Error and/or relief
Though brought as an appeal, the appellate court exercised its discreation and treated the matter as a petition for writ of mandate, the proper vehicle to challenge an order denying the defendant’s motion for discovery under the Racial Justice Act [RJA], as the order was an interlocutory, nonappealable order. We grant the petition.
First Holding:
The petitioner is only authorized to bring an RJA claim by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus because he is incarcerated and his judgment is already final. Petitioner has not filed such a petition.
Authority:
PEN 745
PEN 1473
People v. Hodge (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 985, 999–1000
People v. Serrano (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 276, 292–293
In re Montgomery (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 1062, 1070–1072, review granted Dec. 11, 2024, S287339
Second Holding:
Until recently, appellate courts were divided over whether courts have jurisdiction to rule on a postjudgment RJA discovery motion unattached to a petition for writ of habeas corpus. This dispute, however, was resolved when the Legislature enacted AB 1071 (2025–2026 Reg. Sess.), effective January 1, 2026, which added Penal Code section 1473,(e)(2).
This new provision expressly authorizes a petitioner, or their counsel, to file a discovery motion under section 745(d), upon the prosecution of a petition under this subdivision, or in preparation to file a petition.
Authority:
PEN 745(d)
PEN 1473(e)(2)
People v. Serrano (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 276, 291
Third Holding:
The trial court’s erroneous denial of petitioner’s discovery motion, as an interlocutory order, is not appealable and is challengeable only by petition for writ of mandate. We exercise our discretion to treat the appeal as a petition for writ of mandate, as both parties have thoroughly briefed the merits of the petitioner’s claim of right to discovery under the RJA.
Authority:
People v. Serrano (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 276, 292-293
Gonzales v. Superior Court (2024) 108 Cal.App.5th Supp. 36, 53–54 [Writ review is appropriate in discovery matters where, as here, it is necessary to address questions of first impression that are of general importance to the trial courts and to the legal profession, and where general guidelines can be laid down for future cases.]
Olson v. Cory (1983) 35 Cal.3d 390, 401 [treating an appeal as a writ petition is appropriate when an issue under review has been thoroughly briefed and argued, such that dismissing the appeal would be unnecessarily dilatory and circuitous]
Fourth Holding:
A petitioner seeking to pursue an RJA claim must show good cause to obtain discovery in anticipation of filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus. This good cause standard is more lenient than the prima facie showing required for obtaining relief under section 745(a). Nonetheless, the statute’s good cause language serves a gatekeeping function.
Authority:
PEN 745(d)
Young v. Superior Court (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 138, 166 [whether the allegations underscoring [the petitioner’s racial profiling theory are enough to support a plausible justification that a violation of section 745(a) could or might have occurred in his or her case is an issue for the trial court to assess, exercising its discretion upon an application of the correct legal standard governing good cause]
In re Montgomery (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 1062, 1075 [review granted Dec. 11, 2024, S287339] (conc. opn. of Kelety, J.) [Nor would an interpretation of section 745(d) that allows habeas corpus petitioners to obtain such discovery trigger a right to unlimited discovery]
People v. Serrano (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 276, 293
Fifth Holding:
In Young, the appellate court concluded that the good cause standard for discovery under the RJA is akin to the good cause standard for Pitchess motions [pertaining to discovery of police personnel records in criminal cases]. It observed that the Pitchess good cause standard includes the requirement for a defendant to establish a plausible factual foundation for officer misconduct.
The Young court concluded that the same standard applies in RJA cases. In order to establish good cause for discovery under the RJA, a defendant is required only to advance a plausible factual foundation, based on specific facts, that a violation of the RJA could or might have occurred in his case.
Authority:
Young v. Superior Court (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 138, 158-159
People v. Superior Court (Lalo) (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 707, 712
McDaniel v. Superior Court (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 228, 244
Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531
Sixth Holding:
Based on the evidence presented by the petitioner in his motion, we conclude that he met the foundational requirement of presenting a plausible justification for discovery under section 745(d).
Authority:
Young v. Superior Court (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 138, 144-145
Seventh Holding:
It has long been the law that a criminal defendant who has established his indigent status is constitutionally entitled to those defense services for which he demonstrates a need, which services may include discovery costs, investigative costs, transcript costs, expert fees, etc.
In this matter, petitioner did not assert in the superior court a right to free copies of discovery materials with a demonstration of his indigent status. Unless or until petitioner does so, he is not entitled to free copies of any material discoverable under the RJA. [it does not offend the Constitution to require a nonindigent defendant to pay reasonable fees for duplicating discovery materials disclosed by the district attorney pursuant to section 1054.1]
Authority:
Schaffer v. Superior Court (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1235, 1245 [it does not offend the Constitution to require a nonindigent defendant to pay reasonable fees for duplicating discovery materials disclosed by the district attorney pursuant to section 1054.1]