Error and/or relief
In the sentencing of the defendant on two separate cases, the court erred in believing that consecutive terms were mandatory.
First Holding:
When considering a trial court’s sentencing decision, we apply an abuse of discretion standard of review. Defendants are entitled to sentencing decisions made in the exercise of the informed discretion” of the sentencing court. A trial court cannot properly exercise its informed discretion if it is unaware of its discretionary authority at the time a decision is being made. A trial court generally has discretion to impose consecutive or concurrent sentences. An exception applies when a sentence is imposed under section 667(c)(8), which requires a strike sentence to run consecutive to any other sentence that the defendant is already serving, unless otherwise provided by law. From its comments at sentencing, it is clear the trial court believed consecutive sentences were required under this provision because it was imposing a strike sentence on the 2024 robbery.
Authority:
People v. Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th 825, 847
People v. Hilburn (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 189, 205
People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1391
People v. Panozo (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 825, 837
People v. McDaniels (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 420, 42
Second Holding:
Forfeiture does not apply to claims that the trial court misapprehended its sentencing discretion.
Authority:
People v. Panozo (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 825, 840
Third Holding:
The defendant was convicted by jury of a robbery he committed in 2024. When he committed this offense, he was on probation for another robbery, for which he was convicted in 2021. At the preliminary hearing for the 2024 robbery, the court revoked his probation for the 2021 robbery. At sentencing on both robberies, the court sentenced the defendant to four years for the 2024 robbery, and a consecutive term of one year for the 2021 robbery. In making its order, the court expressed its belief that consecutive sentencing was required under Penal Code section 667.
A trial court generally has discretion to impose consecutive or concurrent sentences. An exception applies when a sentence is imposed under section 667(c)(8), which requires a strike sentence to run consecutive to any other sentence that the defendant is already serving, unless otherwise provided by law. From its comments at sentencing, it is clear the trial court believed consecutive sentences were required under this provision because it was imposing a strike sentence on the 2024 robbery.
When a defendant is placed on probation and imposition of sentence is suspended, as in this defendant’s case, the defendant does not begin serving a sentence until a sentence is later imposed after revocation of probation and the defendant is delivered into custody for that offense. Thus when the court sentenced the defendant for the 2024 robbery, he was not already serving a sentence on the 2021 robbery case. This is not the same situation as in Gonzalez, where the defendant was already serving a sentence because he had been sentenced for violating his probation orders and he was still awaiting trial on the new offense.
Authority:
PEN 667(c)(8)
PEN 669(a)
People v. Rosbury (1997) 15 Cal.4th 206, 210–211
People v. Gonzalez (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 115, 121
Fourth Holding:
Where a sentencing court was not fully aware of the scope of its discretionary powers, the appropriate remedy is to remand for resentencing unless the record clearly indicates that the court would have reached the same conclusion even it had been aware it had such discretion. It is apparent from the court’s comments in the record that it did not intend to impose the maximum possible sentence, as it imposed the low term and struck a prior serious felony. The case should be remanded for the trial court to exercise its discretion whether to impose consecutive or concurrent sentences.
Authority:
People v. Superior Court (Guevara) (2025) 18 Cal.5th 838, 878, fn. 16
People v. Leon (2016) 243 Cal.App.4th 1003, 1026 [relief from a trial court’s misunderstanding of its sentencing discretion is available on direct appeal when such misapprehension is affirmatively demonstrated by the record]