Error and/or relief
We conclude the trial court abused its discretion. It failed to follow the governing statute’s directions. Its conclusion that the defendant posed an unreasonable risk to public safety, as defined by section 1001.36(c)(4), was unsupported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, we issue the requested writ of mandate and direct the court to grant the defendant’s motion for mental health diversion.
First Holding:
In 2018, the Legislature enacted section 1001.36 to create a diversion program for criminal defendants with diagnosed mental health disorders. Diversion allows for the suspension of criminal proceedings and potential dismissal of charges upon successful completion of mental health treatment. By its terms, section 1001.36 was designed to encourage trial courts to broadly authorize pretrial mental health diversion, providing treatment for qualifying mental disorders that result in criminal behavior.
Authority:
PEN 1001.36
Sarmiento v. Superior Court (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 882, 887, 890
Second Holding:
The decision whether to grant diversion is a two-step process. First, the court determines if the defendant satisfies the eligibility requirements set forth in section 1001.36(b). Defendants are eligible if they have been diagnosed with a recognized mental disorder that was a significant factor in the commission of the criminal offense with which they are charged.
Authority:
PEN 1001.36(a) – (b)
Third Holding:
Second, the court determines if the defendant is suitable for diversion under the factors set forth in section 1001.36(c). Those factors are: (1) in the opinion of a qualified mental health expert, the defendant’s mental disorder would respond to treatment; (2) the defendant agrees to waive their speedy trial rights; (3) the defendant agrees to comply with treatment requirements; and (4) the defendant will not pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety as defined in sections 1170.18 and 667(e)(2)(C)(iv).
Authority:
PEN 1001.36(a) and (c)
Sarmiento v. Superior Court (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 882, 891
Fourth Holding:
Finally, even when all eligibility and suitability factors are met, courts have discretion to deny mental health diversion. But this residual discretion must be exercised consistent with the principles and purpose of the governing law.
Authority:
Sarmiento v. Superior Court (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 882, 895-896
People v. Qualkinbush (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 879, 888
Fifth Holding:
Our review is for abuse of discretion.
Authority:
People v. Whitmill (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1138, 1147
Sixth Holding:
Under section 1170.18, the Legislature has narrowly defined an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety to mean an unreasonable risk that the petitioner will commit a new violent felony within the meaning of section 667(e)(2)(C)(iv). The violent felonies encompassed in this definition are known as super strikes. The super strikes are murder, attempted murder, solicitation to commit murder, assault with a machine gun on a police officer, possession of a weapon of mass destruction, any serious or violent felony punishable by death or life imprisonment, or any sexually violent offenses or sexual offense committed against minors under the age of 14.
Authority:
PEN 1170.18(c)
People v Moine (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 440, 449
People v. Whitmill (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1138, 1150-1151
Seventh Holding:
By statute, when determining the risk of danger, t]he court may consider the opinions of the district attorney, the defense, or a qualified mental health expert, and may consider the defendant’s treatment plan, the defendant’s violence and criminal history, the current charged offense, and any other factors that the court deems appropriate. A defendant who seeks diversion is not being sentenced, so the general sentencing objectives set forth in rule 4.410 of the California Rules of Court are inapplicable.
Authority:
PEN 1001.36(c)(4)
People v. Whitmill (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1138, 1149
Eighth Holding:
A court abuses its discretion when it makes an arbitrary or capricious decision by applying the wrong legal standard or bases its decision on express or implied factual findings that are not supported by substantial evidence.
The trial court expressed that it could not know whether the defendant was going to commit a super strike, and based on his two violent incidents from 2007 and 2010, the trial court concluded that there was a danger that there was a likelihood that the defendant could commit a super strike, thereby permitting the trial court to exercise its residual discretion to deny diversion.
But the court misunderstood what was required. The plain language of the statute requires a finding that a defendant will not pose an unreasonable risk of committing a super strike.
The statute does not, as the trial court suggested, require a prediction that a defendant will not, in fact, commit a super strike. The correct analysis thus requires assessing probabilities; not predicting outcomes, as the trial court incorrectly understood.
These are two distinct types of inquiry. Applying the correct standard to the record before us, we conclude the evidence is insubstantial that the defendant is too dangerous to be treated in the community on the ground that he poses an unreasonable risk of committing a super strike.
A trial court abuses its discretion when the factual findings critical to its decision find no support in the evidence.
Authority:
PEN 1001.36(c)(4)
People v. Whitmill (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1138, 1147
People v. Cluff (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 991, 998
Ninth Holding:
The only question that remains is whether further proceedings are required. We conclude they are not. The trial court found that the defendant satisfied all criteria for diversion except the public safety factor, leaving nothing further to be decided. The People do not argue otherwise. Under these circumstances, we will reverse the court’s order with directions to grant the defendant’s motion unless the People present changed circumstances that warrant rehearing.
Authority:
People v. Williams (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 990, 1005