This is an odd little brass (??) dish I found in my office decorations box when I was cleaning out in anticipation of my January 15, 2026, retirement. Something I bought at a “somebody must think it’s a treasure” used thingies store down the street, some time in the last several decades. I think the various surrounding decorations represent cigar bands, as the words “Flor de Lovera” and “Jose Lovera Company” are inscribed. Jose Lovera (1861-1928) apparently owned a cigar company. I’ve heard rock bands, ukulele bands, and blues bands, but I’m really curious to hear the sound of cigar bands.
Well, the previous post was short (if not sweet). This has only four cases in it, but as typical in many appeals, some have several different issues, or perhaps several different aspects that must be considered on a single overall issue.
Since the previous post was relatively short, and the current one wouldn’t otherwise win in a wordiness contest in competition with The Whale (the 1851 book, not the 2022 movie), I’m taking this opportunity to remind you a little about how I’m presenting the summaries. (And as I reached the end of drafting it, I see I do a little soapboxing as well.)
Reminder on How My Summaries Smush Concepts and Authorities Together
I’ve tried to explain on my “Posting Proclivities” page, but I think it bears reminding from time to time that the actual phrasing used in the opinion may be quite different from how I have put it together. In a typical opinion, the court might say something like,
Blah-di-blah-di blah (§ 2xx.6) “requires a Blah-di-blah-di blah in which the blah-di-blah-di blah blah-di-blah-di blahed . . . the blah-di-blah-di blah.’ (§ 2xx.6, subd. (b)(1)–(2); see People v.Somecase(199x) xx Cal.4th xx, yy–zz.)” (People v. Smothercase, supra, xx Cal.App.5th at p. abc.) The blah-di-blah-di blah may be of either blah-di-blah-di blah or blah-di-blah-di blum. (People v. Yetanotherdude (200x) xx Cal.4th yy, zzz.) ; [I]n a [Blah-di-blah-di blah (§ 2xx.6 or inkin for blinkin (§ 2xxx.5)] involving an associated crime, the jury should be instructed to consider whether the blah-di-blah-di blah was incidental to the commission of that crime in determining the blah de dum substantiality. . . . [S]uch consideration is relevant to determining whether more than one crime has been committed, and is amply supported by the case law.’ [Citation.] An associated crime for the purposes of Blah-di-blah-di blah ‘is any criminal act the defendant intends to commit where, in the course of its commission, the defendant also blah-di-blah-di blahs by force or fear against his or her will.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Howmanydudesarethere (20xx) xx Cal.App.5th abc, zzz.)
And the actual passage I took that format from goes on and on and on in that manner, citing principles important to multiple facets of the issues dealt with, and often quoting other cases’ quotations from yet third and fourth other nested citations.
All of that is critical to the court’s opinion. A well-crafted opinion is assailable only by disagreement in philosophy, and that will require a court or the Legislature to decide that what we’ve thought in the past we don’t or shouldn’t think in the future. So I’m not poking fun at those opinions when I substitute my blah-di-blah nonsensicals in there. I’ve promised to maintain as much anonymity as I can in my summaries, because I prefer that no one without a need to know can determine the identity of the parties and witnesses.
So by keeping the actual layout of the presentation of a portion of the opinion, my point is simply that a typical opinion will be loaded with ellipses, parentheses, brackets, section symbols, multiple layers of opening and closing quotation marks, supras, infras, case citations partial and complete (depending on if cited previously in the opinion), and then you may also have to deal with ids and ibids, cfs and op cits. The authors want to attribute their decision to established authority to show they’re not just making this stuff up as they go.
While that may make an airtight opinion, I don’t think a summary has to be so tight. Hence, I mash statements together and I try to remember to delete the attribution punctuation. I even may join phrases in a single sentence that actually appeared several sentences apart. While maintaining what I believe to be the essence of the holdings, I may not be simply pasting verbatim with only mild deletions. I try to make them as readable as I can, and that requires manipulation. (That said, there are instances where I have directly copied and pasted, without attribution and without quotation marks. I’m not claiming these holdings as my own– I’m condensing and summarizing and paraphrasing for readability.) As I have said elsewhere in this website as well as in the dozens of articles I have written, if you see something important, you have to read the opinion. (Which, as I have also said, I will provide to attorneys on individual request. You don’t have my email info probably when I upload this post, but it will follow after January 15, 2026.)
So what have I brought you today?
Summary of Summaries
A trial court forgot to impose and stay an enhancement and didn’t follow the correct procedure for imposing an aggregate sentence on the defendant’s two cases before the court.
Gotta remember to recalculate credit for time served when the defendant appears in the case for resentencing or modification of the judgment.
More than a quarter century later, a minor remains in custody for acts committed when he was only 14. We see how the trial court did not do right in initially denying the petition for recall under section 1170(d).
Another abstract of judgment needs correction.
Soapboxing
GARY NOTE: As an aside to that last reference to abstracts. I run across many, many cases where the abstracts of judgment are incorrect in ways that could harm the defendants’ interests. CDCR and parole authorities are going to accept what they see on the abstract of judgment as a true and accurate account. Errors might affect an inmate’s housing and job assignments and may even result in denial of the proper calculation for good behavior and work credits, not to mention result in depletion of inmate funds for the repaying of debts no longer or never owed. I personally believe attorneys should obtain a copy of the abstract of judgment and minute orders–because minute orders, too, have been seen to contain errors, and they, too, can be used to guide the decisions that affect inmates–and check out their accuracy immediately. Where wrong, it should be brought to the attention of the proper person or court to get the correction.
As an example of how something can go terribly wrong, suppose a defendant was convicted years ago of violating Penal Code section 245, which (at the time in my hypothetical) could be violated by assaulting a person EITHER by use of a deadly weapon OR by means likely to cause great bodily harm, because the then-wording of section 245 started out, “an assault upon the person of another with a deadly weapon or instrument other than a firearm or by any means of force likely to produce great bodily injury,” rather than having the two methods separated in different parts of the section as the section now reads. Decades later, the defendant commits a robbery, only his second offense ever. If the abstract of judgment erroneously indicates that his prior violation of section 245 was by use of a deadly weapon–rather than by means of force, as it actually was (in my hypothetical)–it would appear that the defendant would have a strike, resulting in a doubled sentence. Or if the defendant’s record was a bit worse and that old conviction is seen to count toward a total of two prior strikes, he’s possibly looking at a minimum of 25 years to life, depending on the nature of the new offense. All because of an incorrect abstract of judgment “proving” that he had that as a strike. Isn’t avoiding that risk worth securing a correct abstract of judgment and related minute orders? Okay, I see I’ve bent the planks in my soapbox, so I’ll dismount, for now.
Stop the Presses! Back up on the soapbox! Since the original drafting a few days ago, I have run across an unpublished case (Case 000300, so it may be a while before you see the summary) where the abstract of judgment incorrectly stated the defendant had been convicted of a serious or violent felony! The appellate court has ordered its correction, but my, my! That mistake might have resulted in all sorts of problems should the defendant ever be convicted of yet another crime in the future. Sure, I’m certain there are those out there who think people get what they deserve and shouldn’t complain when their poor judgment results in worse punishment than the law permits. That’s not how I feel, however. There’s enough injustice out there already, and the Legislature has spoken on what the punishment may be. There’s no call for someone to be subjected to beyond what the law permits. Okay, I’m done for now. I’ve worn out the soapbox so much it couldn’t qualify for a derby.
Case: 000091
Remand for resentencing is required because (1) the trial court erred by failing to impose and then stay execution of the sentence on the great bodily injury enhancement under Penal Code section 12022.7, subdivision (a); and (2) the trial court erred in failing to resentence the defendant to a single aggregate term of imprisonment for this case and another case for which he is serving a term of 24 years. We accept the People’s concession and remand the matter for resentencing.
First Holding: At sentencing, the trial court did not orally pronounce a sentence for the infliction of great bodily injury enhancement. The matter is accordingly remanded for the trial court to impose and stay execution of the three-year sentence on the Penal Code section 12022.7, subdivision (a) enhancement. [See] People v. Gonzalez (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1118, 1127-1130.).
Second Holding: When a defendant is convicted of multiple crimes in different cases and a consecutive term of imprisonment is imposed, the aggregate term for those cases is the sum of the principal term and subordinate term. In this instance, the trial court did not impose a single aggregated term. We will therefore remand for the trial court to do so. During resentencing, the trial court shall also award the appropriate custody credits for the aggregate term. [See] PC 1170.1; Rules of Court, rule 4.452 [setting forth the procedure for imposing consecutive sentencing under PC 1170.1].
Third Holding: During resentencing, the trial court shall award the appropriate custody credits for the aggregate term. [GARY NOTE: Court must recalculate credit for time served on resentencing] [See] GARY NOTE: People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 29, 37]; GARY NOTE: PC 2900.1].
Case: 000092
In 2023, the defendant filed a petition for recall and resentencing under Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (d). He was serving a sentence of more than 50 years to life for offenses committed when he was 14 and tried as an adult. We agree with the defendant that he adequately demonstrated he did not have prior juvenile felony adjudications for assault or other disqualifying felonies, contrary to the finding of the trial court. We agree that the prior offense was not adjudicated as a felony. Section 1170(d) requires that he satisfy at least one of the specified criteria, which he has. On that basis, we are compelled to reverse the order denying his petition for recall and resentencing.
First Holding: In light of the ban against cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment, in 2013 the Legislature created a procedure for a juvenile offender sentenced to life without the possibility of parole (LWOP) to petition for a recall of the offender’s sentence and resentencing after the offender has served at least 15 years of the sentence. [See] P C 1170(d); In re Kirchner (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1040, 1049; Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48; People v. Heard (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 608, 622–626.
Second Holding: There is a conflict. Some courts have held that it violates the constitutional promise of equal protection of the laws to deny relief under the statute to juvenile offenders sentenced to lengthy terms of years amounting to the functional equivalent of LWOP. Other courts have concluded that PC 3051 moots a juvenile defendant’s constitutional claim that he is serving a sentence that is the functional equivalent of LWOP. [See] People v. Sorto (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 435, 450–454; People v. Bagsby (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 1040, 1054–1061; People v. Cabrera (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 650, 653; People v. Ortega (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 1252, 1260; People v. Isayev (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 1117, 1123.
Third Holding: We apply the substantial evidence standard of review when considering disputed findings of fact made by trial courts. Under that standard of review, we review the record in the light most favorable to the order to determine whether the order is supported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is evidence that is of ponderable legal significance, reasonable in nature, credible, and of solid value, and substantial proof of the essentials which the law requires in a particular case. [See] People v. Munoz (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 499, 506–507; People v. Harring (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 483, 495; People v. James (1985) 176 Cal.App.3d 795, 798; Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1006.
Fourth Holding: Insofar as the defendant’s claims require us to interpret section 1170, subdivision (d), they present questions of statutory construction subject to de novo review. Statutory construction begins with the plain, commonsense meaning of the words in the statute, because it is generally the most reliable indicator of legislative intent and purpose. A statute is not to be read in isolation, but construed in context and with reference to the whole system of law of which it is a part so that all may be harmonized and have effect. If there is no ambiguity or uncertainty in the language, the Legislature is presumed to have meant what it said, and we need not resort to legislative history to determine the statute’s true meaning. [See] People v. Munoz (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 499, 506; People v. Harring (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 483, 495; People v. Heard (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 608, 622–623.
Fifth Holding: Penal Code section 1170(d) states that, when the defendant seeks relief under that section, the petition shall include the defendant’s statement that the defendant was under 18 years of age at the time of the crime and was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole, the defendant’s statement describing their remorse and work towards rehabilitation, and the defendant’s statement that one of the following is true: (A) The defendant was convicted pursuant to felony murder or aiding and abetting murder provisions of law; (B) The defendant does not have juvenile felony adjudications for assault or other felony crimes with a significant potential for personal harm to victims prior to the offense for which the sentence is being considered for recall; (C) The defendant committed the offense with at least one adult codefendant; (D) The defendant has performed acts that tend to indicate rehabilitation or the potential for rehabilitation, including, but not limited to, availing themselves of rehabilitative, educational, or vocational programs, if those programs have been available at their classification level and facility, using self-study for self-improvement, or showing evidence of remorse. [See] PC 1170(d).
Case: 000093
The clerk of the superior court is directed to correct the abstract of judgment to reflect that the court did not impose any prior-prison-term enhancements under section 667.5, subdivision (b). The clerk of the superior court is directed to forward copies of the corrected abstract of judgment to the CDCR.
First Holding: As the judge did not orally impose any prior-prison-term enhancements, section 1172.5 does not come into play, despite a reference to the priors in the abstract of judgment. [See] People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185.
Second Holding: Effective January 1, 2020, Senate Bill No. 136 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2019, ch. 590, § 1) amended section 667.5 to limit the enhancement to prior prison terms for sexually violent offenses (§ 667.5, subd. (b). [See] People v. Garcia (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 848, 854.; PC 667.5.
Third Holding: Effective January 1, 2022, Senate Bill No. 483 made the change retroactive to “all persons currently serving a term of incarceration in jail or prison for these repealed sentence enhancements. [See] People v. Rhodius (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1050, 1062; PC 667.5.
Fourth Holding: An abstract of judgment is not the judgment of conviction; it does not control if different from the trial court’s oral judgment and may not add to or modify the judgment it purports to digest or summarize. [See] People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185.
Fifth Holding: Penal Code 1172.75 affords relief when the sentence enhancement was imposed but the punishment on the enhancement was stricken. [See] People v. Rhodius (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1050; PC 1172.75.
Sixth Holding: An appellate court reviews the trial court’s ruling, not its reasoning, and will affirm on any correct ground. [See] People v. Battle (2021) 11 Cal.5th 749, 800.
Seventh Holding: The abstract may be corrected at any time when it does not reflect the oral pronouncements. [See] People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185.
Case: 000094
The defendant challenges his sentence on the ground it violates Penal Code section 654. We agree that the course of criminal conduct in two of the counts was indivisible, and the trial court should have stayed execution of the sentence on one of them. We will remand the matter to the trial court to correct the sentence. In all other respects, we affirm.
Holding: When a defendant’s single course of conduct violates two criminal statutes, the defendant may be convicted of both crimes, but may only be sentenced on one. [See] PC 654; People v. Jones (2012) 54 Cal.4th 350, 358–359.