Error and/or relief
When the defendant pleaded guilty, the agreement was that he would be placed on probation, and if he violated probation and it was revoked, he would be sentenced to prison for three years. It was error on revocation of probation for the court to sentence him to four years.
First Holding:
The process of plea negotiation contemplates an agreement negotiated by the People and the defendant and approved by the court. Pursuant to this procedure the defendant agrees to plead guilty or no contest in order to obtain a reciprocal benefit, generally consisting of a less severe punishment than that which could result if he were convicted of all offenses charged.
This more lenient disposition of the charges is secured in part by prosecutorial consent to the imposition of such clement punishment, by the People’s acceptance of a plea to a lesser offense than that charged, either in degree or kind, or by the prosecutor’s dismissal of one or more counts of a multi-count indictment or information.
Judicial approval is an essential condition precedent to the effectiveness of the bargain worked out by the defense and prosecution. But implicit in all of this is a process of bargaining between the adverse parties to the case—the People represented by the prosecutor on one side, the defendant represented by his counsel on the other—which bargaining results in an agreement between them.
Authority:
People v. Segura (2008) 44 Cal.4th 921, 929–930
People v. Prudholme (2023) 14 Cal.5th 961, 970
Second Holding:
The prosecutor is the only party authorized to negotiate on behalf of the state, and the trial court cannot substitute itself in place of the prosecutor. Such judicial activity would contravene express statutory provisions requiring the prosecutor’s consent to the proposed disposition, would detract from the judge’s ability to remain detached and neutral in evaluating the voluntariness of the plea and the fairness of the bargain to society as well as to the defendant, and would present a substantial danger of unintentional coercion of defendants who may be intimidated by the judge’s participation in the matter.
Authority:
People v. Segura (2008) 44 Cal.4th 921, 930
Third Holding:
Because a negotiated plea agreement is a form of contract, it is interpreted according to general contract principles. Acceptance of the agreement binds the court and the parties to the agreement. [When a guilty or nolo contendere plea is entered in exchange for specified benefits such as the dismissal of other counts or an agreed maximum punishment, both parties, including the state, must abide by the terms of the agreement.
Authority:
People v. Segura (2008) 44 Cal.4th 921, 930-931
Fourth Holding:
Although a plea agreement does not divest the court of its inherent sentencing discretion, a judge who has accepted a plea bargain is bound to impose a sentence within the limits of that bargain.
A plea agreement is, in essence, a contract between the defendant and the prosecutor to which the court consents to be bound. Should the court consider the plea bargain to be unacceptable, its remedy is to reject it, not to violate it, either directly or indirectly. Once the court has accepted the terms of the negotiated plea, it lacks jurisdiction to alter the terms of a plea bargain so that it becomes more favorable to a defendant unless, of course, the parties agree.
For its part, of course, the trial court may decide not to approve the terms of a plea agreement negotiated by the parties. If the court does not believe the agreed-upon disposition is fair, the court ‘need not approve a bargain reached between the prosecution and the defendant, but it cannot change that bargain or agreement without the consent of both parties.
Authority:
People v. Segura (2008) 44 Cal.4th 921, 931
Fifth Holding:
When the plea is accepted by the prosecuting attorney in open court and is approved by the court, the defendant, except as otherwise provided in this section, cannot be sentenced on the plea to a punishment more severe than that specified in the plea and the court may not proceed as to the plea other than as specified in the plea.
Authority:
PEN 1192.5(b)
Sixth Holding:
Thus, a court may not modify the terms of a plea agreement while otherwise leaving the agreement intact, nor may the court effectively withdraw its approval by later modifying the terms of the agreement it had approved. When a court accepts a plea bargain, it must impose a sentence within the limits of that bargain.
Authority:
People v. Brooks (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 1099, 1107
People v. Segura (2008) 44 Cal.4th 921, 931
People v. Cunningham (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1044, 1047
Seventh Holding:
It is well settled that a criminal defendant cannot argue for the first time on appeal that the trial court aggravated a sentence based on items contained in a probation report that were erroneous or otherwise flawed. The defendant did not object to the recommendation in the probation report that he be sentenced to four years, nor did he object when the court imposed that term.
Authority:
People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 351–352
People v. Victorian (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 954, 958
Eighth Holding:
Defendant raises the alternate argument that the trial attorney was prejudicially ineffective for failing to object to the trial court’s imposition of the four-year term. To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance, a defendant must show both that counsel’s performance was deficient—it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness—and that defendant was thereby prejudiced.
Such prejudice exists only if the record shows that but for counsel’s defective performance there is a reasonable probability the result of the proceeding would have been different. To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance on appeal the record must affirmatively disclose the lack of a rational tactical purpose for the challenged act or omission.
Authority:
People v. Cash (2002) 28 Cal.4th 703, 734
Ninth Holding:
In the usual case, where counsel’s trial tactics or strategic reasons for challenged decisions do not appear on the record, we will not find ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal unless there could be no conceivable reason for counsel’s acts or omissions.
Authority:
People v. Jones (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1229, 1254
Tenth Holding:
It appears that between the time of the plea agreement in 2022 and the revocation proceedings in 2025, the trial court and the parties were unaware of the terms and conditions of the plea agreement, that the court did not withdraw its approval of the plea agreement, the plea agreement was never modified, and the probation report’s recommendation of the upper term violated the terms and conditions of the plea agreement as agreed to by the prosecution and defendant in 2022.
Instead, it appears the probation officer unilaterally recommended the upper term of four years without consideration of the plea agreement for the midterm of three years.
Defendant is not seeking a sentence outside the terms of the plea agreement but seeking to enforce the plea agreement. When a guilty plea is entered in exchange for specified benefits such as the dismissal of other counts or an agreed maximum punishment, both parties, including the state, must abide by the terms of the agreement.
Therefore, we direct modification of the abstract of judgment to reflect the sentence agreed to by the parties and approved by the trial court in 2022—that defendant should be sentenced to the midterm of three years.
Authority:
People v. Panizzon (1996) 13 Cal.4th 68, 80