a sentence has been recalled. As relevant here, subdivision (d) specifies: that resentencing pursuant to this section shall result in a lesser sentence than the one originally imposed as a result of the elimination of the repealed enhancement, unless the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that imposing a lesser sentence would endanger public safety.

Resentencing pursuant to this section shall not result in a longer sentence than the one originally imposed. The trial court must apply the sentencing rules of the Judicial Council as well as any other changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion so as to eliminate disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing.

In addition, the court may consider postconviction factors, including, but not limited to, the disciplinary record and record of rehabilitation of the defendant while incarcerated, evidence that reflects whether age, time served, and diminished physical condition, if any, have reduced the defendant’s risk for future violence, and evidence that reflects that circumstances have changed since the original sentencing so that continued incarceration is no longer in the interest of justice.

Authority:

PEN 1172.75

People v. Rhodius (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1050, 1055

Fourth Holding:

Section 1172.75 entitles a defendant to resentencing if the underlying judgment includes a prior-prison-term enhancement that was imposed before January 1, 2020, regardless of whether the enhancement was then executed or instead stayed. The trial court has the authority to exercise its discretion under section 1385(a) and Romero to strike any or all of defendant’s strike priors after recalling his sentence and for the purpose of resentencing him under section 1172.75.

Authority:

People v. Rhodius (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1050, 1054

People v. Rogers (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 340, 364

People v. Monroe (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 393, 400

People v. Dowdy (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 1, 9-13

People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497

Discretion, Standard of review

Case 000749

Posted on by Gary McCurdy

Error and/or relief

The trial court abused its discretion in denying mental health diversion by basing its denial on findings not supported by substantial evidence and by exercising its discretion in a manner inconsistent with the principles and purpose of the statute.

(Gary’s note: The conclusion that the court abused its discretion relied extensively on facts reviewed by the Court of Appeal. These summaries are designed more to recite the various principles than to ferret out exactly how the principles achieved the result in the particular case. Sometimes it is obvious, but many times the outcome is very fact-dependent. Since these unpublished opinions cannot be cited as authority, it serves little purpose to recite the extensive details that led to the result in a particular case.)

First Holding:

We review a trial court’s order denying mental health diversion for abuse of discretion. A court abuses its discretion when it makes an arbitrary or capricious decision by applying the wrong legal standard, or bases its decision on express or implied factual findings that are not supported by substantial evidence.

Authority:

Vaughn v. Superior Court (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 124, 135

People v. Gerson (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 1067, 1080

People v. Moine (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 440, 448

Second Holding:

Mental health diversion under section 1001.36 requires the trial court to find the defendant both eligible for diversion and suitable for the program. A defendant is eligible for mental health diversion if both of the following criteria are met: (1) defendant presents evidence he or she has been diagnosed with a mental disorder by a qualified mental health expert, identified in the most recent edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSMD), within the last five years and (2) defendant’s mental disorder was a significant factor in the commission of the charged offense.

A court may consider any relevant and credible evidence, including, but not limited to, police reports, preliminary hearing transcripts, witness statements, statements by the defendant’s mental health treatment provider, medical records, records or reports by qualified medical experts, or evidence that the defendant displayed symptoms consistent with the relevant mental disorder at or near the time of the offense.

Authority:

PEN 1001.36(b)

Sarmiento v. Superior Court (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 882, 891

Third Holding:

As to suitability, each of the following criteria must be met: (1) in the opinion of a qualified mental health expert, the defendant’s symptoms of the mental disorder causing, contributing to, or motivating the criminal behavior would respond to mental health treatment; (2) the defendant consents to diversion and waives their right to a speedy trial; (3) the defendant agrees to comply with treatment as a condition of diversion; and (4) the defendant will not pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety, as defined in section 1170.18, if treated in the community.

In determining whether the defendant poses an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety, the court may consider the defendant’s treatment plan, the defendant’s violence and criminal history, the current charged offense, and any other factors that the court deems appropriate.

Authority:

PEN 1001.36(c)

Fourth Holding:

Even where defendants make a prima facie showing that they meet all the express statutory requirements, the court may still exercise its discretion to deny diversion. This residual discretion is not unfettered and must be exercised consistent with the principles and purpose of the governing law.

Authority:

Sarmiento v. Superior Court (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 882, 892

People v. Gerson (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 1067, 1079

Vaughn v. Superior Court (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 124, 134-135

People v. Qualkinbush (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 879, 891 [court’s discretion must be informed by legal principles and purpose of statute]

People v. Superior Court (Alvarez) (1997) 14 Cal.4th 968, 977, superseded by statute on other grounds as indicated in People v. Lynall (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 1102, 1108 [all exercises of legal discretion must be grounded in reasoned judgment and guided by legal principles and policies appropriate to the particular matter at issue]

Fifth Holding:

The stated purpose of mental health diversion is to keep people with mental disorders from entering and reentering the criminal justice system while protecting public safety, to give counties discretion in developing and implementing diversion across a continuum of care settings, and to provide mental health rehabilitative services. That purpose includes a strong legislative preference for treatment of mental health disorders because of the benefits of such treatment to both the offending individual and the community.

A trial court’s denial of mental health diversion using its residual discretion should be limited to those situations where the purposes of the statute would not be achieved. Where the court chooses to exercise this residual discretion to deny diversion, its statement of reasons should reflect consideration of the underlying purposes of the statute and explain why diversion would not meet those goals.

Authority:

Gomez v. Superior Court (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 671, 691

Sarmiento v. Superior Court (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 882, 892-893

Vaughn v. Superior Court (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 124, 138

People v. Qualkinbush (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 879, 891-892

Lacour v. Superior Court (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 391, 401