Holy Sky, Matban!
This will be the summary. I think I need a book of clever transitions if I’m going to try to say something different before each digest. I could get a book that lists a thousand intros, and then save everyone some time just by typing its number instead of my saying anything at all. Hmm.
Well, till then:
Summary of Summaries
Victims can’t be given a windfall by way of restitution orders.
A court has no jurisdiction ex nihilo to change the original award of credit for time served based on a CDCR analyst’s letter suggesting there was error.
Notices of appeal have jurisdictional time limits, so calendar accordingly.
An officer can’t simply turn a hunch into reasonable suspicion to detain.
Case: 000083
The amount of the victim restitution order must be amended, the restitution collection fee must be stricken.
First Holding: Victims are entitled to an amount of restitution so as to make them whole but not more than their actual losses arising out of the defendant’s criminal conduct. Restitution is not intended to provide the victim with a windfall. Although the court’s discretion in setting the amount of restitution is broad, and it may use any rational method of fixing the amount of restitution as long as it is reasonably calculated to make the victim whole, here the court awarded the victim what amounts to a windfall. [See] People v. Nichols (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 330, 342; People v. Baker (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 463, 470.
Second Holding: The 10 percent restitution collection fee is unenforceable and uncollectible and any portion of a judgment imposing those costs shall be vacated. [See] PC 1465.9; People v. Greeley (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 609, 625.
Case: 000084
The trial court did not have jurisdiction to amend earlier (erroneous) pronouncements on credit for time served, and the appellate court left in place the uncorrected credit for time served even though it gave him more conduct credit than he was entitled to. The appellate court treated the defendant’s appeal as a petition for writ of habeas corpus, because there was no right to appeal from an order that the trial court had no jurisdiction to make. The California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation clerk’s letter saying there was an error in the award of credit for time served does not constitute a request by CDCR to resentence the defendant under section 1172.1. As the judgment was already final, the trial court had no jurisdiction to change the judgment, even though erroneous. The superior court was directed to amend the abstract of judgment to reflect that the prior sentence as reflected in the original abstract of judgment is reinstated including the awarding of the custody credits.
First Holding: The court may treat an appeal as a petition for writ of habeas corpus. [See] People v. Singleton (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 783.
Second Holding: Unlike a letter from the California Department of Correction and Rehabilitation Secretary or their authorized representative expressly requesting recall and resentencing, a letter from a CDCR analyst recommending the court to review its file does not confer jurisdiction under section 1172.1 to vacate or modify a sentence notwithstanding the long-standing practice of treating such letters as a jurisdictional basis. [See] People v. Singleton (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 783, 787.
Third Holding: Under the general common law rule, a trial court is deprived of jurisdiction to resentence a criminal defendant once execution of the sentence has commenced. Once the case is final, the court can modify the sentence only if the court has jurisdiction under section 1172.1 or another authorizing statute, or by the filing of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, or to correct a clerical error, or to modify an unauthorized sentence when the error is apparent from the record. [See] People v. Codinha (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 976, 990; People v. Karaman (1992) 4 Cal.4th 335, 344; People v. Singleton (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 783, 788, 791.
Case: 000085
This habeas petition seeks a belated appeal from a judgment rendered in the superior court. Petitioner urges this court to apply the constructive filing doctrine to permit such a belated filing. n response to this court’s request to file an informal response, the Attorney General does not oppose petitioner’s requested relief. Pursuant to the Attorney General’s response, this court may grant relief without further proceedings. (People v. Romero (1994) 8 Cal.4th 728, 740, fn. 7.) In addition to the Attorney General’s nonopposition, petitioner demonstrates to this court’s satisfaction that his forthcoming notice of appeal should be deemed timely filed under the constructive filing doctrine. (In re Benoit (1973) 10 Cal.3d 72.) We accordingly grant petitioner’s request to file a belated notice of appeal. [GARY NOTE: The issue is fairly straightforward and there was not much discussion. I have taken the liberty of adding “holdings” and authorities for educational purposes.]
First Holding: Habeas relief can determine whether a notice of appeal should be deemed timely constructively filed [See] In re Benoit (1973) 10 Cal.3d 72.
Second Holding: [GARY NOTE: In felony cases, the notice must be filed within 60 days.] [See] [GARY NOTE: Rule 8.308. Time to appeal. (a) Normal time. Except as provided in (b) or as otherwise provided by law, a notice of appeal and any statement required by Penal Code section 1237.5 must be filed within 60 days after the rendition of the judgment or the making of the order being appealed. Except as provided in rule 8.66, no court may extend the time to file a notice of appeal. (b) Cross-appeal. If the defendant or the People timely appeals from a judgment or appealable order, the time for any other party to appeal from the same judgment or order is either the time specified in (a) or 30 days after the superior court clerk sends notification of the first appeal, whichever is later. c) Premature notice of appeal. A notice of appeal filed before the judgment is rendered or the order is made is premature, but the reviewing court may treat the notice as filed immediately after the rendition of judgment or the making of the order. (d) Late notice of appeal. The superior court clerk must mark a late notice of appeal “Received [date] but not filed,” notify the party that the notice was not filed because it was late, and send a copy of the marked notice of appeal to the district appellate project.]
Third Holding: [GARY NOTE: In misdemeanor appeals, the notice must be filed within 30 days.] [See] [GARY NOTE: Rule 8.393. Time to appeal. A notice of appeal under this article must be filed within 30 days after the rendition of the judgment or the making of the order being appealed.]
Fourth Holding: [GARY NOTE: An untimely notice of appeal divests the appellate court of jurisdiction to hear the appeal. [See] [GARY NOTE: In re G.C. (2020) 8 Cal.5th 1119]; [GARY NOTE: People v. Mendez (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1084, 1094, An untimely notice of appeal is `wholly ineffectual: The delay cannot be waived, it cannot be cured by nunc pro tunc order, and the appellate court has no power to give relief, but must dismiss the appeal on motion or on its own motion.]
Case: 000086
The defendant appeals from the trial court’s order denying his motion to suppress evidence, contending the court erred when it found police officers had reasonable suspicion to detain him. Because we have concluded there was insufficient evidence that defendant’s conduct, when considered in the totality of circumstances, supported a reasonable suspicion that he was, or was about to be, engaged in activity relating to crime, we agree with defendant that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to detain him. Accordingly, the subsequent recovery of the handgun was the product of an illegal detention and arrest and evidence related to the recovery was subject to exclusion. [GARY NOTE: The facts relied on by the court are too extensive to adequately summarize. Essentially, the officer saw a group of people milling about. When some appeared to notice him, they ran off, though the defendant and one other did not run off. The officer described various body movements and claimed to have seen something that was not borne out by the appellate court’s review of the body cam video.]
First Holding: The Fourth Amendment permits an officer to initiate a brief investigative stop when the officer has a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity. [Although a mere hunch does not create reasonable suspicion, the level of suspicion the standard requires is considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence, and obviously less than is necessary for probable cause. Because it is a less demanding standard, reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause. The standard depends on the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act. Courts cannot reasonably demand scientific certainty where none exists. Rather, they must permit officers to make commonsense judgments and inferences about human behavior. [See] Kansas v. Glover (2020) 589 U.S. 376, 380–381; People v. Flores (2024) 15 Cal.5th 1032, 1041.
Second Holding: The officer’s subjective suspicion must be objectively reasonable, and an investigative stop or detention predicated on mere curiosity, rumor, or hunch is unlawful, even though the officer may be acting in complete good faith. [See] People v. Wells (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1078, 1083.
Third Holding: In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, we defer to that court’s factual findings, express or implied, if they are supported by substantial evidence. We exercise our independent judgment in determining whether, on the facts presented, the search or seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. In doing so we do not consider each fact in isolation. Instead, we must consider the totality of the circumstances—the whole picture. [See] People v. Flores (2024) 15 Cal.5th 1032, 1043.