Who doesn’t really like purple flowers? Among my favorite!
Okay, I’ve promised previews. I’m going back in time to add the pre-summary summaries. In this Eighth post, we get treated by the following:
If the evidence doesn’t support the greater offense, it may modify the judgment to reflect a conviction for a lesser included offense;
It is important that minute orders and abstracts of judgment reflect what the judge actually ordered;
Restitution fines are not collectible after 10 years;
The trial court must choose the correct triad for a determinate sentence;
Probation conditions must be adequately specific and reasonable (timely objections may be critical);
One is entitled to full resentencing under section 1172.75 even if the now-invalid enhancement for prior prison terms was never executed;
A judge cannot unilaterally fine a defendant for an uncharged infraction where the process must instead be initiated by the prosecution.
Case: 000040
Two of the convictions for a lewd act upon a child of 14 or 15 years must be reversed because there was insufficient evidence that victim was under 16 years old at the time of the crimes. The People concede and ask us to modify the verdicts to the lesser included and affirm as modified. Remanded for full resentencing.
Holding: Where the appellate court finds there is insufficient evidence to support a conviction for a greater offense, it may modify the judgment of conviction to reflect a conviction for a lesser included offense.” [See] People v. Ellis (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 590, 601.
Case: 000041
At the resentencing hearing conducted after the remittitur issued, the trial court declined to strike or reduce the Penal Code section 12022.53, subdivision (d) firearm enhancement and reimposed the sentence of 50 years to life. The parties agree that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to conduct the earlier hearing (while the appeal was up in higher court, the trial court permitted the prosecution to file new circumstance in aggravation) and the matter must be remanded for a new resentencing hearing. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a new sentencing hearing conducted in accordance with Senate Bill 567.
First Holding: It is well established that “[t]he filing of a valid notice of appeal vests jurisdiction of the cause in the appellate court until determination of the appeal and issuance of the remittitur.” [See] People v. Perez (1979) 23 Cal.3d 545, 554; People v. Burhop (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 808, 813.
Second Holding: This jurisdictional rule serves to “protect the appellate court’s jurisdiction by preserving the status quo until the appeal is decided,” and “prevents the trial court from rendering an appeal futile by altering the appealed judgment . . . by conducting other proceedings that may affect it.” [See] People v. Awad (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 215, 224.;
Third Holding: During the premature hearing, the trial court permitted the prosecution to amend the information to add a factor in aggravation pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 4.421(b)(1), and accepted defendant’s waiver of his right to trial and admission to the new allegation. Because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to conduct this hearing, all proceedings conducted during that hearing—including the amendment of the information and defendant’s subsequent admission—are null and void. [See] People v. Williams (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 436, 446-447.
Case: 000042
The matter is remanded for the trial court to correct the nunc pro tunc minute order dated in 2024 to reflect that in 2022, the defendant was resentenced pursuant to section 1170. The judgment is otherwise affirmed. The minute order incorrectly reflects that in 2022, the defendant was resentenced pursuant to sections 1172.7 and 1172.75, and must be corrected to reflect that he was resentenced pursuant to section 1170.
Holding: The matter is remanded for the trial court to correct the nunc pro tunc minute order dated October 24, 2024, to reflect that on January 26, 2022, the defendant was resentenced pursuant to section 1170.
[GARY NOTE: The court did not cite authority other than that both parties agreed, but generally speaking, the minute order must be amended to conform to the oral pronouncement. See People v. Price (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 224, 242 [“Any discrepancy between the minutes and the oral pronouncement of a sentence is presumed to be the result of clerical error. Thus, the oral pronouncement of sentence prevails in cases where it deviates from that recorded in the minutes.”]; People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185 [holding reviewing courts have the inherent power on appeal to correct clerical errors found in court records, such as may be found in abstracts of judgment, whether on the court’s own motion or upon application of the parties]; accord People v. Jones (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1, 89.]
Case: 000043
The judgments in both defendants’ cases are modified to vacate the restitution fine imposed pursuant to section 1202.4.
First Holding: Restitution fines are no longer collectible 10 years after their imposition. [See] Effective January 1, 2025, Penal Code section 1465.9 was amended to add subdivision (d), which provides, “Upon the expiration of 10 years after the date of imposition of a restitution fine pursuant to Section 1202.4, the balance, including any collection fees, shall be unenforceable and uncollectible and any portion of a judgment imposing those fines shall be vacated.” (Stats. 2024, ch. 805, § 1.).
Second Holding: Any remaining amount on their restitution fines should now be vacated. [See] People v. Greeley (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 609, 626-627 [interpreting Gov. Code, § 6111, subd. (a), providing that as of July 1, 2021, “the unpaid balance of any court-imposed costs” pursuant to specified statutes “is unenforceable and uncollectable and any portion of a judgment imposing those costs shall be vacated”].
Case: 000044
The appellate court corrected the sentence to the correct term (16 months not 2 years), running some counts concurrent per the trial court order rather than consecutive per the abstract of judgment, and corrected the abstract to include several fees and fines that were imposed.
First Holding: The abstract and minute order must be corrected to reflect that the “one third of the midterm” pronounced by the judge should have been 16 months, not two years, because the middle term for the offense is four years, not six years. [See] People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185 [holding reviewing courts have the inherent power on appeal to correct clerical errors found in court records, such as may be found in abstracts of judgment, whether on the court’s own motion or upon application of the parties]; accord People v. Jones (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1, 89.
Second Holding: Because the minute order incorrectly states that the sentences were to run consecutively, rather than concurrently as actually ordered by the court, the minute order must be corrected, as the oral pronouncement controls. [See] People v. Price (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 224, 242 [“Any discrepancy between the minutes and the oral pronouncement of a sentence is presumed to be the result of clerical error. Thus, the oral pronouncement of sentence prevails in cases where it deviates from that recorded in the minutes.”
Third Holding: The appellate court may correct the amount imposed by the superior court for specified assessments whose amounts are mandatory. [See] People v. Castellanos (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1524, 1530 [“Because the seven additional assessments, surcharge, and penalties are mandatory, their omission may be corrected for the first time on appeal”].
Case: 000045
On appeal, the minor contends that the electronics search conditions should be stricken as unreasonable under People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481 or, at a minimum, modified as unconstitutionally overbroad. He also maintains that the association condition should be modified due to its overbreadth. We find the electronics search conditions reasonable under Lent, but we accept the People’s concession that they are unconstitutionally overbroad. We see no constitutional infirmity in the association condition. We therefore remand the matter to the trial court to strike or modify the electronics search condition. Remanded to modify terms 9 and 16.
First Holding: The failure to object to a probation condition as unreasonable under Lent generally forfeits the contention on appeal. And only facial constitutional challenges to a probation condition that are “capable of correction without reference to the particular sentencing record” are exempt from the general forfeiture rule. [See] People v. Welch (1993) 5 Cal.4th 228, 234-235, 237; In re P.O. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 288, 294; In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 887.
Second Holding: The court may nevertheless exercise its discretion to consider the merits of both his Lent and constitutional claims in light of the People’s concession and the minor’s alternative contention that his trial counsel’s failure to make an adequate objection constituted ineffective assistance. [See] People v. Mattson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 826, 854 [considering issues not raised in trial court to forestall later claim of constitutionally inadequate representation]; People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161, fn. 6 [appellate courts may reach unpreserved questions].
Third Holding: Under People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481, a condition of probation “will not be held invalid unless it ‘(1) has no relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct which is not reasonably related to future criminality. The Lent test is conjunctive—all three prongs must be satisfied before a reviewing court will invalidate a probation term. We find dispositive the first element of Lent’s test, which “asks whether the probation condition has no relationship to the conviction.” Here, the record supports an implied finding that there was a relationship between the offense and minor’s use of an electronic device and the internet. [See] People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 379; People v. Patton (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 934, 945; see Lent, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 486.
Fourth Holding: In applying the Lent test, we review the conditions imposed for abuse of discretion. [See] In re Ricardo P. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1113, 1118; People v. Salvador (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 57, 62, 64.
Fifth Holding: We review constitutional overbreadth questions de novo. [See] In re P.O. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 288, at p. 297.
Sixth Holding: The electronic search conditions here were overly broad. [See] People v. O’Neil (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1351, 1355 [“If a probation condition serves to rehabilitate and protect public safety, the condition may ‘impinge upon a constitutional right otherwise enjoyed by the probationer, who is “not entitled to the same degree of constitutional protection as other citizens.” ’ ” ]; In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 890 [“A probation condition that imposes limitations on a person’s constitutional rights must closely tailor those limitations to the purpose of the condition to avoid being invalidated as unconstitutionally overbroad.”]; In re E.O. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1149, 1153 [“The essential question in an overbreadth challenge is the closeness of the fit between the legitimate purpose of the restriction and the burden it imposes on the defendant’s constitutional rights—bearing in mind, of course, that perfection in such matters is impossible, and that practical necessity will justify some infringement.”];
Case: 000046, Case: 000047, and Case: 000048
[GARY’S NOTE: All three cases held exactly the same and are lumped together here.] Pursuant to Rhodius, we therefore reverse the trial court’s order denying defendant a resentencing hearing, and remand for the court to hold that hearing
Holding: People v. Rhodius (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1050 resolved a split of authority among the Courts of Appeal regarding resentencing eligibility when a defendant’s sentence for a prior prison enhancement (see former § 667.5, subd. (b)) was stayed and never executed. Rhodius held that defendants whose enhanced prison prior term or terms were stayed at sentencing are eligible for resentencing under section 1172.75. [See] People v. Rhodius (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1050.;
Case 000049 There is no Case 000049]
Case: 000050
The trial court erred in imposing a $100 infraction fine after defendant failed to submit a firearm relinquishment form. Here, the People did not charge or approve the charging of an infraction for failure to file a completed Prohibited Persons Relinquishment Form. Nevertheless, the trial court found that defendant did not file the required form and imposed the $100 fine. As the People concede, “[t]his was beyond its power to do.” We will modify the judgment to strike the fine.
First Holding: The court may not unilaterally fine a defendant for failing to complete a firearms relinquishment form. The process requires first that a prosecutor file a complaint alleging violation of Penal Code section 29810. Penal Code section 29810 requires persons convicted of a felony to relinquish all firearms within a prescribed period of time following the conviction. Section 29810, subdivision (c)(5): Failure by a defendant to timely file the completed Prohibited Persons Relinquishment Form with the assigned probation officer shall constitute an infraction punishable by a fine not exceeding one hundred dollars ($100).
Second Holding: Due process of law requires that criminal prosecutions be instituted through the regular processes of law. These regular processes include the requirement that the institution of any criminal proceeding be authorized and approved by the district attorney. [See] People v. Villatoro (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 365, 369.