Error and/or relief
The trial court abused its discretion by denying mental health diversion because the court’s finding that his proposed treatment plan would not address his mental health needs was not supported by the record. The trial court abused its discretion by denying developmentally disabled diversion because the defendant did not produce suitable treatment program.
First Holding:
The Legislature enacted sections 1001.35 and 1001.36 to create a pretrial diversion program for criminal defendants with diagnosed mental health disorders. The statute expressly promotes increased diversion of individuals with mental disorders to mitigate the individuals’ entry and reentry into the criminal justice system while protecting public safety. Section 1001.36 requires the trial court to find the defendant both eligible for diversion and suitable for the program. Section 1001.36(b) and (c) set forth the criteria for each.
Authority:
PEN 1001.35
PEN 1001.36
Sarmiento v. Superior Court (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 882, 890-891, 887 (section 1001.36 was designed to encourage trial courts to broadly authorize pretrial mental health diversion, providing treatment for qualifying mental disorders that result in criminal behavior)
Vaughn v. Superior Court (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 124, 133
Second Holding:
If the defendant is both eligible and suitable, the trial court must also be satisfied that the recommended inpatient or outpatient program of mental health treatment will meet the specialized mental health treatment needs of the defendant. This is not an additional eligibility or suitability requirement the defendant must meet.
Rather, section 1001.36(f)(1) read as a whole appears to contemplate an ongoing assessment to assure that defendants will receive appropriate treatment for their particular conditions as part of the diversion program. Under this provision, a court might reject diversion if it concluded that the proposed treatment services did not target or could not effectively address the defendant’s particular diagnosis. For instance, the court might be legitimately concerned if the evaluation of the defendant suggested the need for psychiatric medication and the recommended program did not provide psychiatric services.
Authority:
PEN 1001.36(f)(1)(A)(i)
Vaughn v. Superior Court (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 124, 134
Sarmiento v. Superior Court (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 882, 892, 895, fn. 9
Third Holding:
Even where a defendant makes a prima facie showing that the defendant meets all the eligibility and suitability requirements, the trial court may still exercise its discretion to deny diversion. But this residual discretion is not unfettered and must be exercised consistent with the principles and purpose of the governing law.
That purpose includes a strong legislative preference for treatment of mental health disorders because of the benefits of such treatment to both the offending individual and the community. Where the court chooses to exercise this residual discretion to deny diversion, its statement of reasons should reflect consideration of the underlying purposes of the statute and explain why diversion would not meet those goals.
Authority:
PEN 1001.36(a)
Sarmiento v. Superior Court (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 882, 892
Vaughn v. Superior Court (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 124, 135
Fourth Holding:
A trial court’s ruling on a request for mental health diversion is reviewed for abuse of discretion. A court abuses its discretion when it makes an arbitrary or capricious decision by applying the wrong legal standard, or bases its decision on express or implied factual findings that are not supported by substantial evidence. Further, action that transgresses the confines of the applicable principles of law is outside the scope of discretion and constitutes an abuse of discretion.
The trial court found the defendant made a prima facie showing that he was eligible and suitable for mental health diversion but denied diversion because it found the defendant’s proposed treatment program would not meet his mental health needs. We conclude substantial evidence does not support the court’s finding. (Gary note: The opinion then discusses facts specific to this defendant and the evidence produced, and concluded the evidence was insufficient to support the trial court’s conclusion that there was no suitable treatment plan.)
Under the circumstances, we will conditionally reverse the judgment and remand the matter for the court to reconsider the motion, bearing in mind the statutory principles and purpose of the mental health diversion statute.
Authority:
People v. Whitmill (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1138, 1147
People v. Graham (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 787, 795
Lacour v. Superior Court (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 391, 401
People v. Qualkinbush (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 879, 892, 895
Fifth Holding:
In this instance, the defendant also was denied diversion under section 1001.20 et seq. for developmentally disabled persons. When the court suspects that a defendant may have a developmental disability, the trial court shall order the prosecutor, the probation department, and the regional center to prepare reports on specified aspects of the defendant’s case. The trial court has a sua sponte duty to consult with the relevant agencies to determine whether a defendant may be diverted.
As with a denial of a request for mental health diversion, we review a trial court’s denial of developmental disability diversion for abuse of discretion.
Authority:
Authority:
PEN 1001.20
People v. K.D. (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 1, 16, 18-19 [abuse of discretion arises if the trial court based its decision on impermissible factors or on an incorrect legal standard]
Sixth Holding:
Unlike other diversion statutes, section 1001.23(b) does not include a stand-alone requirement that the defendant prove that his or her developmental disability was a significant factor in the commission of the charged crime.
Authority:
People v. K.D. (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 1, 24
Seventh Holding:
There is no dispute that the defendant has a developmental disability and is eligible for regional center services. The trial court denied developmental disability diversion because it was not satisfied that the defendant presented a suitable program to meet his needs.
Under section 1001.20 et seq., however, the defendant was not required to provide a proposed plan or one that would meet his needs.
Remand is required so that the court can exercise informed discretion with the information required by statute, keeping in mind the ultimate question of whether, in light of the statutorily-prescribed considerations, defendant is a person who would benefit by diversion.
Authority:
People v. K.D. (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 1, 31-32, 28 [trial court erroneously denied motion for developmental disability diversion under the misguided view that defendant was obligated to provide a treatment plan]