Error and/or relief
The trial court failed to appropriately instruct the jury that, in order to find them guilty of implied malice murder as aiders and abettors, the jury must find that they personally acted with malice.
First Holding:
In order to find the defendants guilty of implied malice murder as aiders and abettors, the jury must find that they personally acted with malice.
Authority:
People v. Langi (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 972, 982 [the previous standard jury instructions on aider and abettor liability create an ambiguity under which the jury may find the defendant guilty of aiding and abetting second degree murder without finding that he personally acted with malice]
Second Holding:
We determine whether a jury instruction correctly states the law under the independent or de novo standard of review. When we review a purportedly erroneous instruction, we consider whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way that violates the Constitution. We consider the instructions as a whole and assume that jurors are intelligent persons and capable of understanding and correlating all jury instructions which are given.
Authority:
People v. Ramos (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1082, 1088
People v. Richardson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 959, 1028
Third Holding:
If a trial court incorrectly instructs on an element of a charged offense such that the error impermissibly shifted or lowered the burden of proof for that element, the applicable standard of prejudice is the Chapman standard. Under the Chapman standard, a federal constitutional error requires reversal unless the People show the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Authority:
Rose v. Clark (1986) 478 U.S. 570, 570–581
Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24
Fourth Holding:
For the error to be harmless, the state must show it would be impossible, based on the evidence, for a jury to make the findings reflected in its verdict without also making the findings that would support a valid theory of liability. While overwhelming evidence may demonstrate harmlessness, a court’s analysis of whether the evidence is overwhelming in this context is not as subjective or free-ranging as that term might imply. Instead, the analysis requires a court to rigorously review the evidence to determine whether any rational juror who found the defendant guilty based on an invalid theory, and made the factual findings reflected in the jury’s verdict, would necessarily have found the defendant guilty based on a valid theory as well. The question here is not the sufficiency of the evidence to support a valid theory, but its opposite.
Authority:
In re Lopez (2023) 14 Cal.5th 562, 568, 591
Fifth Holding:
In determining whether instructional error that leaves out an element of the offense is harmless, we do not focus exclusively on the evidence favorable to the verdict, and we do not presume the existence of any facts the jury might reasonably infer in favor of the prosecution. We do not view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. We review the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant, and in doing so, we do not reweigh the evidence or resolve evidentiary conflicts. The testimony of a single witness may be sufficient—even if there is significant countervailing evidence, and the testimony is subject to justifiable suspicion. If a thorough review of the record shows there is any evidence that a rational juror could find as a basis for reasonable doubt as to any erroneously omitted element, then the error requires reversal, even when there is ample evidence to support a finding of guilt.
Authority:
People v. Madrigal (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 219, 243
People v. Mil (2012) 53 Cal.4th 400
People v. Valenti (2016) 243 Cal.App.4th 1140, 1166, 1167
People v. Barnwell (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1038, 1052
Sixth Holding:
Second degree murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought but without the additional elements, such as willfulness, premeditation, and deliberation, that would support a conviction of first degree murder. Malice may be either express, i.e., when a defendant manifests an intention to kill, or implied. Malice is implied when the killing is proximately caused by an act, the natural consequences of which are dangerous to life, which act was deliberately performed by a person who knows that his conduct endangers the life of another and who acts with conscious disregard for life. Thus, implied malice includes an objective component—an act that is dangerous to life—and a subjective component—the defendant’s awareness of and disregard for the danger. Intent to kill may be inferred from the defendant’s acts and the circumstances of the crime. A person can be convicted of aiding and abetting second degree murder based on implied malice.
Authority:
People v. Clements (2022) 75 Cal. App. 5th 276, 299
People v. Smith (2005) 37 Cal.4th 733, 741
People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 990
People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 850 [Notwithstanding SB 1437’s elimination of natural and probable consequences liability for second degree murder, an aider and abettor who does not expressly intend to aid a killing can still be convicted of second degree murder if the person knows that his or her conduct endangers the life of another and acts with conscious disregard for life]
Seventh Holding:
In the context of implied malice, the actus reus required of the perpetrator is the commission of a life-endangering act. For the direct aider and abettor, the actus reus includes whatever acts constitute aiding the commission of the life-endangering act. Thus, to be liable for an implied malice murder, the direct aider and abettor must, by words or conduct, aid the commission of the life-endangering act, not the result of that act. The mens rea, which must be personally harbored by the direct aider and abettor, is knowledge that the perpetrator intended to commit the act, intent to aid the perpetrator in the commission of the act, knowledge that the act is dangerous to human life, and acting in conscious disregard for human life.
Authority:
ADPeople v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 991