Error and/or relief
The court imposed separate punishments for an indivisible course of conduct. We conclude that all but one of the offenses was temporally distinct and served an independent objective, separate punishments were appropriate. We agree that the defendant broke down victim’s door as part of the robbery, as he had no separate motive to break it. We direct that the one-year sentence for vandalism of the door be stayed.
First Holding:
An act or omission that is punishable in different ways by different provisions of law may be punished under either of such provisions, but in no case shall the act or omission be punished under more than one provision. Section 654 thus precludes multiple punishments for a single act or indivisible course of conduct. If a single action or course of conduct by a defendant violates multiple laws, the distinct crimes may be charged in separate counts and may result in multiple verdicts of guilt, but the trial court may impose sentence for only one offense and must stay the sentence for the others.
Authority:
PEN 654
People v. Hester (2000) 22 Cal.4th 290, 294
People v. Sek (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 657, 673
Second Holding:
The question of whether section 654 is factually applicable to a given series of offenses is for the trial court, and the law gives the trial court broad latitude in making this determination. Whether a course of criminal conduct is divisible depends on the intent and objective of the actor. If a defendant harbored multiple criminal objectives, which were independent of and not merely incidental to each other, he may be punished for each statutory violation committed in pursuit of each objective, even though the violations shared common acts or were parts of an otherwise indivisible course of conduct. Multiple punishments are also permissible where the offenses are temporally separated in such a way as to afford the defendant opportunity to reflect and to renew his or her intent before committing the next one, thereby aggravating the violation of public security or policy already undertaken and creating a new risk of harm.
Authority:
People v. DeVaughn (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1092, 1113
People v. Jackson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 269, 354
People v. Harrison (1989) 48 Cal.3d 321, 335
People v. Gaynor (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 794, 800, 804
Third Holding:
We review for substantial evidence the trial court’s express or implied findings regarding the defendant’s intent and objective viewing the trial court’s determination in the light most favorable to the respondent and presuming the existence of every fact the court could reasonably deduce from the evidence. We will uphold the court’s findings in support of its determination if substantial evidence supports them.
Authority:
People v. Vasquez (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 732, 737
People v. Jones (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1143
People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 730–731