Error and/or relief
It was error to impose the upper term on aggravating factors there were not stipulated to or found true beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury.
First Holding:
We review the validity of a jury trial waiver under the totality of the circumstances unique to each case. Relevant circumstances can include the nature of the colloquy prior to the court’s acceptance of a waiver, the presence of counsel and references to discussions between the defendant and counsel regarding the jury right, and the existence and contents of a written waiver. Ultimately, the record must affirmatively show the waiver is voluntary and intelligent under the totality of the circumstances. When a defendant is denied the right to a jury trial on aggravating factors, this error is not structural but subject to harmless error analysis.
Authority:
People v. Morelos (2022) 13 Cal.5th 722, 753
People v. Sivongxxay (2017) 3 Cal.5th 151, 167
People v. Daniels (2017) 3 Cal.5th 961, 991
People v. Collins (2001) 26 Cal.4th 297, 310
People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 750-751, 755
Second Holding:
We review procedural due process claims de novo because the ultimate determination of procedural fairness amounts to a question of law.
Authority:
In re Jonathan V. (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 236, 241
Third Holding:
Ordinarily, an appellate court will not consider a claim of error if an objection could have been, but was not, made in the lower court. However, a defendant’s failure to object would not preclude his asserting on appeal that he was denied his constitutional right to a jury trial. Also, it is well-established that an appellate court is generally not prohibited from reaching questions that have not been preserved for review by a party.
Authority:
People v French (2008) 43 Cal. 4th 36, 46
People v. Smith (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1207, 1215
Fourth Holding:
Under Apprendi, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the statutory maximum prescribed for that crime must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The Varnell court nevertheless held there is no due process right to notice in the accusatory pleading with respect to a sentencing factor. A sentencing factor is a circumstance, which may be either aggravating or mitigating in character, that supports a specific sentence within the range authorized by the jury’s finding that the defendant is guilty of a particular offense.
Because sentencing factors do not operate to increase the penalty for a crime beyond the statutory maximum, they are not required to be pleaded. Unlike penalty provisions and enhancements, the finding of an aggravating factor by a jury does not require or prescribe an added penalty; it merely authorizes the sentencing court to impose the upper term. The California Supreme Court has yet to squarely address whether due process requires pleading and notice of aggravating factors under the most recent sentencing laws.
Authority:
In re Varnell (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1132, 1135, fn.3, 1142
Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 490
Chavez Zepeda v. Superior Court (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 65, 95
People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 769 [stating it was not necessary to decide exactly what the statute and the federal Constitution demand in the pleading and notice context]
Fifth Holding:
A defendant is entitled to a jury trial on all aggravating facts, other than the bare fact of a prior conviction and its elements, that expose the defendant to imposition of a sentence more serious than the statutorily provided midterm. For example, a defendant is entitled to have a jury determine whether his prior convictions were of increasing seriousness and whether he had performed unsatisfactorily on probation, before the court could rely on those aggravating facts to find justification for an upper term sentence. Under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the federal Constitution, a judge may do no more than determine what crime, with what elements, the defendant was convicted of.
The burden is on the People to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the facts relied on to justify an upper term sentence. If those facts are properly proven, the court may take them into account and exercise its discretion under section 1170(b) to determine what sentence to impose. Here, the court’s findings that the defendant “has an extensive prior criminal history” and he “was on a grant of misdemeanor probation when he picked up the new charge” constitute qualitative decisions that go beyond the bare fact of the existence of the prior conviction and, absent a waiver, he was entitled to a jury trial on those factors.
Authority:
PEN 1170(b)(3)
People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1076, 1085, 1086
Erlinger v. United States (2024) 602 U.S. 821, 838
Sixth Holding:
When a court improperly relies upon a factor that was not properly proven at a jury trial, the error is prejudicial unless an appellate court can conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury would have found true all of the aggravating facts relied upon by the trial court to justify an upper term sentence, or that those facts were otherwise proved true in compliance with the current statutory requirements. If the reviewing court cannot so determine, applying the Chapman standard of review, the defendant is entitled to a remand for resentencing. If any aggravating circumstance fails to meet this standard, “the defendant is entitled to a remand for resentencing.
Authority:
Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18
People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 768