Gary Musings, on Pedro T., because there is no summary for Case 000317
I (Gary) decided not to include a summary on this what I have coded as Case 000317, because it contained very few new nuggets of legal principles, was very fact specific, and the facts were very convoluted. But of SOME possible interest, you may wish to review In re Pedro T. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1041, which was mentioned in the case I’m not posting.
In essence, the question in Pedro T. was what happens when a defendant commits a new offense (in Pedro’s case, vehicle theft under section 10851) during a time when the penalty had been temporarily increased by the Legislature, with a sunset provision that would revert the available punishment to its previous status in the event the Legislature chose not to extend or remove the sunset provision.
In Pedro’s case, Vehicle Code section 10851 had been amended (before he committed his crime) to increase the range of punishment from a 16-month, 2-year, 3-year triad to a 2-year, 3-year, 4-year triad. He committed his crime under the new triad. During the course of the juvenile court’s efforts to rehabilitate the minor, he reached the limits of the court’s patience and was committed to the California Youth Authority for a term that was based on the increased tier.
While Pedro was serving his time, the sun set and the penalty range reverted to the former lower triad. Because his judgment was not final (he was still under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, which could modify his disposition at any time), he sought to have his term lowered in keeping with the newly restored lower range, relying on In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740.
You may recall that Estrada firmly established the presumption that, in the absence of clear indication that the Legislature intended otherwise, ameliorative legislation is retroactive to any person whose judgment was not final when it took effect.
Pedro T. points out a very important aspect of Estrada: “The basis of our decision in Estrada was our quest for legislative intent.”
In other words, Estrada does NOT establish a rule that ameliorative provisions apply retroactively to defendants whose judgments are final. Instead, it holds that the courts will assume that the Legislature meant amelioration to apply to any that it could, UNLESS there is something that indicates that the Legislature did NOT intend it to apply retroactively.
So why didn’t the Supreme Court agree with Pedro that he should get the benefit of the reduced tier? “Ordinarily when an amendment lessens the punishment for a crime, one may reasonably infer the Legislature has determined imposition of a lesser punishment on offenders thereafter will sufficiently serve the public interest. In the case of a “sunset” provision attached to a temporary enhancement of penalty, the same inference cannot so readily be drawn.” (Pedro T., at p. 1045.)
The court noted the practical effect of a contrary rule. The purpose of increasing the triad was to make the consequences more severe so the average car thief would be discouraged from stealing cars. (I have thoughts running through my mind trying to pinpoint clients I had who refrained from misconduct because they carefully considered the penalty that potentially could be inflicted were they to be caught. I’m even trying to think whether I ever had a client who thought he (or she) might be caught. Nope, can’t think of any. But surly there must be SOME people who were willing to steal cars when the range was 16-2-3 but decided it wasn’t worth it when the penalty rose to 2-3-4. I suppose I simply never met the ones who didn’t do the crime because they didn’t want to do THAT much more time.)
But I digressed. Sorry ’bout that. The practical effect stated by Pedro T. is that a three-year legislative experiment in enhanced penalties might be seriously undermined if those penalties, instead of applying to all offenders during the three years, could be imposed only on those whose convictions became final before the sunset date. A rule that retroactively lessened the sentence imposed on an offender pursuant to a sunset clause would provide a motive for delay and manipulation in criminal proceedings. When the Legislature signals, years in advance, its intention to reduce the punishment for an offense, defendant and counsel have a strong incentive to delay the finality of a judgment in the hope of eventually receiving the lessened, postsunset term.
All in all, then, the Pedro T. majority (four of the seven justices; there was a dissenting opinion by Justice Arabian, in which Justices Kennard and Mosk concurred) concluded that it was the intent of the Legislature that all persons convicted of committing the crime during the three years of the increased triad were to be punished with that triad in mind, and the reversion to the lower triad was not to be considered retroactive to those whose judgments were not final when the sun set and the penalty lowered to its former self.
Many years ago (2013 and 2014), I wrote a few articles in the Forum (the publication produced by the California Attorneys For Criminal Justice) tracing the development of Estrada. Four cases were decided at that time, with variations on whether the factual scenario supported retroactivity.
In re Daup (1965) 63 Cal.2d 754 had the same result as Estrada. Daup escaped from prison at a time when the penalty for escape without force or violence was a term in prison of not less than one year (meaning the maximum was life). Prior to his trial, the statute was amended and the penalty for that crime was six months to five years in prison. Mr. Daup got the benefit of the reduction.
In re Griffin (1965) 63 Cal.2d 757, reiterated the holding in Estrada, but found that the statute in question was not ameliorative as to the defendant. The defendant had been sentenced to prison for 10 years to life on the current drug offense (Health & Saf. Code, sec. 11351) because he had a prior conviction of a type that triggered that sentence. Before judgment was final, however, the Legislature lowered the term to five years to life, but increased the minimum time that must be served before the inmate could be paroled. Thus, it ameliorated the punishment in some respects, and increased it in others. Since he had already been paroled, application of retroactivity would actually have sent him back to prison because he had been paroled earlier than under the new law. The Court concluded that the overall effect of the change in the law was harsher, and declined to apply it to the defendant. I’d like to say I’ve often wondered whether the result would have been different had he not yet been paroled. But I can’t honestly say I’ve often wondered about it. Maybe just once or twice?
In re Kirk (1965) 63 Cal.2d 761 again upheld the presumption in Estrada, and reached the same result as Estrada. He committed his theft when the felony trigger was $50 (less than would be petty theft, a misdemeanor), and he’d stolen $75. Before his judgment became final, though, the threshold rose to $100. The Supreme Court deemed the change applicable to him, reducing his offense from felony to misdemeanor status.
Note that all four cases arose by way of habeas corpus petitions. Back in the day, the judges did not set felony sentences when probation was not granted. If not granted probation, the person was sentence to imprisonment in the state prison for the term prescribed by law. Assault with a deadly weapon carried a penalty of six months to life. Assault with intent to kill (under section 217, which was repealed decades ago) carried 1 year to 14 years. In Daup’s case, the penalty changed from “a term in prison of not less than one year,” which meant potentially a life term. Then it was changed to six months to five years.
The Adult Authority was the body that decided when a prisoner could be released on parole. When the Determinate Sentence Law (DSL) was enacted in 1976-1977, the terms specified as the tiers were based on the terms that normally had been fixed by the Adult Authority for release on parole. Or at least, the practices were examined and were influential in decisions on the triads.
Did you know that for a short time, until around 1978, second degree murder was assigned a range of 5-6-7 years under the Determinate Sentence Law? If you have a cold case pop up, it’s very important to look at the exact statutes in effect at the time of the offense. Until the early 1980s, life terms could not be ordered to be served consecutively. Who knew, eh? For a few years back in the day, if a defendant on a wobbler was committed to the California Youth Authority, it immediately rendered the offense a misdemeanor. There was no requirement of successful completion. Also, there were limitations on the combined length of determinate terms where consecutive sentences were imposed. Every hear of “double the base term”? Or five-year limitations on prior prison term enhancements?
I have no official source for the following claim, and I have no idea whether it is even remotely true, but I heard that prosecutors and judges approached the Legislature in at least the 1980s and 1990s to do away with as many of the limitations as possible because the DSL was too complicated. Seriously? Anyone read the tax codes and successfully get them simplified? Again, I do NOT know whether that claim has any truth. It may be simply a result of myths and legends generated by and kept alive by defense attorneys lamenting the loss.
And in my admittedly biased opinion, the DSL was nowhere nearly as complex as some of the “hard on crime and criminals” statutes that were enacted in the decades since.
It has been refreshing (again, I’m biased) to see the reasonable move by the Legislature in recent years to restore justice over vengeance (yes, “meow”) to the extent it (and the initiative process as well, I guess) has.