I think these are some of the retired stunt doubles from the famous Hitchcock movie filmed in Bodega and Bodega Bay more than 60 years ago.
And this is the third and final installment of today’s blurbs. (Remember, I’m breaking this into parts because it may facilitate searches–if I ever master that piece. Not to mention–but I will anyway–who has time to read a single post of nearly 5,000 words?)
So here’s what we have on the sub-sub-menu today (sorry folks, not sandwiches):
Summary
Remand for full resentencing because the trial court failed to conduct a full resentencing as required by section 1172.75.
A probation condition was held to be overbroad.
Yet another abstract of judgment needed correction.
Case: 000113
The trial court erred in finding the defendant was ineligible for a full resentencing hearing under section 1172.75, because his judgment includes a now-invalid prison prior and thus the court’s order must be reversed. [The court had imposed and stayed the one-year prior prison term.]
Holding: Section 1172.75 entitles a defendant to resentencing if the underlying judgment includes a prior-prison-term enhancement that was imposed before January 1, 2020, regardless of whether the enhancement was then executed or instead stayed. [See] People v. Rhodius (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1050.
Case: 000114
The condition of probation that prohibits the defendant from “frequent[ing] any area where gang members are known by him/her to congregate, or areas known by him/her for gang related activity” is overbroad and can be more narrowly tailored by allowing the defendant’s probation officer to specify the areas involving gang-related activity. Accordingly, we modify the condition of probation that currently states that the defendant “shall not associate with any person known to him/her as a gang member and shall not frequent any area where gang members are known by him/her to congregate, or areas known by him/her for gang related activity.” The condition is modified to read that the defendant “shall not associate with any person known to him/her as a gang member and shall not frequent any areas specified by his probation officer as involving gang-related activity, subject to reasonable exceptions to accommodate family, work, and educational needs as determined by his probation officer.”
First Holding: The court’s discretion of the court to impose conditions of probation is not boundless. The authority is wholly statutory, and the statute furnishes and limits the measure of authority which the court may exercise. A condition of probation will not be held invalid unless it (1) has no relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct which is not reasonably related to future criminality. Conversely, a condition of probation that requires or forbids conduct which is not itself criminal is valid if that conduct is reasonably related to the crime of which the defendant was convicted or to future criminality. [See] PC 1203.1; People v. Cervantes (1984) 154 Cal.App.3d 353, 356; People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481, 486.
Second Holding: The Lent test is conjunctive—all three prongs must be satisfied before a reviewing court will invalidate a probation term. As such, even if a condition of probation has no relationship to the crime of which a defendant was convicted and involves conduct that is not itself criminal, the condition is valid as long as the condition is reasonably related to preventing future criminality. [See] People v. Moran (2016) 1 Cal.5th 398, 403.
Third Holding: As to the third prong of Lent, courts may properly base probation conditions upon information in a probation report that raises concerns about future criminality unrelated to a prior offense. But the third prong “contemplates a degree of proportionality between the burden imposed by a probation condition and the legitimate interests served by the condition. [See] In re Ricardo P. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1113, 1122; People v. Lopez (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 615, 626 [relying on information in probation report for gang-related condition].
Fourth Holding: Probation is a privilege and not a right, and adult probationers, in preference to incarceration, validly may consent to limitations upon their constitutional rights. [See] People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 384.
Fifth Holding: A probation condition that infringes a constitutional right is permissible if necessary to serve the dual purpose of rehabilitation and public safety. However, a probation condition that imposes limitations on a person’s constitutional rights must closely tailor those limitations to the purpose of the condition to avoid being invalidated as unconstitutionally overbroad. The essential question in an overbreadth challenge is the closeness of the fit between the legitimate purpose of the restriction and the burden it imposes on the defendant’s constitutional rights—bearing in mind, of course, that perfection in such matters is impossible, and that practical necessity will justify some infringement. [See] People v. Burden (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 1277, 1281; People v. Salvador (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 57, 62-63; In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 890; In re E.O. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1149, 1153.
Sixth Holding: In Victor L., the defendant challenged for overbreadth and vagueness a condition of probation ordering him to stay away from areas known by him for gang-related activity. The court distinguished between probation restrictions encompassing areas known for gang related crimes (which other courts had upheld against constitutional challenges) from restrictions involving gang-related activity. Noting the word ‘activity’ is one of surpassing breadth that could banish the defendant from the area in which he lived, worked, or went to school, Victor L. determined that an individualized list of stay away areas, together with any exceptions necessary to reasonably accommodate the defendant’s legitimate work and educational needs was required. Victor L. reasoned a probation officer, rather than the trial court, was in a better position to identify the forbidden areas for each defendant, using either geographic or activity-based limits. Victor L. modified the condition to prohibit the defendant’s presence in areas known by him for gang-related activity (or specified by his probation officer as involving gang-related activity). Other courts have imposed similar gang-area restrictions. [See] In re Victor L. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 902, 913-918, 931-932; People v. Barajas (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 748, 754-760 [affirming condition that stated that the defendant was not to visit or remain in any specific location which he knows to be or which the probation officer informs him to be an area of criminal street gang-related activity]; In re H.C. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1067, 1072 [It would be altogether preferable to name the actual geographic area that would be prohibited to the minor and then to except from that certain kinds of travel, that is, to school or to work].
Case: 000115
We conclude that the abstract of judgment must be modified to accurately reflect the defendant’s presentence custody credits and his sentence on the attempted murder count. We accordingly modify the judgment to correct these sentencing errors and affirm the judgment as modified.
First Holding: While a defendant sentenced to life in prison with the possibility of parole becomes eligible for parole after serving seven years, the correct sentence to be imposed remains life with the possibility of parole, plus any determinate enhancements. The abstract of judgment, which currently describes the sentence on the attempted murder with premeditation and deliberation as “seven years to life,” must be corrected accordingly. [See] PC 3046(a)(1); PC 664(a); People v. Wong (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 972, 977, fn. 4 [shorthand pronouncement of seven years to life where statutory term is life with the possibility of parole is incorrect because it indicates a minimum term exists, rather than a minimum parole eligibility].
Second Holding: The trial court miscalculated the credit for time served. The defendant is entitled to three additional days, and the abstract of judgment must be modified accordingly. [GARY NOTE: The court did not provide any authority for this correction, most likely because it is so obvious that it must be corrected. Authorities supporting the court’s order (but not cited by the court) could include PC 2900.5 and People v. Smith (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 523, 527.]