Error and/or relief
The trial court improperly imposed an upper term sentence without an appropriate factual finding or stipulation as to an aggravating factor, as required by Penal Code section 1170(b). We conclude that the defendant may raise this issue even though he stipulated to the sentence as part of a plea bargain.
First Holding:
When the defendant entered his plea in 2020, the choice to impose a lower, middle, or upper term sentence was committed to the sound discretion of the court. But when the court ultimately entered judgment in 2024, following the passage of SB 567, a trial court was permitted to impose an upper term sentence only when aggravating circumstances have been stipulated to by the defendant or have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a court trial. The defendant argues that, although he agreed to the sentence in his plea agreement, the change in the law renders his agreement to an upper term sentence invalid in the absence of an appropriate finding of or stipulation to aggravating circumstances. The circumstances in French differ from those here in potentially meaningful ways. Nonetheless, in light of the significant uncertainty in this area and the potential Sixth Amendment implications, we deem it appropriate to exercise our discretion to reach the merits of the defendant’s arguments.
Authority:
PEN 1170
People v. French (2008) 43 Cal.4th 36 [defendant did not forfeit his Sixth Amendment right by failing to request a jury trial on the aggravating circumstances]
People v. Gonzalez (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 312, 326–327 [exercising discretion to forgive forfeiture because the application of amended section 1170, subdivision (b) implicates a constitutional right, as recognized in People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730]
Second Holding:
With respect to the merits, the People argue that because the defendant agreed to a specific term of imprisonment as part of his plea bargain, section 1170(b)’s sentencing procedures are irrelevant. As we have noted, this issue has been addressed in multiple Court of Appeal decisions and is now before the Supreme Court. We therefore dispense with offering significant additional analysis, except to say we are persuaded by the logic of the courts that have allowed defendants subject to stipulated sentences to seek the benefits of Senate Bill 567. Among other things, we think this best comports with Stamps, which is the leading authority on what relief is available under ameliorative sentencing legislation that takes effect after a defendant enters a plea agreement for a stipulated sentence.
Authority:
People v. De La Rosa Burgara (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 1054, 1063, review granted February 21, 2024, S283452 [defendant entitled to remand]
People v. Todd (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 373, 381–382, review granted April 26, 2023, S279154 [same]
People v. Stamps (2020) 9 Cal.5th 685
Third Holding:
In keeping with Stamps, if the defendant waives the requirements of amended section 1170(b), the trial court shall reinstate his original sentence. If he invokes the requirements of section 1170(b), he must state whether he stipulates to the facts underlying an aggravating circumstance justifying the imposition of the upper term on count 1 and the enhancement, or whether he desires a jury or bench trial on any aggravating circumstances alleged by the People. If he stipulates to the facts underlying an aggravating circumstance justifying the upper-term sentence, the trial court shall find that the upper term may be imposed on count 1. If he requests a trial, the People will have the burden proving beyond a reasonable doubt the truth of any alleged aggravating circumstance justifying the imposition of the upper term. If the factfinder finds an aggravating circumstance true, and the trial court determines the upper term can be imposed on count 1, the court shall reinstate the original sentence. If the People fail to prove the truth of an aggravating circumstance, the trial court shall find that the sentence on count 1 cannot exceed the middle term. At that point, if the court does not approve of the plea agreement with the reduced sentence or if the People do not agree to the reduced sentence, the court shall vacate the plea in toto and return the parties to their status quo ante.
Authority:
People v. Stamps (2020) 9 Cal.5th 685
[Gary note: Is Stamps still good law? Effective 1/1/2025, section 1171 was enacted to give courts guides on how to handle various amerliorative statutes. Take a look at 1171(c)(3) in this partial rendition of section 1171 (bold and italics by me): [Penal Code section 1171[(a) For the purposes of this section, “postconviction proceeding” means a proceeding to modify a sentence or conviction pursuant to an ameliorative statute. Ameliorative statutes include, but are not limited to, Sections 1170.18, 1172.1, 1172.6, 1172.7, and 1172.75.[…[(c) The following shall apply for all postconviction proceedings unless there is a conflict with a more specific rule established in statute, in which case the more specific statute shall apply: … (3) Any changes to a sentence shall not be a basis for a prosecutor or court to rescind a plea agreement.[…[(e) This section does not diminish the ability of the prosecution to oppose relief requested in a postconviction proceeding.[(f) This section shall not be interpreted to authorize anything prohibited by an initiative statute.]