Error and/or relief
By shifting the burden of proof from the People to appellant, the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s petition to terminate his duty to register as a sex offender.
First Holding:
Before 2021, if an offender was required to register as a sex offender, they were required to register for life. Beginning on January 1, 2021, SB 384 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) restructured the sex offender registration requirement into three tiers: tier one, registrants must register for at least 10 years; tier two, for at least 20 years; and tier three, for their lifetimes.
Authority:
PEN 290(d)
People v. Franco (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 184, 190
People v. Thai (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 427, 432
Second Holding:
Appellant is a tier two registrant who is required to register for at least 20 years. Provided the registrant meets certain criteria, including registering for the required minimum period, a registrant can petition the superior court to terminate the registration requirement.
Authority:
PEN 290.5(a)-(c)
Third Holding:
Upon receiving notice of a petition to terminate registration, the district attorney may object and present evidence demonstrating that community safety would be significantly enhanced by continued registration.
The prosecutor has the burden of producing evidence to establish terminating the registration requirement would considerably raise the threat to society because the defendant is currently likely to reoffend. The trial court’s task is to assess whether the People have carried their burden of producing evidence establishing that requiring continued registration appreciably increases society’s safety.
Authority:
People v. Thai (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 427, 433
People v. Franco (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 184, 192
Fourth Holding:
In making this determination, the trial court may consider the following seven factors: [(1)] the nature and facts of the registerable offense; (2) the age and number of victims; (3) whether any victim was a stranger at the time of the offense (known to the offender for less than 24 hours); (4) criminal and relevant noncriminal behavior before and after conviction for the registerable offense; (5) the time period during which the person has not reoffended; (6) successful completion, if any, of a Sex Offender Management Board-certified sex offender treatment program; and (7) the person’s current risk of sexual or violent reoffense, including the person’s risk levels on SARATSO static, dynamic, and violence risk assessment instruments, if available.
The trial court may base its determination upon declarations, affidavits, police reports, or any other evidence submitted by the parties which is reliable, material, and relevant.
Authority:
PEN 290.5(a)(3)
Fifth Holding:
The standard of review applied by an appellate court reviewing a trial court’s order on a petition for termination is abuse of discretion. The showing required to establish an abuse of discretion is as follows: To establish an abuse of discretion, the defendant must demonstrate the trial court’s decision fell outside the bounds of reason, i.e., was arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd.
The abuse of discretion standard is not a unified standard; the deference it calls for varies according to the aspect of a trial court’s ruling under review. The trial court’s findings of fact are reviewed for substantial evidence, its conclusions of law are reviewed de novo, and its application of the law to the facts is reversible only if arbitrary and capricious. A trial court abuses its discretion when its factual findings are not supported by the evidence, or its decision is based on an incorrect legal standard.
Authority:
People v. Thai (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 427, 433
Sixth Holding:
Section 290.5 required the prosecutor to prove that appellant was currently likely to reoffend and that community safety would be significantly enhanced by continued registration. Here, the trial court denied the petition, at least in part, due to the absence of evidence that appellant no longer posed the threat he did when he committed the registrable offenses. Doing so placed the burden on appellant, rather than on the prosecutor, to produce evidence of the current threat, if any, posed by appellant. This was error. We remand for a new hearing.
Authority:
PEN 290.5(a)(2)-(3)
People v. Thai (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 427, 432-433
People v. Franco (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 184, 192
Seventh Holding:
(Gary Note: The court proceeded to explain why the error was prejudicial, applying the Watson standard, based on facts specific to this defendant, and the details need not be recited in this summary.)
Authority:
People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836