There’s a moon out tonight!
A summary, even thought it’s a bit wintry out there today.
For those on a low-word diet, I present the following summary of summaries:
Abstracts of judgments need to be correct.
Don’t forget to look into statutes of limitations–there still are some.
When a nonappealable order might actually be appealable, depending on the court’s treatment of it.
A defendant may find it advantageous to insist on being prosecuted under a statute that is more specific than the general statute. (The case doesn’t discuss it, but it’s always wise to use caution when asking for what you are entitled to. It might not always be the best course. Not applicable in this case, just sayin’.)
It’s not our first Rhodius.
There’s a case with a gazillion issues, including changes in gang activity statutes and the Racial Justice Act.
With rare exception of a bare fact of a prior conviction, factors that increase a punishment for the crime must be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, in the absence of a stipulation.
Case: 000075
For the reasons set forth below, we affirm with instructions to modify the abstract of judgment. The trial court clerk shall prepare an amended abstract of judgment to reflect appellant’s conviction of second degree murder and forward a copy to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. In all other aspects, the judgment is affirmed.
Holding: The abstract of judgment incorrectly states that the conviction was for murder in the first degree, whereas it was actually for murder in the section degree. The People agree that an error in the classification of appellant’s conviction exists and that we have the authority to correct this error. [See] People v. Taylor (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 628, 647.
Case: 000076
The charge for violating a protective order was barred by the statute of limitations. We therefore vacate defendant’s conviction for violating a criminal protective order but otherwise affirm the judgment.
Holding: The misdemeanor violating a criminal protective order (§ 166, subd. (c)(1)) must be vacated because it is barred by the applicable one-year statute of limitations [See] PC 802; People v. Williams (1999) 21 Cal.4th 335, 338, 341.
Case: 000077
The defendant won only that the 1172.1 denial was appealable under these circumstances. The appellate court affirmed the denial of the request for resentencing. The defendant appealed from the trial court’s denial of his petition for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.1. For the reasons discussed in the opinion, the appellate court found that the trial court’s order was appealable in this instance. However, it concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to recall and resentence the defendant and affirm the order denying the defendants petition.
First Holding: The steps taken by the court in this instance, mirroring those it would take had the petition been submitted by an entity with the right to submit a petition for recall (appointment of counsel, holding of a contested hearing, and the merits-based comments denying the request) affected the defendant’s substantial rights, and in this instance, the order is appealable. [See] People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 375 [noting that even if a defendant does not have the right to petition for relief, he does have the right to “invite the court to exercise its power” to do so and may raise a trial court’s failure to do so on appeal].
Second Holding: The right to appeal is statutory only, and a party may not appeal a trial court’s judgment, order or ruling unless such is expressly made appealable by statute. [See] People v. Loper (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1155, 1159.
Third Holding: Ordinarily, the defendant has no right to appeal from either inaction by the court on or its denial of a defendant’s invitation to recall the sentence under section 1172.1 [See] People v. Hodge (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 985; People v. Faustinos (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 687; People v. Raoy (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 991; People v. Brinson (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 1040.
Fourth Holding: While a defendant may invite the court to recall the sentence under PC 1170.1, the defendant has no right to petition for recall under section 1170.1, and the court is not required to respond to such an invitation or to consider the request at all . [See] PC 1172.1; People v. Hodge (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 985.
Fifth Holding: An appellate court has an independent obligation to assure itself of its own jurisdiction. [See] Doe v. Regents of University of California (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 282, 291.
Case: 000078
The defendant was improperly prosecuted under Penal Code section 594, rather than Penal Code section 4600, for damaging two safety cells while on special watch. Section 594 generally prohibits malicious damage to property not one’s own in cases other than those specified by state law. In contrast, section 4600 specifically addresses the destruction or injury of jail or prison property by an inmate. Accordingly, we reverse the conviction and remand the matter to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion, including any retrial the People may elect to pursue.
First Holding: The defendant’s conviction for felony vandalism under section 594 was improper, as a more specific statute was available. [See] PC 594; PC 4600.
Second Holding: When a general statute includes conduct covered by a more specific statute, prosecution must proceed under the specific statute. This principle, known as the Williamson rule, prevents the government from circumventing legislative intent by charging a defendant under a broader statute carrying a harsher penalty. [See] In re Williamson (1954) 43 Cal.2d 651, 654; People v. Murphy (2011) 52 Cal.4th 81, 86.
Third Holding: The Legislature’s intent was to exclude from section 594’s scope conduct addressed by other, more specific statutes, such as section 4600’s prohibition against damaging jail property. Reading the two provisions together gives effect to both and avoids rendering section 4600 superfluous, consistent with well-settled rules of statutory construction. [See] Imperial Merchant Services, Inc. v. Hunt (2009) 47 Cal.4th 381, 390 [“ ‘[s]tatutes must be interpreted, if possible, to give each word some operative effect[,]’ ” meaning that we should not “ ‘construe statutory provisions so as to render them superfluous’ ”]; Shoemaker v. Myers (1990) 52 Cal.3d 1, 22 [“We do not presume that the Legislature performs idle acts, nor do construe statutory provisions so as to render them superfluous”]; River’s Side at Washington Square Homeowners Assn. v. Superior Court (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 1209, 1228.
Case: 000079
The defendant is entitled to correction of the abstract of judgment to reflect the credit for time served orally pronounced.
Holding: Where there is a discrepancy between the oral pronouncement of judgment and the abstract of judgment, the oral pronouncement controls. The abstract of judgment must be corrected to reflet the credit for time served orally pronounced. [See] People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185-186.
Case: 000080
People v. Rhodius (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1050 (Rhodius). Rhodius resolved a split of authority among the Courts of Appeal regarding resentencing eligibility when a defendant’s sentence for a prior prison enhancement (see former § 667.5, subd. (b)) was stayed and never executed. Rhodius held that defendants whose enhanced prison prior term or terms were stayed at sentencing are eligible for resentencing under section 1172.75. Pursuant to Rhodius, we therefore reverse the trial court’s order denying defendant a resentencing hearing, and remand for the court to hold that hearing [NOT A DIRECT QUOTE–COPIED FROM ANOTHER OPIN ON THIS TOPIC]
Holding: A defendant is eligible for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.75 (pertaining to recent legislation that eliminated enhancement for certain prior convictions that resulted in prison terms) where the enhancement for the prior conviction had been imposed but stayed or stricken [See] People v. Rhodius (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1050.
Case: 000081
We agree with the parties that the gang offense must be reversed and the gang-related allegations must be vacated, and that the sentences on several witness dissuasion counts may be readdressed upon remand. We further agree with the defendant that the prosecution should not have been permitted to play and introduce two rap music videos under Evidence Code section 352, although we conclude that the error was harmless given our reversal of the gang offense and the vacation of the gang-related allegations. In addition, we find that the defendant has established a prima facie case that the prosecution violated the California Racial Justice Act by playing and using the rap music videos at trial, and we remand this matter to the trial court to conduct a hearing to determine if a violation of the California Racial Justice Act has been proven by a preponderance of the evidence.
First Holding: Assembly Bill 333 made the following changes: First, it narrowed the definition of a ‘criminal street gang’ to require that any gang be an ‘ongoing, organized association or group of three or more persons. [See] People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1206.
Second Holding: Second, whereas section 186.22, former subdivision (f) required only that a gang’s members individually or collectively engage in a pattern of criminal activity in order to constitute a criminal street gang, Assembly Bill 333 requires that any such pattern have been collectively engaged in by members of the gang. [See] People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1206.
Third Holding: Assembly Bill 333 also narrowed the definition of a pattern of criminal activity by requiring that (1) the last offense used to show a pattern of criminal gang activity occurred within three years of the date that the currently charged offense is alleged to have been committed; (2) the offenses were committed by two or more gang members, as opposed to just persons; (3) the offenses commonly benefitted a criminal street gang; and (4) the offenses establishing a pattern of gang activity must be ones other than the currently charged offense. [See] People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1206.
Fourth Holding: Fourth, Assembly Bill 333 narrowed what it means for an offense to have commonly benefitted a street gang, requiring that any common benefit be more than reputational. [See] People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1206.
Fifth Holding: [GARY NOTE: There were numerous other issues in the case and it’s best for you to simply read the case if you have a further interest, in which case contact me to get it to you.]
Sixth Holding: [GARY NOTE: There was extensive discussion of the Racial Justice Act and its implications to other problems in this case. Again, best to read the opinion, as a summary would be inadequate. Thus, the next Principle has been severely truncated from what could have been expressed in a tome.]
Seventh Holding: A violation of the Racial Justice Act (RJA) occurs when an attorney in the case exhibited bias or animus towards the defendant because of the defendant’s race, ethnicity, or national origin, among other circumstances. A central premise of the RJA is that bias can be unconscious and implied as well as conscious and express. [See] PC 745; Bonds v. Superior Court (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 821, 824
Case: 000082
The trial court prejudicially erred in imposing the upper term based on aggravating circumstances not proven in accordance with Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (b). We will vacate defendant’s sentence and remand the matter to the trial court for further litigation of the aggravating circumstances and resentencing.
First Holding: With the exception of prior conviction allegations, under the Sixth Amendment, any fact that exposes a defendant to a greater potential sentence must be found by a jury and established beyond a reasonable doubt. [See] People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 747 ; Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. 270, 281.
Second Holding: A Sixth Amendment violation occurs when the trial court relies on unproven aggravating facts to impose an upper term sentence, even if some other aggravating facts relied on have been properly established. [See] People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 768.
Third Holding: The United States Supreme Court rejected the argument that the prior conviction exception to the Sixth Amendment “permits a judge to find perhaps any fact related to a defendant’s past offenses. A judge may do no more, consistent with the Sixth Amendment, than determine what crime, with what elements, the defendant was convicted of. [See] Erlinger v. United States (2024) 602 U.S. 821, 837-838.
Fourth Holding: The aggravating circumstances were not proven in accordance with section 1170, subdivision (b)(2) and the prior conviction exception would not apply to them. [See] People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1083-1084 [“We understand Erlinger to require that any fact, beyond the bare fact of a prior conviction, that exposes a defendant to harsher punishment, must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt”].
Fifth Holding: A trial court’s reliance on aggravating circumstances not found in accordance with section 1170, subdivision (b) is prejudicial unless an appellate court can conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury would have found true all of the aggravating facts relied upon by the trial court to justify an upper term sentence, or that those facts were otherwise proved true in compliance with the current statutory requirements. If the reviewing court cannot so determine, applying the Chapman standard of review, the defendant is entitled to a remand for resentencing. [See] Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18; People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 768.
Sixth Holding: When assessing prejudice under Chapman, the proper inquiry is whether any rational fact finder could have come to the opposite conclusion. If a rational juror could have reached the opposite conclusion, the error is not harmless under Chapman. The People bear the burden of establishing that the federal constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt [See] People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1090.); People v. Avalos (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 926, 953.