Error and/or relief
On this appeal from the defendant’s resentencing under section 1172.75, the matter is remanded for the court to exercise its discretion on whether to resentence the defendant under the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012.
First Holding:
Under the Three Strikes law as originally enacted in 1994, an individual convicted of a felony offense following two prior convictions for serious or violent felonies was subject to an indeterminate term of life imprisonment with a minimum term of no less than 25 years. The Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012 lessened the prescribed sentence for a third strike defendant whose current offense was not a serious or violent felony. It included a retrospective provision – section 1172.126 – that provides relief to prisoners already serving third strike sentences where the third strike was not a serious or violent felony.
Authority:
People v. Conley (2016) 63 Cal.4th 646, 651, 652
People v. Superior Court (Kaulick) (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1279, 1292
Second Holding:
In 2021, the Legislature enacted section 1172.75 that invalidates certain sentencing enhancements and requires courts to recall sentences with those enhancements and resentence them by applying any changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion so as to eliminate disparity of sentences and promote uniformity of sentencing
Authority:
PEN 1172.75
Third Holding:
The Reform Act applies at a section 1172.75 resentencing if section 1170.126’s substantive requirements are satisfied, including the following: (1) the defendant is eligible under the Reform Act; and (2) the trial court does not determine that resentencing the defendant would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. Eligibility for resentencing must be decided on a count-by-count basis. A defendant is ineligible under the Reform Act if he was armed with a firearm during the offense for which the third strike sentence was imposed.
As to the public safety component, the People must prove the facts upon which the determination is based by a preponderance of the evidence. Relevant factors include: (1) the defendant’s criminal conviction history, including the type of crimes committed, the extent of injury to victims, the length of prior prison commitments, the remoteness of the crimes; (2) the defendant’s disciplinary record and record of rehabilitation while incarcerated; and (3) any other evidence the court, within its discretion, determines to be relevant in deciding whether a new sentence would result in an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.
Authority:
PEN 1170.126
People v. Superior Court (Guevara) (2025) 18 Cal.5th 838, 850, 852, 878
People v. Johnson (2015) 61 Cal.4th 674, 688
People v. Estrada (2017) 3 Cal.5th 661, 669
Fourth Holding:
Defendants are entitled to sentencing decisions made in the exercise of the informed discretion of the sentencing court. When a court is unaware of the scope of its discretionary powers, the appropriate remedy is to remand for resentencing unless the record clearly indicates that the trial court would have reached the same conclusion even if it had been aware that it had such discretion.
In applying the clearly indicates test, it is almost always speculative for a reviewing court to say what the sentencing court would have done if it had known the scope of its discretionary powers at the time of sentencing. Remand for resentencing is required unless the sentencing court (1) announced it was aware of forthcoming legislation and explained how it would exercise its discretion under that legislation or (2) made “the kind of definitive statements to clearly indicate it would not impose a lesser sentence under any circumstances.
Authority:
People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1391
People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 776
Fifth Holding:
The trial court’s focus on defendant’s public safety risk was under Romero and section 1385(c). Those standards do not cover the section 1170.126(g) standard for purposes of satisfying the clearly indicates test. Under section 1385(c), the court has discretion to dismiss an enhancement unless there is a likelihood that the dismissal of the enhancement would result in physical injury or other serious danger to others.
This likelihood standard is not equivalent to or inclusive of the unreasonable risk of danger to public safety standard described in section 1170.126 for purposes of the clearly indicates test. And in denying the defendant’s request to dismiss his prior strikes under Romero, the trial court operated under a circumscribed power to depart from the sentencing norm established by the Three Strikes law. The circumstances had to be extraordinary for defendant to be deemed to fall outside the spirit of that law.
Authority:
People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497
People v. Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024, 1029
People v. Buford (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 886, 902-903
People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 378
People v. Mayfield (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 1096, 1105
Sixth Holding:
On remand, the trial court may consider the entire sentencing scheme given the inherently integrated nature of felony sentencing for a multiple-count conviction.
Authority:
People v. Burbine (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 1250, 1257-1258
People v. Valenzuela (2019) 7 Cal.5th 415, 424-425 [the full resentencing rule allows a court to revisit all prior sentencing decisions when resentencing a defendant]