Category Archives: Abstracts and Minutes

Case: 000473

Error and/or relief

The abstract of judgment must be corrected because it shows an incorrect code section for the defendant’s conviction.

Holding:

[GARY NOTE: There was no authority indicated in the opinion for the correction of the abstract. The error is so obvious that it hardly seems necessary to provide authority. Nonetheless, there is authority the court could have cited. The appellate court may direct the trial court to correct clerical errors in an abstract of judgment.]

Authority:

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185

Case: 000471

Error and/or relief

Although not technically incorrect, the minute order is ambiguous and could be construed representing as a court finding that the court did not make. The court ordered a slight rewording.

Holding:

[GARY NOTE: The court did not cite any authority for its order rewording the minute order, but if one considers that the original order could be construed to mean something it did not, then this act is akin to ordering correction of a minute order. Though none was cited, the following cases do support the court’s authority to order corrections in abstracts of judgment and minute orders, often in the context of where the minute order or abstract does not accurately reflect the oral pronouncement.]

Authority:

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185 [courts may correct clerical errors at any time, and appellate courts with jurisdiction have the power to order correction of abstracts of judgment that do not accurately reflect the oral judgment of the sentencing court]

People v. Scott (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 1303, 1324

People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 385

People v. Mesa (1975) 14 Cal.3d 466, 471 [rendition of judgment is an oral pronouncement; the record of the oral pronouncement of the court controls over the clerk’s minute order and abstract of judgment]

Second Holding:

Add holding blurb here

Authority:

ADD AUTHORITIES HERE

Case 000470

Error and/or relief

The abstract of judgment must be amended to make clear the trial court found an inability to pay fees and fines, and to provide the correct number of prejudgment credit days.

First Holding:

At sentencing, the trial court found that the defendant did not have the ability to pay the court fees. The abstract of judgment, however, imposes a court security fee of $200 and a criminal conviction assessment of $150. We will direct the trial court to amend the abstract of judgment accordingly.

Authority:

People v. Costella (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 1, 10

Second Holding:

Based on counsel’s representations, the court awarded credit for actual days served that was 30 days less than he actually served. Therefore, the court’s minute order should be corrected to reflect the proper number of credit days, and the abstract of judgment should be amended accordingly.

[GARY NOTE: The court did not cite any authority for this correction, but there is plenty. I have listed authority the court could have cited.]

Authority:

PEN 2900.5

People v. Chilleli (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 581, 591 [The failure to properly calculate custody and conduct credit is a jurisdictional error that can be corrected at any time]

People v. Taylor (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 628, 647

People v. Acosta (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 411, 428, fn. 8

Case 000453

Error and/or relief

The abstract of judgment incorrectly indicates that the defendant was convicted under the Three Strikes law, and must be corrected.

Holding:

The clerk of the superior court is directed to prepare an amended abstract of judgment by unchecking the box that the defendant was sentenced under the Three Strikes law.

Authority:

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185 [reviewing courts have the inherent power on appeal to correct clerical errors found in court records, such as may be found in abstracts of judgment, whether on the court’s own motion or upon application of the parties]

Case 000451

Error and/or relief

The defendant appeals from the denial of resentencing relief pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.75. He contends, and the People agree, the resentencing court erroneously relied on a previously stricken enhancement for a sexually violent offense, as well as an unalleged prior conviction for a sexually violent offense in finding defendant ineligible for resentencing. The record establishes error. We therefore reverse and remand.

First Holding:

The trial court erroneously relied on prior felony convictions to determine that the defendant was not eligible for relief under section 1172.75, because those prior convictions had previously been stricken in the appeal from the original judgment, leaving no disqualifying prior convictions in place. Section 1172.75(a) invalidates any sentence enhancement that was imposed prior to January 1, 2020, pursuant to section 667.5(b), except for any enhancement imposed for a prior conviction for a sexually violent offense as defined in section 6600(b) of the Welfare and Institutions Code.

However, a stricken enhancement cannot be a sentence enhancement that was imposed under section 1172.75(a). As noted, this court previously struck the otherwise-disqualifying section 667.5(b) enhancement stemming from defendant’s 1981 conviction. As such, it may not serve as the basis for denying resentencing relief under section 1172.75.

Authority:

PEN 667.5(b)

People v. Green (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 365, 370

People v. Tang (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 1003, 1007

Second Holding:

More than 30 years ago, defendant was convicted of both a disqualifying felony and robbery. However, for purposes of the current case, the prosecution only alleged a prior prison term enhancement for the 1990 robbery, not the disqualifying felony. The allegation was found true and the enhancement for the prior prison term stemming from the robbery was imposed. Because the enhancement was for robbery, the section 667.5(b) enhancement that became part of defendant’s sentence was not imposed for his conviction of a disqualifying offense as required by the plain terms of section 1172.75. Because a one-year prior prison term enhancement was not alleged, proved, or imposed for the 1990 conviction of an otherwise-disqualifying offense, it may not be used to deny defendant resentencing relief pursuant to section 1172.75.

Authority:

People v. Green (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 365, 371

Third Holding:

In the appeal from the original judgment more than a decade ago, this court ordered defendant’s judgment modified to strike 10 of his 15 prior prison term enhancements and ordered the abstract of judgment amended to reflect the change. An amended abstract of judgment filed after the conclusion of that appeal reflected just such a change.

During the resentencing proceedings in the superior court in 2025, the court also addressed a motion by defendant to vacate his remaining restitution fines. The court granted defendant’s request pursuant to section 1465.9(b) and ordered the abstract of judgment amended. A new abstract of judgment issued in July 2025 reflected the change to defendant’s restitution; however, it also listed eight of the 10 previously stricken prior prison term enhancements. This is a clerical error. The abstract of judgment should list imposition of five 1-year enhancements—one on each count—for defendant’s prior prison term served in connection with his med-2000s petty theft conviction.

Authority:

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185 [Courts may correct clerical errors at any time]

Case: 000438

Error and/or relief

We agree with the defendant that the trial court erred in calculating his sentence, and we therefore remand for a full resentencing. At that resentencing, the trial court may revisit the aggravating factors, so we decline to decide today the defendant’s challenge to one aggravating factor. We likewise decline to decide whether the victim’s mother and sister were properly named as protected persons on the criminal protective order, as the trial court must also determine the scope of the protective order in fully resentencing the defendant.

There were also errors in the minute order and the abstract of judgment because they reflected imposition of multiple fines that were not imposed in the court’s oral pronouncement.

First Holding:

It was error for the court to sentence the defendant under section 667.71 and also sentence him to a determine term. Section 667.71, also known as the “Two Strikes” law, provides that a habitual sexual offender shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for 25 years to life. A habitual sexual offender is defined as a person who has been previously convicted of one or more of certain specified offenses and who is convicted in the present proceeding of one of those offenses. Among the specified offenses is lewd or lascivious act in violation of section 288(a).

The Two Strikes law is an alternative sentencing scheme for specified sexual offenses. Unlike a sentence enhancement, which imposes an additional term of imprisonment added to the base term, the Two Strikes law sets forth an alternate penalty for the underlying felony itself when the defendant has satisfied specified conditions. In other words, the trial court may either sentence the defendant under the penalty specified in the underlying statute or based on the Two Strikes law, but not both.

Authority:

People v. Lopez (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 355, 360

People v. Murphy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 136, 155

People v. Acosta (2002) 29 Cal.4th 105, 118 [discussing One Strike law]

Second Holding:

Because we find the trial court’s sentence as to count 2 is unauthorized, we remand for a full resentencing as to all counts to allow the trial court to exercise its sentencing discretion in light of the changed circumstances.

Authority:

People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893

Third Holding:

As there were errors in the minute order and abstract of judgment listing multiple fines that were not imposed in the oral pronouncement of judgment, we trust the court’s minutes and abstract of judgment will track the court’s oral pronouncement on remand.

Authority:

People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 389 [Rendition of the judgment is normally an oral pronouncement, and the abstract of judgment cannot add to, or modify, the judgment, but only purports to digest and summarize it]

Case: 000437

Error and/or relief

The abstract of judgment incorrectly indicates a restitution fine of $3,400 to be paid, rather than the $2,400 imposed by the trial court. It must be corrected.

Holding:

[GARY NOTE: The court cited no authority for its order directing the trial court to correct the abstract of judgment–likely because the legal principle is well-established and seems obvious–but there is plenty of authority, which I cite below.]

Authority:

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185 [holding reviewing courts have the inherent power on appeal to correct clerical errors found in court records, such as may be found in abstracts of judgment, whether on the court’s own motion or upon application of the parties]

People v. Jones (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1, 89

People v. Baker (2021) 10 Cal.5th 1044, 1109 [court has inherent power to correct clerical errors in abstract of judgment]

Case: 000436

Error and/or relief

The abstract of judgment is incorrect in that it indicates that the trial court imposed a restitution fund fine of $330 pursuant to section 1202.4 but at sentencing the trial court stated that the amount of that fine was $300. It must be corrected.

Holding:

Where there is a discrepancy between the oral pronouncement of judgment and the minute order or the abstract of judgment, the oral pronouncement controls.

Authority:

People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 385

Case: 000427

Error and/or relief

The matter is remanded for limited resentencing proceedings concerning the imposition of mandatory ancillary costs under Penal Code section 1465.8 and Government Code section 70373, both of which were omitted from the trial court’s original oral sentencing pronouncements.

First Holding:

The sentencing hearing transcript shows the trial court only imposed restitution and parole revocation fines, both in the amount of $500. The court purported to waive all fees and other fines without providing an explanation. Yet, the minute order and the indeterminate abstract of judgment indicate an imposed $200 court security fee pursuant to Penal Code section 1465.8, as well as a $150 criminal conviction assessment pursuant to Government Code section 70373.

The court security fee and the criminal conviction assessment are properly characterized as ancillary costs. That is, they are funding mechanisms created by the Legislature to raise funds for court operations and facilities; they are not punitive in nature. Imposition of these ancillary costs is mandatory for every criminal conviction except parking offenses. However, due to a robust fee waiver system in civil cases for the same types of ancillary costs, the unavailability of a fee waiver in criminal cases violates equal protection guarantees. Upon request by a criminal defendant, a trial court must consider a defendant’s inability to pay before imposing a court operations assessment under section 1465.8(a)(1) or a court facilities assessment under Government Code section 70373(a)(1). This includes allowing the parties to present and contest any relevant evidence or argument on the question.

Authority:

People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1, 11, 14-15, 26-27, 30

Second Holding:

[Gary Note: The court sidestepped the issue because it remanded for a Kopp hearing, but oral pronouncements prevail over written orders. The court has the authority to order corrections where the abstract of judgment or minute order does not reflect exactly what the court ordered. Had the court decided to order the correction, there are many cases it could have chosen from as authority. I have set forth a few below. Again, the discrepancy was moot in this case.]

Authority:

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185

People v. Delgado (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1059, 1070

People v. Leon (2020) 8 Cal.5th 831, 855

In re Black (1967) 66 Cal.2d 881, 890

People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 385

People v. Farell (2002) 28 Cal.4th 381, 384, fn. 2

Case: 000426

Error and/or relief

It was error for the jury to convict defendant of counts 1 and 2, which appeared to be based on the same facts. The conviction on count 2 should be stricken. Further, counts 1 and 3 were part of an indivisible course of conduct with the same intent and objective, and section 654 therefor applies. And the abstract of judgment must be amended to reflect the correct count number for one of the counts.

First Holding:

The record shows that defendant was charged with kidnapping for ransom (PC 209(a)) in count 1 and kidnapping (sec. 207(a)) in count 2. The jury acquitted him of counts 1 and 2 as charged and found him guilty of false imprisonment (sec. 237(a)) as a lesser included offense on both counts. During closing argument and again at sentencing, the prosecutor acknowledged that counts 1 and 2 were charged in the alternative and were based on the same facts. Section 954 authorizes multiple convictions for different or distinct offenses, but does not permit multiple convictions for a different statement of the same offense when it is based on the same act or course of conduct. The conviction on count 2 should be stricken.

Authority:

PEN 954

People v. Vidana (2016) 1 Cal.5th 632, 650

Second Holding:

Section 654(a) provides, in pertinent part, that an act or omission that is punishable in different ways by different provisions of law may be punished under either of such provisions, but in no case shall the act or omission be punished under more than one provision. It precludes multiple punishments for a single act or indivisible course of conduct.The purpose of section 654 is to prevent multiple punishment for a single act or omission or indivisible course of conduct, even though that act or omission or indivisible course of conduct violates more than one statute and thus constitutes more than one crime.

Authority:

PEN 654

People v. Hester (2000) 22 Cal.4th 290, 294-295

People v. Liu (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1119, 1135

Third Holding:

It is defendant’s intent and objective, not the temporal proximity of his offenses, which determine whether the transaction is indivisible. If all of the offenses were merely incidental to, or were the means of accomplishing or facilitating one objective, the defendant may be found to have harbored a single intent and therefore may be punished only once. But if the defendant acts with multiple criminal objectives that are independent of, and not merely incidental to, each other, he may be punished for separate violations, even though the violations shared common acts or were part of an otherwise indivisible course of conduct. Thus, the principal inquiry in each case is whether the defendant’s criminal intent and objective were single or multiple. Each case must be determined on its own facts. The trial court has broad latitude in determining whether section 654(a) applies in a given case.

Authority:

People v. Harrison (1989) 48 Cal.3d 321, 335

People v. Richardson (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 1203, 1214

People v. Liu (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1119, 1135-1136

People v. Garcia (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1550, 15

Fourth Holding:

A court’s determination, express or implied, that two crimes were separate, involving separate objectives, under section 654 is a question of fact we review for substantial evidence. We review the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment and will affirm the court’s sentencing decision if it is supported by substantial evidence.

Authority:

People v. Richardson (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 1203, 1214

Fifth Holding:

Gratuitous violence against a helpless and unresisting victim has traditionally been viewed as not incidental to robbery for purposes of section 654. Section 654 cannot, and should not, be stretched to cover gratuitous violence or other criminal acts far beyond those reasonably necessary to accomplish the original offense.

Authority:

People v. Nguyen (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 181, 190-191

Sixth Holding:

So long as some substantial evidence to support the implied finding exists, there can be no reversal. Where the court made no express findings on the issue, a finding that the crimes were divisible is implicit in the judgment and must be upheld if supported by substantial evidence. Under this standard, the appellate court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s finding and presume the existence of every fact the trial court could reasonably deduce from the record.

Authority:

People v. Ibarra (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 1070, 1083

People v. Vasquez (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 732, 737

Seventh Holding:

We note a clerical error. Generally, a clerical error is one inadvertently made. Clerical errors can be made by a clerk, by counsel, or by the court itself. A court has the inherent power to correct clerical errors in its records at any time so as to make these records reflect the true facts. The abstract of judgment for the indeterminate term lists the assault with a deadly weapon as count 5; however, the assault was count 4 and should be listed as such.

Authority:

People v. Schultz (1965) 238 Cal.App.2d 804, 808

In re Candelario (1970) 3 Cal.3d 702, 705

Case: 000425

Error and/or relief

Having been sentenced to a term of life without the possibility of parole (LWOP) and an indeterminate sentence of 25 years to life, it was error to impose the parole revocation restitution fine. The abstract of judgment also must be corrected to reflect the custody credits awarded at the sentencing hearing.

First Holding:

Section 1202.45(a), provides that the court shall assess a parole revocation restitution fine in every case where a person is convicted of a crime and his or her sentence includes a period of parole. This parole revocation fine statute, however, does not apply in cases where the defendant is sentenced to LWOP and indeterminate terms. The parole revocation fine shall be stricken.

Authority:

People v. Alvarez (2025) 18 Cal.5th 387, 485–486 [parole revocation fine under sec. 1202.45 inapplicable where sentence was death]

People v. Battle (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 50, 63 [improper to impose parole revocation fine where the defendant received an indeterminate term of 25 years to life and LWOP]

People v. Samaniego (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1148, 1184 [where the defendant is sentenced to LWOP, there can be no parole, and therefore the parole revocation fine was improperly assessed]

People v. Brasure (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1037, 1075 [parole revocation fine proper where the defendant, in addition to being sentenced to death, also sentenced to determinate term]

Second Holding:

The abstract of judgment is incorrect in reflecting the custody credits. The court’s oral pronouncement is correct, and it controls over the abstract of judgment or sentencing minute order. The trial court is directed to issue an amended abstract of judgment that accurately reflects the correct number of days of actual custody credit awarded by the court in its oral pronouncement of judgment.

Authority:

People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185 [courts may correct clerical errors at any time, and appellate courts with jurisdiction have the power to order correction of abstracts of judgment that do not accurately reflect the oral judgment of the sentencing court]

Case: 000418

Error and/or relief

The trial court failed to orally dismiss counts that were to be dismissed under the plea agreement. We modify the judgment to reflect the dismissal of the two counts.

Holding:

The trial court erred by failing to dismiss the remaining counts as required by the plea agreement. While the minutes indicate the counts were dismissed, the court did not orally dismiss them at the hearing. To avoid unnecessarily wasting limited resources, we modify the judgment to reflect the plea agreement.

Authority:

PEN 1260

People v. Superior Court (Gifford) (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1333, 1337 [A plea agreement is, in essence, a contract between the defendant and the prosecutor to which the court consents to be bound]