Error and/or relief
A police officer’s observation of a driver’s red, glossy eyes and strong odor of cologne, without more, did not provide a reasonable suspicion to conduct a DUI investigation after instigating a traffic stop. We affirm the trial court’s granting of the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence.
(Gary note: This is a long summary. In short, the defendant showed no signs of driving under the influence, and the only reason the officer conducted a search was he perceived the defendant’s eyes as red and glossy and he smelled cologne. I have chosen to set forth the main principles relied on by the Court of Appeal in affirming the trial court’s grant of the suppression motion, which had been overturned by the appellate division of the superior court before the Court of Appeal transferred the matter to itself on the defendant’s petition.)
First Holding:
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects against unreasonable searches and seizures. As such, a defendant may move to suppress evidence on the grounds that the search or seizure without a warrant was unreasonable. The burden to show proper justification for a warrantless search and seizure] rests on the prosecution.
Authority:
U.S. Const. 4th Amend.
PEN 1538.5(a)(1)(A)
People v. Gale (1973) 9 Cal.3d 788, 795
Second Holding:
A seizure occurs for purposes of the Fourth Amendment when an officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, restricts a person’s liberty. A detention is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment when the detaining officer can point to specific articulable facts that, considered in light of the totality of the circumstances, provide some objective manifestation that the person detained may be involved in criminal activity.
Authority:
Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 19, fn. 16
People v. Souza (1994) 9 Cal.4th 224, 231
Third Holding:
A reasonable suspicion to detain requires a lesser showing than probable cause to arrest. Not only can reasonable suspicion be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause, but also reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause.
Authority:
People v. Souza (1994) 9 Cal.4th 224, 230-231,
Alabama v. White (1990) 496 U.S. 325, 330
Fourth Holding:
Ordinary traffic stops are treated as investigatory detentions for which the officer must be able to articulate specific facts justifying the suspicion that a crime is being committed. Thus, a seizure for a traffic violation justifies a police investigation of that violation.
The tolerable duration of police inquiries in the traffic-stop context is determined by the seizure’s mission—to address the traffic violation that warranted the stop and attend to related safety concerns. Because addressing the infraction is the purpose of the stop, it may last no longer than is necessary to effectuate that purpose. Authority for the seizure thus ends when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are—or reasonably should have been—completed.
Authority:
People v. Suff (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1013, 1053–1054
Rodriguez v. United States (2015) 575 U.S. 348, 354
Fifth Holding:
An officer’s mission during a traffic stop includes addressing the traffic violation; checking the driver’s license, registration, and proof of insurance; and determining whether the driver has outstanding warrants—all of which serve the same objective as enforcement of the traffic code: ensuring that vehicles on the road are operated safely and responsibly.
Authority:
Rodriguez v. United States (2015) 575 U.S. 348, 355
Sixth Holding:
Under certain circumstances, an officer conducting a traffic stop may also investigate a suspected crime unrelated to the infraction that initially prompted the stop. However, the officer may not do so in a way that prolongs the stop, absent the reasonable suspicion ordinarily demanded to justify detaining an individual. An articulable and reasonable suspicion that a person is driving while impaired is required to extend a routine traffic stop to involve a more intrusive DUI investigation requiring the driver to exit his or her vehicle to perform field sobriety tests [FSTs].
Authority:
Rodriguez v. United States (2015) 575 U.S. 348, 355
People v. Ayon (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 926, 940-941 [the Fourth Amendment requires officers to diligently pursue a means of investigation reasonably designed to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly]
People v. Evans (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 735, 742 [an officer’s subjective beliefs are generally irrelevant to the lawfulness of a search and seizure]
Seventh Holding:
Here, the trial court found that the officer’s prolonging the traffic stop in order to investigate defendant for a DUI by having him exit the vehicle to undergo field sobriety tests was not independently supported by individualized, reasonable suspicion. We agree with this conclusion.
In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, we defer to that court’s factual findings, express or implied, if they are supported by substantial evidence. On appeal, we draw all inferences from the record in favor of the trial court’s ruling and defer to the trial court’s factual findings, express or implied, where supported by substantial evidence.
We exercise our independent judgment in determining whether, on the facts presented, the search or seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. In doing so we do not consider each fact in isolation. Instead, we must consider the totality of the circumstances—the whole picture.
Authority:
People v. Silveria and Travis (2020) 10 Cal.5th 195, 232
People v. Flores (2024) 15 Cal.5th 1032, 1043
People v. Glaser (1995) 11 Cal.4th 354, 362
People v. Linn (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 46, 56 [when a misdemeanor appeal is certified for transfer to the appellate court, the Court of Appeal’s review is as if the parties directly appealed from the trial court ruling on defendant’s suppression motion]
Eighth Holding:
The officer testified that he suspected defendant may have been intoxicated and, therefore, decided to conduct a DUI investigation based on two factors: defendant had red, glossy eyes and smelled strongly of cologne. These factors are not enough to provide reasonable suspicion of a DUI crime.
Authority:
People v. Flores (2024) 15 Cal.5th 1032, 1045 [mere presence in a known narcotics area is not enough to warrant suspicion]
People v. Ayon (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 926, 940 [finding no substantial evidence to support the officer’s claim that the defendant appeared intoxicated when the defendant did not display any conduct demonstrating insobriety, such as slurred or irregular speech, an inability to walk or stand normally, confusion, or any other mental incapacity, and he was not acting any more nervously than a typical person in a traffic stop]
Ninth Holding:
A mere deviation from perceived social convention does not automatically signal criminal behavior. The particular conduct relied upon must, when considered in the totality of circumstances, support a reasonable suspicion that the person to be detained is, or is about to be, engaged in activity ‘relating to crime.
Authority:
People v. Flores (2024) 15 Cal.5th 1032, 1045
In re L.G. (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 818, 822 [Nervousness, an unrelated arrest, and a gang companion did not create reasonable suspicion L.G. was at that moment committing a crime]
Tenth Holding:
While officers may draw on their own experience and specialized training to make inferences, they cannot rely on mere hunches.
Authority:
People v. Hernandez (2008) 45 Cal.4th 295, 299